美國(guó)應(yīng)該從中國(guó)的歷史中學(xué)到什么經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)？

原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.ltaaa.com 翻譯：回復(fù)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì) 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Feng Xian, former Research Associate at Eurasian Center (2017-2018)
One example is good enough:
Since the Anshi rebellion, the Tang Dynasty experienced a strategic contraction due to the increasing external threat from the Ti...an Empire, Khitan Confederation, Nanzhao country. The Tang Dynasty hence formed a complex relationship with the military zones and legions. On the one hand, the Tang government needed the military zones and legions to confront the external threats. On the other hand, the unreasonable annual salaries and expensive rewards to earn the loyalty of those often disobeyed professional soldiers had become a tremendous financial burden for the central government.
(The soldiers during the period of the mid Tang Dynasty and Five Dynasties Ten Kingdom were known for disobedience, arrogance, aggression. The armors, artifacts and paintings in this period vividly captured the military class’s characteristics and behaviors).
Nowadays, we see a similar trend in the US. Trump is pushing for a strategically global contraction due to the decline of the US hegemony in contrast with the rise of foreign powers (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Turkey, India…). The US is experiencing a great transformation from a universal empire into a nationalist state. However, Trump had to announce a huge increase in the defense budget, including both upgrading & purchasing weapons and increasing the salary of soldiers.
This seems to be controversial and could be interpreted by the liberals as if Trump is going mad once again. Nevertheless, this reflects not Trump’s insanity or “China’s threat” but the political and economic reality of the US.
The reality is American political leaders must earn the support and loyalty of the increasingly influential military faction and class (and the corporate behind). The global Empire with the accumulated history, internal and external interests, has made the military a huge profit craving industry and popularised group which, in my opinion, is strong enough to make the President or any politician get shot by a veteran with “mental issues”. On the other hand, the US’s financial hegemony and “mandate of heaven or manifest destiny”, since manufacturing is gone, are built upon the military hegemony. The US needs the military to preserve its hegemony but the ecosystem of that service and industry do not come for free.
Hence, the US is facing the same dilemma the Tang did with regard to the military faction and class. Soon and later, once the US economy and the government’s budget cannot support that huge spending, the structural conflict would erupt. How to deal with them would be a difficult task for Trump and futural leaders. The good news is at least for now Trump can fire John Bolton and the mad dog when he feels the gap of security policies.
While it is true that one happened in the 8th- 9th centuries, another 2019, there shouldn’t be the discredit to the former as if the experience and lesson are useless. The Tang Dynasty also had a carefully designed and sophisticated bureaucracy, law, monitor, check and balance to restrain the army, generals and soldiers. It was not the institution but obedience to the rule and institution, triggered by internal corruption and external accumulations and environment, went wrong.
The US military already has that trend. The US military not only has a close relationship with the arms industry and lobbyists but experience also a tremendous level of internal corruption. The loose punishment of the Courts-martial on war crime, corruption and sexual assaults of American soldiers also show the institution does not always function as the institutionalism and military nationalization promised (and imagine how will that look like in 10 years later?).
After all, if the institution can magically solve all the problems, then Liberia and Philippines that duplicated the American political system 70 or less than 200 years ago should become developed countries already rather than struggle with poverty or the civil war.
When the military is so capitalized, structurally speaking soldiers’ loyalty and discipline in the long run are questionable. To prepare for the future, I recommend the American scholars and politicians to study the history of the mid-late Tang Dynasty and the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, immediately.

