原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.ltaaa.com 翻譯：阿煌看什么 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


Keegan McNamara is a data scientist and venture partner for Contrary Capital studying mathematics at CU Boulder. He can be reached on Twitter.
video games are ubiquitous. Nearly 70% of Americans play on some sort of device. People between the ages of 15–20 collectively spent over eight billion hours playing Fortnite in 2018. While that number is nearly double the roughly 4.2 billion man-hours spent on the Apollo mission, it’s trivial compared to the total time humanity has spent playing video games in general.

基根 · 麥克納馬拉，數(shù)據(jù)科學(xué)家，Converst Capital風(fēng)險(xiǎn)合伙人，在加州大學(xué)博爾德分校學(xué)習(xí)數(shù)學(xué)。
電子游戲無處不在，將近70% 的美國人用某種設(shè)備來玩。2018年，15-20歲的年輕人總共花費(fèi)了超過80億小時(shí)玩《堡壘之夜》。 雖然這個(gè)數(shù)字幾乎是阿波羅任務(wù)花費(fèi)的大約42億小時(shí)的兩倍，但與人類花費(fèi)在玩電子游戲上的總時(shí)間相比，這個(gè)數(shù)字微不足道。

That’s a lot of human potential, being spent on something of questionable value. The traditional justification for seemingly harmful or non-productive behaviors is that people have an individual right to freely choose how to spend their time. But the decisions involved in gaming are often far from rational or even individual. Many video games increasingly take advantage of instinctual psychological drives, routing around higher reflection to create addicting escape experiences for people who find real life increasingly frustrating and unrewarding.

人類的潛力是巨大的，但花費(fèi)在值得懷疑的東西上。對(duì)于看似有害或非生產(chǎn)性的行為的傳統(tǒng)理由是，人們有自由選擇如何度過時(shí)間的個(gè)人權(quán)利。 但是，游戲中涉及的決策往往不是理性的，甚至不是個(gè)人能決定的。許多電子游戲越來越多地利用本能的心理驅(qū)動(dòng)，繞過更高層次的反思，為那些認(rèn)為現(xiàn)實(shí)生活越來越令人沮喪和無回報(bào)的人，創(chuàng)造著迷的逃避體驗(yàn)。

The international video game industry is a compelling profit engine—it generated $135 billion in revenue in 2018. U.S. gamers spent $36 billion on content, which includes the games themselves and in-game purchases. It’s a behemoth industry, and is growing steadily at a rate of roughly $10 billion per year. The incentive for psychological optimization of games by developers and companies is obvious solely from the numbers. That incentive has existed since the early ’70s when the commercialization of games first began.

國際電子游戲產(chǎn)業(yè)是一個(gè)引人注目的利潤引擎，2018年創(chuàng)造了1350億美元的收入。美國游戲玩家在游戲內(nèi)容上花費(fèi)了360億美元，其中包括游戲本身和游戲內(nèi)購買。這是一個(gè)龐大的產(chǎn)業(yè)，正以每年大約100億美元的速度穩(wěn)步增長。 游戲開發(fā)商和公司對(duì)游戲進(jìn)行心理優(yōu)化的動(dòng)機(jī)，完全來自于這些數(shù)字。自從70年代早期游戲開始商業(yè)化以來，這種激勵(lì)機(jī)制就一直存在。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


Prior to early commercialization, the developers who created the first video games in the 1950s and ’60s were computer hobbyists exploring what was possible. They weren’t profit-motivated, and their games were relatively low production value. Early influential games like Tennis for Two and Spacewar! were free. As commercialization set in during the early ’70s, gaming transitioned from a programmer’s hobby to a true industry. With that transition, some games surged in popularity. Pong and its clones are perhaps the first examples of video game virality, but Tank, Frogger, Donkey Kong, Pac-Man and Space Invaders also achieved widespread commercial and cultural success in the ’70s.

早期的商業(yè)化之前，在20世紀(jì)50年代和60年代發(fā)明了第一個(gè)電子游戲的開發(fā)者是計(jì)算機(jī)愛好者，他們探索著什么是可能的。他們沒有盈利動(dòng)機(jī)，而且他們的游戲產(chǎn)值相對(duì)較低。早期有影響力的游戲，如《雙人網(wǎng)球》和《太空大戰(zhàn)》這些新奇玩意兒是免費(fèi)的。在70年代早期，隨著商業(yè)化的到來，游戲從程序員的愛好轉(zhuǎn)變成了一個(gè)真正的產(chǎn)業(yè)。隨著這種轉(zhuǎn)變，一些游戲大受歡迎?！镀古摇泛退目寺“姹疽苍S是電子游戲病毒式傳播的第一個(gè)例子，但《坦克》、《青蛙過河》、《大金剛》、《吃豆人》和《太空入侵者》在70年代也獲得了廣泛的商業(yè)和文化上的成功。

