為什么中國(guó)的客運(yùn)鐵路系統(tǒng)比美國(guó)的先進(jìn)得多？

原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.ltaaa.com 翻譯：阿煌看什么 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Glenn Luk , Invests in China
Building high-speed rail networks is more about coordination than any sort of underlying technology issues:
* The software and signaling systems used to coordinate hundreds of trains in a rail network are less sophisticated than systems used to coordinate the thousands of planes that are flying in the air at any given moment.
* The technology to accelerate a passenger train using electricity to over 200 mph has been around for a long time. But to do it safely means building very straight tracks.
* The largest cost item in most high-speed rail projects is a result of the need to cut these straight lines through populated areas. Reducing land acquisition costs is all about coordination with local communities along the right-of-way.
* Providing a good transit experience for commuters is about reducing intermodal friction costs. In other words, making the hand-off from long-haul inter-city rail to local transit networks (bus, subway, auto) as seamless as possible. Once again, this involves coordination between state and local officials.
Thus, the decision to invest a massive amount of effort and coordinate resources is really a question of economics: Do the incremental economic benefits of going through this coordination exercise outweigh the costs? And to put it bluntly, the economics of high-speed rail work in China and they don’t work as well in the U.S.
This could change in the future with technology advancements in related areas (e.g. autonomous vehicle technology, proliferation of electric vehicles) but under the current situation, this is the reality that prevails.
In the United States, it costs a lot to build high-speed rail[2]:
* It is expensive and time-consuming to acquire land — that is the price you pay for strong property rights.
* Construction costs are high — that’s the price you pay for being an advanced economy with developed safety laws and regulations.
* Topography may also play a role, depending on the region.
* Cost is not just about money, it is time as well. Authorities are projecting Phase I of the California HSR project to be completed in 2033. Because it takes so long to complete, you have to contend with the double-whammy of delaying the benefits well into the future while dealing with living next to a construction zone for many, many years.
Assuming you can overcome these obstacles and get the rail network built, you then need to contend with the risk of low capacity utilization or ridership:
* Population density is relatively low and even in developed areas, families seem to favor living in low-density “suburban sprawl” type development. Train station design is very different in high-density vs. low-density environments. For example, the amount of space dedicated to parking is significantly higher in suburban environments vs. urban environments.
* The most heavily trafficked and populated corridors in the U.S. are point-to-point vs. web-like networks. Think San Francisco to Los Angeles or Boston to Washington, D.C. Furthermore, the heavily populated coastal regions are separated from each other by thousands of miles of relatively sparsely populated interior. The time savings of high-speed rail tend to get overtaken by air travel around the 400 to 500-mile mark — this is why it doesn’t make much sense to build high-speed rail in Australia either[3].
* Transportation alternatives are well-developed. The incremental time and convenience benefit of HSR in many situations is not that much better than the alternative.
Some of these factors can be solved by time and technology advancement. For example, construction techniques may improve so that it becomes easier to lay track. The country has strong demographics and robust inbound immigration and population density is rising faster than other advanced economies.
But some things are structural in nature: Strong property rights and labor laws are good characteristics that should not be materially changed, in my view.
In China, it is inexpensive to build high-speed rail:
* Land acquisition is easy under China’s authoritarian system. In China, land is ultimately owned by the State and individuals only own “l(fā)and use rights”. For everyday situations, this is not unlike property ownership but if the government needs your land, you have fewer protections — you may get some form of compensation but probably nothing compared to what you would get if you owned the property outright. Your ability to hold up the process will be limited.
* Construction costs are low — China has a large blue-collar labor pool and can leverage economies of scale — like a massive beam-launching machine that was invented for the sole purpose of laying high-speed rail track[4].
* Topography is fairly mild in the places Chinese people have historically tended to congregate and live. This means fewer expensive bridges and tunnels that need to be built (even then, China has still had to build a massive number of these).
* China can move fast. In the time it is projected to build out the 800-km line from San Francisco to Los Angeles, China is planning to complete an entire “8x8” high-speed rail network totaling over 30,000 kilometers that connects nearly every major Chinese city to the grid[5]. Typical lines are completed and operational within 4–5 years of initial planning. In other words, Chinese are able to realize the economic benefits of their construction efforts much, much sooner.
Once Chinese high-speed rail lines were built, they were heavily utilized:
* Population density is high, especially if you exclude two-thirds of the country out west in areas that are mostly desert and mountains and thus, sparsely populated[6].