應(yīng)該吸取的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)是：
自安史之亂以來，由于吐蕃帝國(guó)，契丹聯(lián)盟以及南詔國(guó)等外部威脅的持續(xù)加劇，使得唐朝經(jīng)歷了一次戰(zhàn)略收縮。因此，唐朝與軍區(qū)以及軍團(tuán)形成了復(fù)雜的關(guān)系。一方面，唐朝政府需要軍區(qū)和軍團(tuán)來對(duì)抗外部威脅。另一方面，這些專業(yè)士兵相當(dāng)不服從，所以為了獲得他們的忠誠(chéng)，唐朝政府必須向他們提供不合理的薪水和昂貴的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，這就給唐朝中央政府帶來了巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)擔(dān)。
（唐朝中期和五代十國(guó)期間的士兵以不服從，自大和好斗而聞名。這個(gè)時(shí)期的盔甲，人工制品和繪畫生動(dòng)體現(xiàn)了軍人階級(jí)的特征和行為）。
如今，美國(guó)出現(xiàn)了類似的趨勢(shì)。相比于其他國(guó)家的崛起（中國(guó)，俄羅斯，伊朗，朝鮮，土耳其，印度等等），美國(guó)的全球霸主地位在衰退，所以美國(guó)的川普在推行全球性的戰(zhàn)略收縮。美國(guó)正從一個(gè)全球帝國(guó)向一個(gè)民族主義的國(guó)家轉(zhuǎn)變。然而，川普不得不提升美國(guó)的軍費(fèi)，包括升級(jí)和購(gòu)買武器，以及增加士兵的工資。
這貌似是富有爭(zhēng)議的，而且自由主義者會(huì)認(rèn)為川普再次瘋狂了。然而，這并不反映川普的瘋狂，也不反映“中國(guó)的威脅”，而是反映了美國(guó)的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)實(shí)。
這個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)就是美國(guó)政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人必須獲得影響力漸長(zhǎng)的軍事派別和階級(jí)（以及它們背后的企業(yè)）的支持和忠誠(chéng)。美國(guó)軍事現(xiàn)在變成了一個(gè)渴望巨大利潤(rùn)的產(chǎn)業(yè)，也變成了一個(gè)大眾化的群體，在我看來，已經(jīng)強(qiáng)大到足以刺殺總統(tǒng)或者任何其他政客。另一方面，隨著制造業(yè)的消失，美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)霸權(quán)和“天命”建立在了軍事霸權(quán)之上。美國(guó)需要軍隊(duì)來保持自己的霸權(quán)地位，但是這種服務(wù)并不是免費(fèi)的。
是的，中國(guó)唐朝是八九世紀(jì)的事情，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)是2019年了，但是我們不應(yīng)該懷疑前者的價(jià)值，不要覺得唐朝的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn)是毫無價(jià)值的。唐朝也擁有一個(gè)精心設(shè)計(jì)和成熟的官僚制度，法律，監(jiān)督，牽制與平衡來限制軍隊(duì)，將軍和士兵。不是制度本身的問題，而是由于內(nèi)部腐敗以及外部環(huán)境的原因，導(dǎo)致軍隊(duì)不遵守規(guī)則和制度。
美軍已經(jīng)有了這種趨勢(shì)。美軍不僅與軍工產(chǎn)業(yè)以及游說團(tuán)體關(guān)系密切，而且內(nèi)部腐敗也非常嚴(yán)重。軍事法庭對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)罪行的放縱，腐敗以及美軍的性騷擾。
畢竟，如果這個(gè)制度可以神奇地解決所有問題，那么70年前以及200年前分別復(fù)制美國(guó)政治制度的利比亞和菲律賓現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該已經(jīng)成為發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家而不是掙扎于貧窮或內(nèi)戰(zhàn)了。
當(dāng)一個(gè)軍隊(duì)變得這么資本化以后，那么從結(jié)構(gòu)上而言，士兵的忠誠(chéng)度和紀(jì)律長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看是有問題的。為了應(yīng)對(duì)將來，我建議美國(guó)學(xué)者和政客學(xué)習(xí)一下中晚期的唐朝歷史以及五代十國(guó)時(shí)期的歷史，馬上。

Amit Jambhale
Chinese empires had no influence outside China. That situation is not with US.

當(dāng)時(shí)的中國(guó)帝國(guó)在中國(guó)之外是沒有任何影響力的。而美國(guó)的影響力遍及全世界。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Ben Tover
But the Tang dynasty cannot print money like the US can. Tang didn’t have a currency everyone
used.

但是唐朝無法像美國(guó)這樣印刷紙幣。唐朝的貨幣并不被所有國(guó)家使用。

Jevin Liu
The United States cannot print money willy nilly either. If they did, they would increase the supply of money, generating inflation, which decreases trust in the currency. Thus, less people demand it and thus its value goes down. It’s a vicious cycle of inflation.

美國(guó)也無法隨意的印刷紙幣，如果美國(guó)這么做了，那么貨幣供應(yīng)會(huì)增加，導(dǎo)致通脹，從而降低美元的信任度。那么人們就會(huì)更少使用美元，美元價(jià)值就會(huì)下降。這是通脹的惡性循環(huán)。

Jansen Junaedi
He is not talking about the money, but budget allocations and its political impact.

他說的不是金錢本身，而是預(yù)算分配及其所產(chǎn)生的政治影響。

Peng XiangPing
Tang Dynasty last about 280 years. It was one of the golden era of Chinese history. Now PRC is trying to return to that level of success in 21st century.

唐朝持續(xù)了大約280年。是中國(guó)歷史上的黃金時(shí)期?，F(xiàn)在中國(guó)也想回歸到那個(gè)時(shí)候的成功水平。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Jansen Junaedi
This looks similar to Late Roman Empire don’t you think?

這看起來很像羅馬帝國(guó)后期，不是嗎？