As the industry iterated on the successes of the ’70s, developers started to notice specific psychological effects that drove popularity in their games, and they began to intentionally embed those effects to drive demand. One of the most important concepts in the industry to emerge during this time was the compulsion loop. In a very general sense, loops are sequences of actions that organisms will reliably repeat to gain rewards. Obvious examples from the animal kingdom are things like having sex and consuming food, but in the gaming domain, loops are sequences of actions within games that players will reliably repeat to get a rewarding experience—the rush when Candy Crush colors connect and pop in a dazzling animation, or when the “Head Shot: +150” badge flashes across the screen after a Call of Duty player manages to excavate the brain of another. Loops are fundamental to understanding how game designers and developers harness the psychological tendencies of the players. Along with other gamification tactics, loops began to become more and more widespread in the ’70s and ’80s, and can be readily recognized in games like the aforementioned Frogger, Pac-Man, and Donkey Kong.

隨著70年代游戲行業(yè)的成功，開發(fā)者開始注意到一些特殊的心理效應(yīng)，這些心理效應(yīng)推動(dòng)了游戲的流行，于是他們開始有意識(shí)地嵌入這些效應(yīng)，以推動(dòng)需求。在這個(gè)時(shí)期產(chǎn)業(yè)中出現(xiàn)的最重要的概念之一就是強(qiáng)制循環(huán)。 在一個(gè)非常普遍的意義上，循環(huán)是生物體為了獲得回報(bào)而可靠重復(fù)地進(jìn)行一系列動(dòng)作。在動(dòng)物世界的明顯例子是交配和吃東西，但在游戲領(lǐng)域，玩家重復(fù)循環(huán)游戲中的一系列動(dòng)作，以獲得獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)——當(dāng)《糖果傳奇》的顏色在炫目的動(dòng)畫中連接并彈出，或者當(dāng)《使命召喚》的玩家對(duì)另一個(gè)玩家爆頭后，“爆頭：+ 150”的徽章就會(huì)在屏幕上出現(xiàn)?！把h(huán)”是理解游戲設(shè)計(jì)者和開發(fā)者如何利用玩家的心理傾向的基礎(chǔ)。隨著其他游戲化策略，“循環(huán)”在70年代和80年代開始變得越來越普遍。

By the time the ’90s and early 2000s rolled around, the Internet had achieved mass adoption, and gaming devices had become many orders of magnitude more powerful. Using the connectivity afforded by the Internet and the power made available by innovations in computer hardware, developers were capable of simulating more life-like environments and complex interactions between human players; the Wolfenstein and Call of Duty franchises were pioneers in 3-dimensional graphics and online gaming. As games became more advanced, though, so too did the gamification techniques.

到了20世紀(jì)90年代和21世紀(jì)初，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)得到了廣泛的應(yīng)用，游戲設(shè)備性能和數(shù)量級(jí)也變得越來越強(qiáng)大。利用互聯(lián)網(wǎng)提供的連通性和計(jì)算機(jī)硬件創(chuàng)新帶來的能力，開發(fā)人員能夠模擬更逼真的環(huán)境和人類玩家之間復(fù)雜的互動(dòng)；《德軍總部系列》和《使命召喚》是3D圖像和在線游戲的先行者。隨著游戲越來越先進(jìn)，游戲化技術(shù)也越來越發(fā)達(dá)。

Mobile gaming was born in the same period, with the advent of miniaturized devices capable of doing what previously required large workstations. Ports of simple games like Snake and Tetris existed in early Nokia phones, but when the first iPhone arrived, the App Store and an explosion of mobile game consumption quickly followed. Titles like Angry Birds, Plants vs. Zombies, and Temple Run came to dominate. Fast-forward to 2018, and gaming purchases on smartphones and tablets accounted for 47% of the gaming industry’s total revenue. The average U.S. gamer spent 29% of their gaming time on a mobile or tablet device.