* Chinese urban development tended to develop in a more web-like design. Web-like rail networks tend to be used more intensively, as it allows for incremental transit traffic to supplement traditional point-to-point traffic. For example, as you can see (if you squint) in the map below, Changsha has become a major transit center as it carries both North-South traffic (Guangzhou to Wuhan) and East-West traffic (to Shanghai).
* Transportation alternatives are less well-developed in still-developing China[7]. For one, fewer people own their own cars. Fewer people can afford air travel. So the cost-value proposition of high-speed rail over the closest long-haul options (e.g. bus, regular trains) is superior in many cases.
* Intermodal friction costs are lower in China. In almost every instance, high-speed rail, local metro and local bus stations are all in the same place. I will note the huge contrast in my first experience taking a Chinese high-speed train and switching to the subway in Nanjing[8] with the experience I have trying to transfer from the NYC Subway to the Airtrain to John F. Kennedy Airport.
Since high-speed rail made economic sense in China — which we are starting to see in the financials of the main company involved in running these networks[9] — it made sense to build a lot of high-speed rail lines and absorb all of the related technologies and know-how that are required to implement it efficiently. People and companies learn through repetition[10] and so it should be entirely unsurprising that Chinese firms developed core capabilities in building and implementing high-speed rail networks.
The net result of these structural differences is that usage of passenger rail (all types, including non-HSR) in China is around 21x that of the United States (1,346 billion[11] passenger-km compared to 63 billion[12]). Adjusting for population, use of passenger rail is still 5x more prent.
I would love to see high-speed rail happen in the U.S. but it has to make economic sense. We have to remember that resources are limited, and allocating resources to one area has an opportunity cost.
For example, perhaps a better use of economic resources is figuring out autonomous driving technology or taking the lead on electric vehicle technology — both of which could solve some of the issues of low-density suburban sprawl.
Perhaps once we solve autonomous driving and/or shift to a more sustainable energy strategy (solar/battery + electric vehicles), the economics of high-speed rail change such that it becomes an attractive option at that point.
And maybe it is not even technology-related change that impacts the economics of high-speed rail. For example, there seems to be a growing trend to live in walkable (i.e. “higher density”) neighborhoods instead of traditional “suburban sprawl” type environments. But these changes happen gradually and take many decades to really play out.
