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(原標(biāo)題)軟實(shí)力超級大國

Global trends in cultural engagement and influence

(副標(biāo)題)全球文化參與與文化影響力變化趨勢

Author: Alistair MacDonald

作者:阿利斯泰爾·麥克唐納

United States
In the Cold War the US was for many ‘the shining city on the hill’, ‘the land of the free’, where it was possible to live out the American Dream that promised affluence for people who worked hard and had talent.

【美國篇】
在冷戰(zhàn)中,美國對很多國家來說是“山巔之城”,是“自由的國度”,在那里是有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)美國夢的,而后者承諾那些努力工作以及有天賦之人能得到富足的生活。

That promise of liberty and success was and remains an essential element of the US’s soft power.

對自由和成功的許諾曾經(jīng)是也依然是美國軟實(shí)力的基本元素。



… there are many elements of soft power where the US is unrivalled. America attracts more international students than any other nation, American culture is globally ubiquitous, and the US sets the pace in tech and digital. If The Soft Power 30 rankings were calculated on obxtive metrics alone, the US would have… the top spot. However, the US finished sixteenth across an average of the polling categories. In many ways the American government and perceptions of US foreign policy tend to be a net detractor for American soft power.

“…在構(gòu)成軟實(shí)力的很多要素上,美國都是無與倫比的。美國吸引的國際學(xué)生比其他任何國家都多,美國文化在全球無孔不入,而且在科技和數(shù)碼領(lǐng)域,都以美國馬首是瞻。如果軟實(shí)力30強(qiáng)排名只計算客觀指標(biāo),美國早就榮登榜首了。然而,美國在各種調(diào)查類別中的平均排名只有第16位。在很多方面,美國政府以及對美國外交政策的看法,往往會對美國的軟實(shí)力帶來凈減損的效果。”

Pointedly, that survey pre-dated the inauguration of President Trump and the blizzard of controversy that has ensued since. To put it another way, ‘there may be little or no relationship between America’s ubiquity and its actual influence today. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not necessarily identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with America’. 26 Indeed familiarity may breed contempt with some audiences appalled by the graphic portrayal of sex and violence of Hollywood’s biggest movies. Others are outright hostile to what they perceive as American cultural imperialism, seeing Americana as a threat to their identity and values.

體現(xiàn)出指向性的是,這項(xiàng)調(diào)查在時間上早于特朗普總統(tǒng)的就職典禮以及緊接著發(fā)生的有關(guān)暴雪公司的爭論。換句話說,‘美國的無孔不入和它今天的現(xiàn)實(shí)影響力之間,也許并不存在什么相關(guān)關(guān)系,甚至是沒有關(guān)系。全世界有數(shù)億人穿美國、聽美國、吃美國、看美國、跳美國,但他們并不一定會因?yàn)檫@些日常生活中的配備而去認(rèn)同美國’。這種真實(shí)存在的親密感,可能會在那些震驚于好萊塢大片中對性和暴力清楚形象描寫的觀眾心中埋下輕蔑的種子。其他人則對他們理解中的美國文化帝國主義懷有徹底的敵意,將美國視為他們身份認(rèn)同和價值觀的威脅。

The lack of a filtering mechanism or set of institutions to act as independent interlocutor between American culture and the diverse audiences of the world at large could be seen as a weakness in the US’s soft power. However, many of the functions of the European cultural relations delivery model are mirrored by the Department of State’s in-house Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) that operates out of the US diplomatic network’s 300 plus embassies and consulates. As this is not an independent or quasi-independent organisation, it has not been possible to map its global presence in the same way as this report has sought to do for other key soft power nations.

在美國文化和各式各樣的全體全球受眾之間,欠缺一種過濾機(jī)制或是一整套能起到獨(dú)立對話者作用的制度,這可以視為是美國軟實(shí)力的一個弱點(diǎn)。然而,歐洲打造文化關(guān)系的模式中,有很多功能,在美國是由國務(wù)院內(nèi)部的教育與文化事務(wù)局(ECA)在發(fā)揮,后者的運(yùn)營依托的是美國外交網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的300多家大使館和領(lǐng)事館。因?yàn)檫@不是一個獨(dú)立或準(zhǔn)獨(dú)立的機(jī)構(gòu),它還不可能用這份報告中其他關(guān)鍵性軟實(shí)力國家尋求訴諸的同樣方式,去繪制其全球存在地圖。



(譯注:馬蒂廣播電視臺總部位于邁阿密,由美國聯(lián)邦政府資助,針對古巴播送西班牙語新聞)

The profile of the new budget that sees cuts to the work of the NED and increases in the already massive defence budget reflects the priority the Trump administration gives to hard power and the seemingly lack of regard for soft power. America has traditionally been viewed as using its power for more than the promotion of its own interests. There has been a belief in many countries that the US has acted to help maintain the rules-based international system and in so doing support a broader common good.