移動(dòng)游戲誕生于同一時(shí)期，隨著微型設(shè)備的出現(xiàn)，能夠完成以前大型設(shè)備的工作。早期的諾基亞手機(jī)中就有像《貪吃蛇》和《俄羅斯方塊》這樣的簡單游戲，但是當(dāng)?shù)谝淮?iPhone 出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候，App Store 和手機(jī)游戲消費(fèi)緊接著爆炸式增長。像《憤怒的小鳥》、《植物大戰(zhàn)僵尸》和《神廟奔跑》這樣的游戲開始占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位?？爝M(jìn)到2018年，智能手機(jī)和平板電腦上的游戲購買量占到了游戲行業(yè)總收入的47%。美國玩家平均花費(fèi)29% 的游戲時(shí)間在移動(dòng)設(shè)備或平板電腦上。

Mobile games have come to permeate the small pieces of time when people aren’t actively engaged by their lives—quick levels of Candy Crush in line at the grocery store, or 20-minute-long sessions raiding enemy bases in Clash of Clans while on lunch break. Freemium games abound, with stimulating visual rewards for in-game achievements, and gambling-like environments to get their users to spend real money. Mobile games offer a low-commitment alternative to console and desktop games, but provide the same artificial accomplishments, skill progressions, and sedentary adventure.

當(dāng)人們沒有積極參與到現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中的時(shí)候，手機(jī)游戲就已經(jīng)開始滲透到生活中的一些小片段中——在雜貨店里排隊(duì)時(shí)，玩一會(huì)兒《糖果傳奇》 ，或者在午休時(shí)間在《部落沖突》中花20分鐘的時(shí)間突襲敵軍基地。免費(fèi)增值游戲比比皆是，游戲中的成就可以得到視覺上的刺激獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，還有類似賭博的環(huán)境可以讓用戶用真金白銀來消費(fèi)。移動(dòng)游戲提供了一個(gè)低投入的游戲機(jī)和桌面游戲的替代品，但提供同樣的人工成就，技能升級(jí)，和久坐的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

Game developers aren’t necessarily malicious or even conscious in using techniques to make their games more psychologically compelling. The practice has evolved over the course of the industry’s maturation to become more of an inherent feature of video games than an intentional one. Firms now struggle to make money unless they use state-of-the-art psychological techniques in their games, and it’s hard to even imagine what it would mean for a video game to be fun if it didn’t involve some loop of challenge and reward. There’s a reason the brain is attracted to such activities: in reality, loops of skill-improvement, challenge, and reward are the substance of a successful life.

游戲開發(fā)者并不一定是惡意的，甚至在使用技術(shù)，讓他們的游戲更具心理吸引力方面也沒有意識(shí)。 隨著游戲行業(yè)的成熟，這種做法已經(jīng)演變成為電子游戲的一個(gè)固有特征，而不是有意為之的。現(xiàn)在的公司很難賺錢，除非他們?cè)谟螒蛑惺褂米钕冗M(jìn)的心理技術(shù)。如果一個(gè)電子游戲不包含一些挑戰(zhàn)和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的循環(huán)，那么它將意味著什么。大腦被這些活動(dòng)所吸引是有原因的：在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，技能提高、挑戰(zhàn)和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的循環(huán)是成功生活的基礎(chǔ)。

In a way, what video games do is provide an alternate, simulated environment that is more psychologically palatable and seemingly rewarding—where success is less demanding than real life. A few game developers strive to limit addictive mechanics and give their games artistic or intellectual content, but most don’t.
在某種程度上，電子游戲所做的是提供一種替代的、虛擬的環(huán)境，這種環(huán)境在心理上更可接受，而且似乎也更有回報(bào)ーー在這種環(huán)境中，成功的要求比現(xiàn)實(shí)生活還要低。 一些游戲開發(fā)者努力限制令人著迷的機(jī)制，給他們的游戲增加藝術(shù)或智力方面的內(nèi)容，但大多數(shù)人并不這樣做。
For someone whose real life isn’t otherwise engaging them with a stream of surmountable challenges, skill growth, and rewarding victories, it’s easy to understand the draw of escape into virtual worlds that do. For some young men, video games have even displaced having a job. It’s not terribly surprising that this has happened just as a stagnant economy and extreme competition has put respected, decent-paying jobs, and participation in rewarding social fabric, increasingly out of reach. If the challenge of real social participation becomes increasingly inaccessible, some proportion will decide not to bother at all.

對(duì)于那些在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中，無法參與一系列可以克服的挑戰(zhàn)、技能成長和有回報(bào)的勝利的人來說，很容易理解逃入虛擬世界的吸引力。對(duì)于一些年輕人來說，電子游戲甚至取代了工作。當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯和極端的競爭，使得受人尊敬、待遇體面和有回報(bào)的工作，變得越來越遙不可及時(shí)，這種情況的發(fā)生，也就不足為奇了。如果現(xiàn)實(shí)的社會(huì)參與挑戰(zhàn)變得越來越難以接近時(shí)，一部分人就會(huì)決定不去操心。

One gamification tactic that started emerging in the ’90s and 2000s was human-vs.-human competition. It’s one of the core components for a game to get on a breakout path to rapid success. For a modern example, consider Fortnite—Fortnite’s first version was a game whose core mechanic was players fighting against computer-controlled enemies. It flopped. The next game mode they implemented, a multiplayer battle royale, had the psychological hooks necessary to draw in 125 million players in less than a year and propel Fortnite’s ascent to becoming the most successful free-to-play game in the history of the industry. Human-vs.-human competition introduces a high-stakes arena that would’ve been unimaginable to the early game developers of the ’70s.