Once the economics of high-speed rail make sense where we can deploy high-speed rail networks at scale, figuring out how to build it will be easy. The underlying technology isn’t rocket science. I have faith we can figure it out out after a few reps.
So just because high-speed rail doesn’t make economic sense today does not mean that it won’t in the future.

在中國(guó)投資
建設(shè)高鐵網(wǎng)絡(luò)更多的是為了協(xié)調(diào)，而不是為了解決任何潛在的技術(shù)問(wèn)題：
* 用于協(xié)調(diào)鐵路網(wǎng)中數(shù)百列車的軟件和信號(hào)系統(tǒng)，不如用于協(xié)調(diào)任何時(shí)間在空中飛行的數(shù)千架飛機(jī)的系統(tǒng)復(fù)雜。
* 利用電力將列車加速到每小時(shí)200英里以上的技術(shù)已經(jīng)存在很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間了。但為了安全起見，這意味著要建造非常直的軌道。
* 在大多數(shù)高鐵項(xiàng)目中，成本最高的項(xiàng)目是需要橫穿人口密集地區(qū)的直線鐵路。降低土地購(gòu)置成本完全取決于與沿線的當(dāng)?shù)厣鐓^(qū)進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)。
* 為通勤者提供良好的交通體驗(yàn)是為了減少多式聯(lián)運(yùn)的摩擦成本。換句話說(shuō)，就是使長(zhǎng)途城際鐵路與地方交通網(wǎng)絡(luò)(公共汽車、地鐵、汽車)盡可能無(wú)縫切換。這又一次涉及到國(guó)家和地方官員之間的協(xié)調(diào)。因此，投入大量精力和協(xié)調(diào)資源的決定，實(shí)際上是一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)問(wèn)題：通過(guò)這種協(xié)調(diào)工作，增加的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益是否超過(guò)成本？坦率地說(shuō)，中國(guó)高鐵的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益很好，而美國(guó)卻不太好。
未來(lái)，隨著相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的技術(shù)進(jìn)步(如無(wú)人機(jī)技術(shù)、電動(dòng)汽車的普及) ，這種情況可能會(huì)發(fā)生改變，但在當(dāng)前形勢(shì)下，這是一個(gè)普遍存在的現(xiàn)實(shí)。
在美國(guó)，修建高鐵的成本很高：
* 購(gòu)置土地既昂貴又費(fèi)時(shí)——這是你為強(qiáng)有力的產(chǎn)權(quán)，所付出的代價(jià)。
* 建造成本高昂——這是發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體擁有成熟的安全法律法規(guī)，所付出的代價(jià)。
* 視地區(qū)而定，地形也可能會(huì)有一定的影響。
* 成本不只是在金錢方面，還有時(shí)間。當(dāng)局預(yù)計(jì)加州高鐵項(xiàng)目的第一階段將于2033年完工。 由于這項(xiàng)工程需要很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間才能完成，你不得不面對(duì)雙重打擊，一方面要把高鐵帶來(lái)的福利延遲到未來(lái)，另一方面又要在一個(gè)建筑工地附近生活很多很多年。
假設(shè)你能克服這些障礙并建成鐵路網(wǎng)絡(luò)，那么你就需要面對(duì)產(chǎn)能利用率或客流量低的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：
* 美國(guó)人口密度較低，即使在發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)，家庭似乎也傾向于生活在低密度的地區(qū)，“郊區(qū)蔓延”式正在發(fā)展中?；疖囌镜脑O(shè)計(jì)在高密度和低密度的環(huán)境中是非常不同的。例如，在郊區(qū)環(huán)境中專門用于停車的空間明顯大于城市環(huán)境。
* 美國(guó)交通最繁忙、人口最密集的走廊是點(diǎn)對(duì)點(diǎn)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)的形式。想想從舊金山到洛杉磯，或者從波士頓到華盛頓特區(qū)。此外，人口密集的沿海地區(qū)與相對(duì)人口稀少的內(nèi)陸地區(qū)，相隔了數(shù)千英里。 在400到500英里的范圍內(nèi)，高速鐵路節(jié)省的時(shí)間比不上航空旅行的時(shí)間，這就是為什么在澳大利亞修建高速鐵路也沒有多大意義的原因。
* 美國(guó)各種交通工具發(fā)展良好。在許多情況下，高鐵節(jié)省的時(shí)間和便利性并不比其他交通工具好多少。其中一些因素可以通過(guò)時(shí)間和技術(shù)的進(jìn)步來(lái)解決。例如，施工技術(shù)可以得到改進(jìn)，使鋪設(shè)軌道變得更加容易。中國(guó)擁有強(qiáng)大的人口結(jié)構(gòu)、強(qiáng)勁的入境移民和人口密度的增長(zhǎng)速度快于其它發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體。但是有些事情是結(jié)構(gòu)性的：在我看來(lái)，強(qiáng)有力的產(chǎn)權(quán)和勞動(dòng)法是積極的特征，不應(yīng)該有實(shí)質(zhì)性的改變。
在中國(guó)，修建高鐵并不昂貴：