在這份新預(yù)算案中,能發(fā)現(xiàn)NED的工作被削減了,并增加了數(shù)額已經(jīng)很巨大的防務(wù)預(yù)算,反映出特朗普政府的優(yōu)先級放在了硬實(shí)力上,似乎缺乏對軟實(shí)力的注重。傳統(tǒng)上,一直認(rèn)為美國在運(yùn)用其權(quán)勢的時候不只限于促進(jìn)自身利益。很多國家一直都存在一種觀念,即美國為了幫助維護(hù)基于規(guī)則的國際體制一直在采取行動,并以此來撐持更廣泛的共同利益。

The change in tone in Washington, both in terms of defence and economic policy is eroding that reputation and changing the calculations in capitals around the world. This has already had an impact on the choices of prospective students and academics that have traditionally flocked to American universities, for example there was a fall of three per cent in applications to American graduate schools from international students between 2016 and 2017. 31 If this trend continues at a time of growing international student mobility, it will have an impact on the relative financial and intellectual resources of US universities. It will also affect the economy more widely. The nearly one million foreign students attending American higher education institutions contribute $30.5 billion to the American economy. It will also impact on the US’s future connections and networks. Going forward a loss of goodwill could mean states are less likely to give American policies the benefit of the doubt, to believe it is acting as a positive force in global affairs.

華盛頓方面在防務(wù)和經(jīng)濟(jì)政策上的改弦更張,正在削弱這種聲望,并改變著全世界各大首都中發(fā)生的謀算。這已經(jīng)影響到了各自國家的學(xué)生和學(xué)者的選擇,傳統(tǒng)上他們會鎖定美國的大學(xué),比如說,2016至2017年間,國際學(xué)生申請美國研究生院的數(shù)量回落了三個百分點(diǎn)。如果這種趨勢,在一個國際學(xué)生流動性日益加強(qiáng)的時代中延續(xù)下去,就會對美國大學(xué)的財政資源和才智資源產(chǎn)生影響。這還會在更廣泛的層面上影響到美國經(jīng)濟(jì)。差不多有一百萬來美國高等教育機(jī)構(gòu)就學(xué)的外國學(xué)生,他們?yōu)槊绹?jīng)濟(jì)貢獻(xiàn)了350億美元。這還將影響到美國未來的人脈和關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)。聲譽(yù)的繼續(xù)損失可能會意味著:美國在制定政策時不太可能享受到各國因相信美國會在全球事務(wù)中發(fā)揮正面作用而帶來的利好。



The US has always used all available tools for engagement, Roosevelt’s philosophy remains salient, ‘speak softly and carry a big stick’. Peaceful negotiation from a position of strength has been the core of America’s foreign policy successes. It has used hard economic and military power, allied with significant soft power assets to achieve its aims, an approach that Nye and others have referred to as smart power. However, the truly smart thing about American power in the 100 years since Woodrow Wilson’s seminal Fourteen Points speech has been the emphasis on the common good. The US has been at its most influential – and its interests best served – where it has been perceived as acting in the broader interest of the global community. Moving to a zero-sum view of the world risks leaving everyone, but most especially the US itself, worse off.

美國一直都在利用一切可用的交互手段,羅斯福的哲學(xué)仍然是最重要的,“扛著大棒說軟話”。占據(jù)優(yōu)勢地位進(jìn)行和平談判一直是美國外交政策成功的核心。為了達(dá)到其目的,它使用過經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事方面的硬實(shí)力,并結(jié)合上了其重大軟實(shí)力資產(chǎn),這種手法被奈爾和其他人稱為“巧實(shí)力”。然而,自伍德羅·威爾遜帶來深遠(yuǎn)影響的十四點(diǎn)演講發(fā)生后的100年,關(guān)于美國實(shí)力真正巧妙的事情一直都在于強(qiáng)調(diào)共同利益。美國經(jīng)歷過最具影響力且其利益得到最大程度滿足的時代,那時,世界眼中的美國會為了全球社會更廣泛的利益而行事。美國轉(zhuǎn)變成以零和觀點(diǎn)看待世界,將會讓每個人,尤其是美國自身的境況變得更糟。

(譯注:小約瑟夫·塞繆爾·奈爾(英語:Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr.,1937年-),生于美國新澤西州南奧蘭治,政治學(xué)學(xué)者,曾任哈佛大學(xué)約翰·F·肯尼迪政府學(xué)院院長,曾提出軟實(shí)力、巧實(shí)力等外交學(xué)說;伍德羅·威爾遜(Woodrow Wilson)是19世紀(jì)80年代美國學(xué)會會長、普林斯頓大學(xué)的校長,后來成為了美國總統(tǒng),在一戰(zhàn)接近尾聲時的1918年1月8日,威爾遜總統(tǒng)在對國會所發(fā)表的著名演說中提出十四點(diǎn),認(rèn)為這是促進(jìn)世界和平的“唯一”可行的計劃。隨后,這十四點(diǎn)被采用作為和平談判的基礎(chǔ))