在上世紀(jì)90年代和本世紀(jì)頭十年開始出現(xiàn)的一種游戲化策略就是：人 vs 人，人與人的競爭。它是游戲走向快速成功的關(guān)鍵要素之一。舉個(gè)現(xiàn)代的例子，想想堡壘之夜，它的第一個(gè)版本的游戲模式的核心機(jī)制是玩家與電腦控制的敵人作戰(zhàn)，結(jié)果以失敗告終了。他們實(shí)現(xiàn)的下一個(gè)游戲模式是多人大逃殺，然而在不到一年的時(shí)間里就吸引了1.25億玩家，推動(dòng)堡壘之夜成為該行業(yè)歷史上最成功的免費(fèi)游戲。人與人競爭引入了一個(gè)高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的競技場，這對(duì)于70年代的早期游戲開發(fā)者來說是不可想象的。

Competing against other humans is psychologically intense and rewarding. It isn’t just a solitary activity, but a social one. When you beat another person in a game, it subconsciously becomes a story about your relative social status. If you win, you’re better than they are. If you lose, you need to try harder to keep up, or lose respect. Recreational Rocket League player turned professional, Squishy Muffinz, describes the effects such intense psychological dynamics had on him

與其他人競爭，在心理上是激烈而有益的。這不僅僅是一個(gè)單獨(dú)的活動(dòng)，而是一個(gè)社交活動(dòng)。當(dāng)你在游戲中擊敗另一個(gè)人時(shí)，“與人競爭”下意識(shí)地變成了一個(gè)關(guān)于你相對(duì)社會(huì)地位的事了。如果你贏了，你就比他們強(qiáng)。如果你輸了，你需要更加努力地跟上，否則就會(huì)失去尊重。娛樂性質(zhì)的火箭聯(lián)盟球員變成了職業(yè)球員，Squishy Muffinz，描述了這種強(qiáng)烈的心理動(dòng)力對(duì)他的影響

Another effect of imbuing games with human-vs.-human competition is the emergence of a positive feedback system that incentivizes players to dedicate more and more hours to honing their skills. For any given competitive game, there is a range of natural talent. Natural talent, though, only accounts for so much of any given player’s success in the competitive arena—a far better predictor is aggregate time spent playing. Many games employ a numerical Match Making Ranking (MMR) system to measure the skill of players relative to their peers, which makes it easy to test for a potential correlation between skill and time spent playing. An informal survey taken of Rocket League players shows a positive exponential relationship between a player’s MMR and aggregate time.

在游戲中加入人與人競爭的另一個(gè)效果是出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)正反饋系統(tǒng)，激勵(lì)玩家投入越來越多的時(shí)間來磨練自己的技能。對(duì)于任何特定的競爭游戲，都有一系列的天賦。然而，天賦只是玩家在競技場中成功的一部分因素而已，一個(gè)更好的指標(biāo)是總游戲時(shí)間。許多游戲都采用數(shù)值匹配排名（mmr）系統(tǒng)來衡量玩家相對(duì)于同齡人的技能，這使得測試技能與游戲時(shí)間之間的潛在相關(guān)性變得很容易。一項(xiàng)對(duì)火箭聯(lián)盟球員的非正式調(diào)查顯示，球員的mmr與總時(shí)間呈指數(shù)正相關(guān)。

For professionals, this relationship is at its worst—moving up in the rankings by a few spots requires hundreds of additional hours of gameplay. And although the number of professional gamers relative to the total number of players is small, the influence of a professional scene on a game’s broader community can be significant. In games like Fortnite, CS:GO, and Dota 2 where professional scenes exist, one’s competitive ability is exceedingly important even among more casual players in the game’s community. This status competition creates an arms race in time spent. It’s a normal occurrence for players in the professional scene for any given game to routinely devote 10+ hours each day to training and playing