* 在中國(guó)的威權(quán)體制下，征地很容易。在中國(guó)，土地歸國(guó)家所有，個(gè)人只擁有“土地使用權(quán)”。 在日常情況下，這與財(cái)產(chǎn)所有權(quán)沒什么不同，但如果政府需要你的土地，你得到的保護(hù)就少了——你可能會(huì)得到某種形式的補(bǔ)償，但與你完全擁有這些財(cái)產(chǎn)相比，可能什么都得不到。
* 建造成本低。中國(guó)擁有龐大的藍(lán)領(lǐng)勞動(dòng)力資源，可以發(fā)揮規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效益，就像發(fā)明了一臺(tái)巨大的梁式起重機(jī)，專門用于鋪設(shè)高速鐵路軌道。
* 中國(guó)人歷來(lái)喜歡聚集和生活地形溫和的地方。這意味著需要修建的昂貴橋梁和隧道將會(huì)減少(即便如此，中國(guó)仍然不得不修建大量這樣的橋梁和隧道)。
* 中國(guó)可以迅速行動(dòng)。按照計(jì)劃，在美國(guó)修建從舊金山到洛杉磯的800公里高鐵線路的同時(shí)，中國(guó)正計(jì)劃完成一個(gè)總長(zhǎng)度超過(guò)3萬(wàn)公里的“8x8”高鐵網(wǎng)絡(luò)，該網(wǎng)絡(luò)幾乎將中國(guó)所有主要城市與電網(wǎng)連接起來(lái)。典型的鐵路線在最初規(guī)劃的4-5年內(nèi)就能完工并投入運(yùn)營(yíng)。換句話說(shuō)，中國(guó)人能夠更快地認(rèn)識(shí)到他們的建設(shè)努力帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。
中國(guó)的高鐵線路一旦建成，就得到了廣泛的利用：
* 中國(guó)人口密度很高，特別是如果你把國(guó)家西部三分之二的地區(qū)排除在外，這些地區(qū)大部分是沙漠和山區(qū)，因此人口稀少。
* 中國(guó)城市發(fā)展趨向網(wǎng)狀設(shè)計(jì)。類似網(wǎng)絡(luò)的鐵路網(wǎng)往往使用得更加頻繁，因?yàn)樗试S增加過(guò)境交通，以補(bǔ)充傳統(tǒng)的點(diǎn)對(duì)點(diǎn)交通。例如，你可以在地圖上看到(如果你瞇著眼睛仔細(xì)看的話) ，長(zhǎng)沙已經(jīng)成為一個(gè)主要的中轉(zhuǎn)中心，因?yàn)樗休d著南北交通(廣州至武漢)和東西交通(至上海)。
* 在仍處于發(fā)展階段的中國(guó)，交通工具的替代品還不夠發(fā)達(dá)。首先，擁有自己汽車的人較少。能夠負(fù)擔(dān)得起飛機(jī)旅行的人也少。因此，在許多情況下，高速鐵路的成本價(jià)值優(yōu)于其他長(zhǎng)途運(yùn)輸選擇(例如公共汽車、普通火車)。
* 中國(guó)的多式聯(lián)運(yùn)成本較低。在幾乎所有的情況下，高速鐵路、當(dāng)?shù)氐罔F和當(dāng)?shù)毓卉囌径荚谕粋€(gè)地方。我記得我第一次乘坐中國(guó)的高速列車在南京轉(zhuǎn)乘地鐵的經(jīng)歷，與我試圖從紐約地鐵轉(zhuǎn)乘飛機(jī)列車到肯尼迪機(jī)場(chǎng)的經(jīng)歷之間存在巨大的反差。
由于高鐵在中國(guó)具有經(jīng)濟(jì)意義(我們開始從運(yùn)營(yíng)這些鐵路網(wǎng)的主要公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況中看到了這一點(diǎn)) ，因此建設(shè)大量高鐵線路、吸收高效實(shí)施所需的所有相關(guān)技術(shù)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)是有意義的。個(gè)人和公司通過(guò)學(xué)習(xí)，因此中國(guó)公司在建設(shè)高速鐵路網(wǎng)絡(luò)方面，發(fā)展出核心能力，也就不足為奇了。
這些結(jié)構(gòu)性差異的最終結(jié)果是，中國(guó)客運(yùn)鐵路(包括非高鐵)的使用量約為美國(guó)的21倍?？紤]到人口因素，客運(yùn)鐵路的使用仍然是普通鐵路的5倍。
我很樂(lè)意看到高速鐵路在美國(guó)建成，但它必須具有經(jīng)濟(jì)意義。我們必須記住，資源是有限的，將資源分配到某個(gè)領(lǐng)域是有成本的。例如，或許更好地利用經(jīng)濟(jì)資源來(lái)研究出自動(dòng)駕駛技術(shù)，或者率先發(fā)展電動(dòng)汽車技術(shù)——這兩者都可以解決一些低密度郊區(qū)擴(kuò)張的問(wèn)題。
也許一旦我們解決了自動(dòng)駕駛或轉(zhuǎn)向更可持續(xù)的能源戰(zhàn)略(太陽(yáng)能 / 電池 + 電動(dòng)汽車) ，高速鐵路的經(jīng)濟(jì)性就會(huì)發(fā)生變化，從而成為一個(gè)有吸引力的選擇。
也許影響高鐵經(jīng)濟(jì)的甚至不是與技術(shù)相關(guān)的變化。例如，似乎越來(lái)越多的人選擇住在適于步行(即“高人口密度”)的社區(qū)，而不是傳統(tǒng)的“郊區(qū)蔓延”式的環(huán)境。但這些變化是逐漸發(fā)生的，需要幾十年的時(shí)間才能真正實(shí)現(xiàn)。
一旦高速鐵路的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益說(shuō)得通了，我們就可以大規(guī)模地部署高速鐵路網(wǎng)絡(luò)，弄清楚如何建設(shè)它將會(huì)變得更容易?；A(chǔ)技術(shù)并不是火箭科學(xué)。我相信我們可以在實(shí)施幾次之后找到答案。
因此，僅僅因?yàn)楦咚勹F路在今天沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)意義，并不意味著它在未來(lái)也不會(huì)有。

Krishna Kumar Subramanian , worked at Air India (1971-2006)
You can immediately detect an American from his/her answer to this question: he/she will play down the achievement: “it’s nothing”, etc.