但對(duì)于職業(yè)場景來說，這種關(guān)系是最糟糕的——排名上升幾個(gè)名次需要額外的數(shù)百個(gè)小時(shí)的游戲時(shí)間。盡管職業(yè)游戲玩家的數(shù)量相對(duì)于普通玩家總數(shù)來說是很小的，但是一個(gè)職業(yè)游戲場景對(duì)于一個(gè)游戲更廣泛的社區(qū)的影響卻是巨大的。在像堡壘之夜、CS:GO和Dota 2這樣存在職業(yè)場景的游戲中，一個(gè)人的競爭能力非常重要，即使對(duì)游戲社區(qū)中的休閑玩家來講也是如此。這種地位競爭造成了消耗時(shí)間上的軍備競賽。對(duì)于職業(yè)玩家來說，每天花10個(gè)多小時(shí)訓(xùn)練和比賽是很正常的事情。

Not only does gaming provide a natural mechanism for people to spend a lot of time on gaming, but the profit incentive on the part of the developers also pushes them to positively reinforce that mechanism. A profit-motivated developer not only embeds human-vs.-human competitive loops into games, but also invests heavily in developing a professional-level competitive landscape. By providing a hierarchical structure that players can use to compete with one another and ascend on their way to obtaining the glory and riches given to the pros, developers can increase the amount of time and money that players spend in-game.

游戲不僅為人們提供了一個(gè)在游戲上打發(fā)大量時(shí)間的自然機(jī)制，而且開發(fā)商的利潤動(dòng)機(jī)也促使他們積極地加強(qiáng)這種機(jī)制。一個(gè)以盈利為目的的開發(fā)商不僅僅在游戲中嵌入了人與人之間的競爭，也大量投資于發(fā)展一個(gè)職業(yè)水平的競爭環(huán)境。通過提供一個(gè)等級(jí)結(jié)構(gòu)，玩家可以利用這個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)來相互競爭，并在獲得榮譽(yù)和財(cái)富的道路上繼續(xù)前進(jìn)，開發(fā)商可以增加玩家在游戲中花費(fèi)的時(shí)間和金錢。

Motives to reinforce competitive behavior have led to unprecedentedly large tournament prize pools, such as Epic’s Fortnite World Cup at a total of $30 million—more than Wimbledon’s prize pool in 2015. Despite recent growth, the gaming industry is mostly devoid of large monetary sponsors for events and leagues because of its reputation as a juvenile and low-status activity, compared to something like professional tennis. Most adults don’t look up to professional video game players like they might Roger Federer. At the moment, the largest of such sponsors are primarily gaming-related companies like Twitch, Intel, AMD, Razer, and Corsair, but their check sizes are still minuscule compared to more traditional sports-marketing deals seen in the NFL or MLB. As the industry continues to grow, more and more big-check sponsors will begin pumping money into events and thereby accelerate profit and competition motives. The world of eSports is entering a new age of capital-driven sponsorship and player fame.

加強(qiáng)競爭行為的動(dòng)機(jī)導(dǎo)致了前所未有的大規(guī)模賽事獎(jiǎng)金池，比如Epic的堡壘之夜世界杯，獎(jiǎng)金總額為3000萬美元，超過了2015年溫布爾登足球俱樂部的獎(jiǎng)金池。盡管近年來博彩業(yè)有所增長，但與職業(yè)網(wǎng)球類似的活動(dòng)相比，博彩業(yè)大多缺乏對(duì)游戲賽事和聯(lián)賽的大額贊助，因?yàn)檎J(rèn)為游戲是一種幼稚的、地位低下的活動(dòng)。大多數(shù)成年人不像羅杰 · 費(fèi)德勒那樣仰慕職業(yè)電子游戲玩家。目前，最大的贊助商主要是像 Twitch、 Intel、 AMD、 Razer 和 Corsair 這樣的與游戲相關(guān)的公司，但與 NFL 或 MLB 的傳統(tǒng)體育營銷交易相比，他們的贊助規(guī)模仍然微不足道。 隨著這個(gè)行業(yè)的持續(xù)發(fā)展，越來越多的大贊助商將開始向賽事投入資金，從而加速利潤獲得和競爭動(dòng)機(jī)。電子競技的世界正在進(jìn)入一個(gè)資本驅(qū)動(dòng)的贊助和玩家聲譽(yù)的新時(shí)代。

Rising technological capability and expertise in the video-game industry would seem to lead to a world where many people spend most of their free time and money strapped into VR headsets, to the point of neglecting reality. People already occasionally die playing video games for days straight. They waste years of their lives that they later realize they should have spent studying, planning, and self-improving. They neglect their health and social lives.

電子游戲行業(yè)技術(shù)能力和專業(yè)知識(shí)的不斷提高，似乎會(huì)導(dǎo)致許多人把大部分空閑時(shí)間和金錢都花在虛擬現(xiàn)實(shí)頭戴上，以至于忽視了現(xiàn)實(shí)生活。有人偶爾會(huì)連續(xù)幾天玩電子游戲而猝死。他們浪費(fèi)了多年的時(shí)光，后來才意識(shí)到他們應(yīng)該把時(shí)間花在學(xué)習(xí)、計(jì)劃和自我完善上。他們忽視自己的健康和社會(huì)生活。

These are still relatively speculative problems for most people, but as video games are only slated to become even more compelling, and perhaps as real social life becomes ever less compelling, these trends will continue.

對(duì)于大多數(shù)人來說，這些問題仍然是相對(duì)推測性的問題，但是隨著電子游戲逐漸變得更有吸引力，或許隨著現(xiàn)實(shí)社會(huì)生活變得越來越?jīng)]有吸引力，這些趨勢將會(huì)繼續(xù)下去。

The long-term influence of addictive, competitive loops, and escape from social reality, on the developing brains, skills, and social development of children, especially on a mass scale, remains to be seen. Gamers under the age of 18 constitute 21% of the market, and gamers between the ages of 18 and 35 make up 40% of the market. The majority of players have either grown up in the video game era of the last couple of decades, or are in the process of doing so.

成癮、競爭循環(huán)和逃避社會(huì)現(xiàn)實(shí)對(duì)兒童大腦、技能和社會(huì)發(fā)展的長期影響，尤其是大規(guī)模的影響，仍有待觀察。18歲以下的玩家占市場份額的21% ，18至35歲的玩家占市場份額的40%。大多數(shù)玩家要么是在過去幾十年的電子游戲時(shí)代長大的，要么是這個(gè)過程中長大的。

Little is known about the human brain and how the formation of habits and neural pathways in adolescence can affect long-term social behavior in community participation, family formation, and work life. But among a group of roughly six hundred 8th and 9th graders in Minnesota, those who were classified as addicted to video games self-reported participating in more physical fights, starting more arguments with friends and teachers, and receiving lower grades than their non-addicted peers. It could be that video games are causing psychological problems, or it could be that kids who have more social problems find the addictive escape of video games more compelling. Either way, it indicates a relationship between video game addiction and social pathology. This study was done back in the early 2000s, meaning these children now find themselves in that 18–35 age bracket.

關(guān)于人類大腦以及青春期習(xí)慣和神經(jīng)通路的形成，如何影響社區(qū)參與、家庭組成和工作生活，我們知之甚少。但是，在明尼蘇達(dá)州大約600名8年級(jí)和9年級(jí)的學(xué)生中，那些被歸類為電子游戲成癮的學(xué)生自我描述說，他們發(fā)生了更多的肢體沖突，與朋友和老師發(fā)生了更多的爭吵，并且比那些沒有成癮的學(xué)生分?jǐn)?shù)更低。這可能是因?yàn)殡娮佑螒蛞鹆诵睦韱栴}，也可能是因?yàn)橛懈嗌缃粏栴}的孩子發(fā)現(xiàn)電子游戲的成癮性逃避更有吸引力。不管怎樣，這表明了電子游戲成癮和社會(huì)病理學(xué)之間的關(guān)系。這項(xiàng)研究是在2000年代早期完成的，這意味著這些孩子現(xiàn)在處于18-35歲的年齡段。

Video games, digital media, and surrounding culture don’t just affect people as individuals, they affect what kind of culture we have. It’s common for technically or artistically oriented young people to say they want to make video games as a career. Roughly three times more American kids want to be vloggers and YouTubers than astronauts. The same survey showed that 56% of kids in China want to grow up to be astronauts, compared to 18% who are captivated by vlogging. How kids spend their time, and therefore what they idealize, isn’t just a matter of individual preferences and harms, but a matter of collective strength and ambitions. America’s collective future perhaps starts to look a bit darker. The 21st century might see significant geopolitical reshuffling influenced in part by these cultural dynamics.

電子游戲、數(shù)字媒體和周圍的文化不僅僅影響個(gè)人，它們還影響我們所擁有的文化。 對(duì)于技術(shù)或藝術(shù)導(dǎo)向的年輕人來說，他們想把制作電子游戲作為職業(yè)是很正常的。想成為視頻博主和油管博主的美國孩子，大約是想成為宇航員的美國孩子的三倍。同樣的調(diào)查中顯示，中國有56% 的孩子希望長大后成為宇航員，相比之下，只有18%的孩子迷戀拍攝視頻vlog。孩子們?nèi)绾味冗^他們的時(shí)間，因此他們理想化的東西，不僅僅是個(gè)人喜好和危害的問題，而是集體力量和雄心的問題。 美國的集體未來可能開始變得更加黑暗，21世紀(jì)可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)重大的地緣政治重組，部分原因是受到這些文化動(dòng)態(tài)的影響。

The social reorientation towards video game culture makes it even harder to participate in non-virtual social life for many people, exacerbating the low quality of social life that drives much of the demand for video games in the first place. Why go out when everyone else is at home playing video games or watching Netflix?