Laying out detailed maps of China and talk of “straight runs of track” conceals the fact that China is a big exporter of high-speed rail (along with other kinds of railway rolling stock), and competes with Japan.
The point is, some sensible Americans are wondering, too: Is having the know-how for stealth aircraft and advanced nuclear weapons enough?
It is true that their automobile-obsessed society killed the passenger train in the past (air travel also played a big role); Amtrak was formed in 1971 with government funding to have at least one long-distance passenger rail operating in the US. All the private players had walked away.
And Amtrak, even today, remains the ONLY long-distance passenger rail service connecting almost all of America.

在印度航空工作(1971-2006)
你可以從一個(gè)美國(guó)人對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的回答中，馬上看出他/她的態(tài)度：他/她會(huì)貶低這項(xiàng)成就說(shuō)著“這沒什么”等等。攤開詳細(xì)的中國(guó)地圖，談?wù)摗爸本€軌道”，這就掩蓋了一個(gè)事實(shí)，即中國(guó)是高速鐵路(以及其它類型的鐵路車輛)的出口大國(guó)，并與日本展開競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。
關(guān)鍵是，一些明智的美國(guó)人也在思考：擁有隱形飛機(jī)和先進(jìn)核武器的技術(shù)就足夠了嗎？
的確，他們這個(gè)癡迷汽車的社會(huì)在過(guò)去扼殺了客運(yùn)列車(航空旅行也發(fā)揮了很大作用) ; 美國(guó)鐵路公司(Amtrak)成立于1971年，由政府資助，在美國(guó)至少運(yùn)營(yíng)一條長(zhǎng)途客運(yùn)鐵路。所有的私人公司都離開了。
即使在今天，美國(guó)鐵路公司仍然是連接美國(guó)幾乎所有地區(qū)的唯一長(zhǎng)途客運(yùn)鐵路服務(wù)。既然鐵路旅行如此不受重視，誰(shuí)會(huì)投資高鐵呢？
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Joseph Perez , USAF NCO, Teacher, Driver & now Retired
Because in the USA everyone has access to a car, and there is no need for an antiquated concept like Railroad. In China only 64 out of 1000 own a car. They need to put up with the inconvenience of rail travel, long trips just going to the stations, waiting in crowded terminals and trains, and emerging at your final station still many miles from your actual destination.
It doesn’t matter how fast or efficient you make the forgotten old choo choo move, no one in America wants to ride the crappy transportation system that their great grandfather abandoned when he got his first car in the 1920’s.
Why would anyone in America want to go back to choo choo trains. No one in China would willingly ride those crowded trains if they could simply drive door to door like an American can.

美國(guó)空軍士官，教師，司機(jī) & 現(xiàn)已退休
因?yàn)樵诿绹?guó)，每個(gè)人都使用汽車，不需要像鐵路這樣過(guò)時(shí)的概念。在中國(guó)，每1000人中只有64人擁有汽車。他們需要忍受鐵路旅行帶來(lái)的不便，長(zhǎng)途旅行只能去車站，在擁擠的終點(diǎn)站和火車上等待，在離你真正的目的地還有許多英里。
不管你把這種被遺忘的老式火車開得多快多高效，在美國(guó)沒有人愿意乘坐他們的老古董，在20世紀(jì)20年代美國(guó)得到了第一輛汽車時(shí)，就拋棄了蹩腳的交通系統(tǒng)。
為什么美國(guó)人會(huì)想回到火車上。如果中國(guó)人可以像美國(guó)人那樣每家每戶都有汽車，沒有人會(huì)愿意乘坐那些擁擠的火車。
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Loren Petrich , Ph.D. Astronomy, Cornell University (1988)
I think that it’s from differences in political will. Looking at construction of high-speed-rail and urban-rail lines over the last half-century, I find that it is very patchy. In US urban rail, some cities built new lines a few decades before similar-sized neighboring cities did.I think that it is largely due to the capital expense of construction. Good high-speed lines are expensive. The necessity of acquiring land may also be a factor, since high-speed lines have to be very straight.