社會(huì)對(duì)電子游戲文化的重新定位，使得許多人更難參與現(xiàn)實(shí)社交生活，從而加劇了社交生活質(zhì)量低下的問題，而正是這些問題首先推動(dòng)了對(duì)電子游戲的大量需求。當(dāng)其他人都在家玩電子游戲或者看Netflix的時(shí)候，為什么還要出門去呢？

This general problem isn’t unique to video games. Activities like traditional sports, alcohol-oriented bar and club culture, gambling, sexual subcultures, and other forms of entertainment have existed in all civilizations. They at times get out of control to antisocial levels. But mostly they are kept well-regulated by social norms and laws that limit their downsides and cultivate their upsides, and by competition from more productive activities. This process can be thought of as a sort of “domestication” on the activities in question. Athletic sports and alcohol are mostly domesticated. Video games, being new, are still a wild west of exploration and exploitation.

這個(gè)普遍的問題并不是電子游戲獨(dú)有的。傳統(tǒng)體育活動(dòng)、酒吧文化、俱樂部文化、賭博、性的亞文化和其他形式的娛樂活動(dòng)，在所有文明中都存在。他們有時(shí)會(huì)失控到反社會(huì)的程度，但大多數(shù)情況下，他們受到社會(huì)規(guī)范和法律的良好管理，這些規(guī)范和法律限制了他們的缺點(diǎn)，培育了他們的優(yōu)點(diǎn)，并受到更具生產(chǎn)力的活動(dòng)的競爭。這個(gè)過程可以被認(rèn)為是對(duì)相關(guān)活動(dòng)的一種“歸化”。體育運(yùn)動(dòng)和飲酒文化大多已經(jīng)馴化了。電子游戲作為一種新興事物，仍然是探索和開發(fā)的狂野西部。

The paternalist stance is often advanced in cases like this where market forces, perhaps unstoppable by anyone except the state, are innovating in a socially harmful direction. The gaming industry is now largely characterized by its use of a form of addiction to drive profits, and there is a strong precedent of preventative measures being instituted for addictive or socially harmful products.

家長式的立場在這樣的情況下往往是先進(jìn)的市場力量，或許除了政府以外，任何人都無法阻止它正朝著有害于社會(huì)的方向進(jìn)行前進(jìn)。 游戲產(chǎn)業(yè)現(xiàn)在很大程度上是利用某種形式的成癮來驅(qū)動(dòng)利潤，并且已經(jīng)有了針對(duì)成癮的或者對(duì)社會(huì)有害的游戲產(chǎn)品，制定預(yù)防措施的先例。

We tolerate many things that aren’t necessarily good for the development of the individual, if they serve some important productive purpose. For example, it’s hard to argue that wage labor is the best system for directly promoting the individual flourishing of most people. We use it because it’s an important part of our economic system, to which we don’t have an easy alternative. The market wage labor system creates enormous wealth for us individually, and organizes our collective labor efforts. Some argue that any voluntary exchange between rational individuals is productive in that it fulfills the preferences of both, but this both neglects any higher social purpose to work other than individual preference fulfillment, and assumes a rationality that in many cases—addictive video games in particular—cannot be justified.

我們?nèi)萑淘S多對(duì)個(gè)人發(fā)展不一定有益的事情，如果它們服務(wù)于某些重要的生產(chǎn)目的的話。例如，很難說雇傭勞動(dòng)，是直接促進(jìn)大多數(shù)人的個(gè)人發(fā)展的最佳制度。我們使用這個(gè)制度，是因?yàn)樗俏覀兘?jīng)濟(jì)體系的重要組成部分，我們沒有簡單的替代方案。市場雇傭勞動(dòng)制度為我們個(gè)人創(chuàng)造了巨大的財(cái)富，并組織了我們的集體勞動(dòng)。 一些人認(rèn)為，理性個(gè)體之間的任何自愿交換都是有生產(chǎn)力的，因?yàn)樗鼭M足了兩者的偏好，但這既忽視了除了滿足個(gè)人偏好之外的任何更高的社會(huì)目的，也假定了在許多情況下，特別是成癮性的電子游戲的不合理。

Many video games exploit irrationality, and lack a more holistic social valuation story. At best, playing video games together promotes some healthy social fabric. Alternately, video games may have social value as a form of real artistic expression. But even these points of value are only a small part of the overall social impact story. Time and human capital spent on video games isn’t really getting us much, socially or individually, in return.

許多電子游戲利用非理性，缺乏更全面的社會(huì)價(jià)值描述。在最好的情況下，一起玩電子游戲可以促進(jìn)一些健康的社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)。另一方面，作為一種真正的藝術(shù)表現(xiàn)形式，電子游戲可能具有社會(huì)價(jià)值。 但即使是這些價(jià)值點(diǎn)，也只是整個(gè)社會(huì)影響的一小部分?；ㄔ陔娮佑螒蛏系臅r(shí)間和人力資本并沒有給我們帶來多少回報(bào)，無論是社交上的還是個(gè)人上的。

The domestication pressure on entertainment norms towards benign productive functionality usually comes from the community and the state. Someone has to think about the big picture, and have the power and incentives to act on that thinking to change how entertaining activities like video games actually work. Individual gamers and developers outside of leadership positions in society just don’t have the power or incentive scope to address these collective questions.

娛樂規(guī)范對(duì)良性生產(chǎn)功能的馴化壓力通常來自社區(qū)和國家。有些人必須考慮全局，并且有能力和動(dòng)力按照這種想法行動(dòng)，從而改變電子游戲等娛樂活動(dòng)的實(shí)際工作方式。社會(huì)中的普通游戲玩家和開發(fā)者沒有能力或動(dòng)機(jī)去解決這些集體問題。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


The main problem might not be with video games at all, but with the weakness of the main social fabric, and lack of opportunities for more purposeful and fulfilling behavior. Obsessive gaming is a cope—an elegant cope that allows players to push further into the back of their minds the fear and reality of years slipping away. It’s elegant because it’s compelling, more socially acceptable than hard drugs, and because there’s still some social fabric. Normal society is failing to provide compelling alternative opportunities to the psychological loops and constructed escape experiences of video games.

主要的問題可能根本不在于電子游戲，而在于主要社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)的薄弱，以及缺乏更有目的和更有成就感的行為的機(jī)會(huì)。沉迷于游戲是一種應(yīng)對(duì)方式，一種優(yōu)雅的應(yīng)對(duì)方式，讓玩家能夠?qū)⒍嗄陙淼目謶趾同F(xiàn)實(shí)推到腦后。它之所以優(yōu)雅，是因?yàn)樗耍扔捕酒犯菀妆簧鐣?huì)接受，還因?yàn)樗匀挥幸恍┥鐣?huì)結(jié)構(gòu)。正常社會(huì)未能為電子游戲的心理循環(huán)和構(gòu)建逃避體驗(yàn)，提供令人信服的替代機(jī)會(huì)。

The fast pace of development of ever more compelling digital media like video games requires a corresponding acceleration of the ability of society to domesticate these behaviors into their most benign and socially helpful variants. That is, like many other problems, the problem of domesticating video games is partially a problem of state and community capacity—the same state capacity that would be needed to fill the holes in the social fabric that drive so much demand for addicting video games in the first place.

電子游戲等越來越引人注目的數(shù)字媒體的快速發(fā)展，要求社會(huì)相應(yīng)地加速馴化這些，使之成為最溫和、最有益于社會(huì)的變體。也就是說，和許多其他問題一樣，馴化電子游戲的問題，在一定程度上是國家和社區(qū)的能力問題，國家能力也是填補(bǔ)社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)中的漏洞所需要的，而這些漏洞正是促使人們沉迷電子游戲的首要原因。

Missouri Senator Josh Hawley’s recent bill to ban loot boxes and certain payment incentives in video games is perhaps an early signal of this kind of state-driven domestication action—though one which also shows how difficult it can be to regulate such hyper-specific practices, and inadequate on its own to tackle the problems with the dynamic profit-driven ecosystem of video game development. But American society is at a historical low point of state capacity and strength of social fabric, so our governing institutions may not recognize the problem and get a jump on it, or have the capacity to intervene successfully.

密蘇里州參議員喬希 · 霍利最近提出了一項(xiàng)法案，禁止在電子游戲中使用戰(zhàn)利品箱和某些支付激勵(lì)的措施，這也許是州政府驅(qū)動(dòng)的馴化行動(dòng)的一個(gè)早期信號(hào)，盡管這也表明，要規(guī)范這種超級(jí)具體的行為是多么困難，而且僅靠這項(xiàng)法案本身不足以解決電子游戲開發(fā)。但是，美國社會(huì)正處于國家能力和社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)力量的歷史低點(diǎn)，所以我們的治理機(jī)構(gòu)可能沒有意識(shí)到這個(gè)問題，也沒有能力進(jìn)行成功的干預(yù)。