As to why the US might be lacking the necessary political will, I can only speculate. Despite a lot of talk about high-speed trains, the most that the US has to show for it is the Northeast Corridor and the first stages of a line in California. I think that part of the problem is Republicans disliking something that Democrats like, something very evident after the 2010 elections. But recent passenger-rail developments in Florida and Texas suggests that there may be ways of making high-speed trains ideologically acceptable to Republicans.

康奈爾大學(xué)天文學(xué)博士(1988)
我認(rèn)為這是因?yàn)檎我庠傅牟煌??；仡欉^(guò)去半個(gè)世紀(jì)高速鐵路和城市軌道交通線的建設(shè)，我發(fā)現(xiàn)它們非常零散。在美國(guó)城市軌道交通方面，一些城市比規(guī)模相當(dāng)?shù)泥徑鞘性鐜资杲ㄔ炝诵碌木€路。我認(rèn)為主要是由于建設(shè)的資本費(fèi)用。好的高速鐵路價(jià)格昂貴。獲取必要的土地也可能是一個(gè)因素，因?yàn)楦咚勹F路必須非常直。
至于美國(guó)為何缺乏必要的政治意愿，我只能推測(cè)。盡管有很多關(guān)于高速列車的討論，但美國(guó)展示的最多的是東北走廊和加利福尼亞州一條線路的第一階段。我認(rèn)為部分問(wèn)題在于共和黨人不喜歡民主黨人喜歡的東西，這在2010年大選后非常明顯。 但最近佛羅里達(dá)州和德克薩斯州的客運(yùn)鐵路發(fā)展表明，可能有辦法讓高鐵在意識(shí)形態(tài)上為共和黨所接受。

Mark Rigotti , BBA Accounting & Computer Science, University of Notre Dame (1981)
China and the USA are almost the exact same size geographically at 3.7 million square miles.
The HUGE issue is the distribution of the respective populations. The USA has 2 coasts - China one. Look at the two maps below of the respective distribution of population.
Where are the less dense areas? Chinas western provinces. Their rail service does NOT serve that area. Look at the US. Our less dense population is right smack dab in the middle of the country.
To connect our two coasts involves MASSIVE land acquisition that China does not have to deal with.
To answer your question directly and simply - COST.

會(huì)計(jì)與計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)，圣母大學(xué)1981年
中國(guó)和美國(guó)在領(lǐng)土面積上幾乎是一樣大的，有370萬(wàn)平方英里。
最大的問(wèn)題是各自人口的分布。美國(guó)有兩個(gè)海岸——中國(guó)有一個(gè)。中國(guó)西部省份是密度較小的區(qū)域。他們的鐵路并不服務(wù)那個(gè)地區(qū)?？纯疵绹?guó)，我們?nèi)丝谳^少的地區(qū)恰好位于這個(gè)國(guó)家的中部。
這兩者有很大的不同。 連接我們兩個(gè)海岸需要大量征用土地，而中國(guó)不必處理這些問(wèn)題。
直接而簡(jiǎn)單地回答你的問(wèn)題——成本。
Andy Duffell , Armourer, engineer?軍械工程師

It''''s strange to single China out as particularly good. Many other counties in Europe have also but extensive high-speed networks.
The question should really be asking why, amongst other wealthy developed nations, does the US neglect it''''s railways so badly? That''''s a fair question, the state of the railways is pretty poor in the US. Outside of a few spots in the northeast US railways are way behind what''''s seen overseas. Technology is old, there''''s little appetite for improvement and generally the whole thing looks like a mid-20th century railway.
Part of the problem is low population density in much of the country, but even on the west and east coast progress is slow. Incentivisation from federal or state government is weak or non-existant, and as a result programmes are unambitious. Investing in rail infrastructure may not be sexy, but it does pay off. More centrally-planned economies seem to get that, the US, not so much.

把中國(guó)單獨(dú)挑出來(lái)說(shuō)它特別好，是很奇怪的。歐洲其他許多國(guó)家也有廣泛的高速網(wǎng)絡(luò)。
我們真正應(yīng)該問(wèn)的問(wèn)題是，為什么在其他富裕的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家中，美國(guó)如此嚴(yán)重地忽視了它的鐵路？ 這是一個(gè)公平的問(wèn)題，美國(guó)的鐵路狀況相當(dāng)糟糕。除了美國(guó)東北部的一些鐵路點(diǎn)，其他地方的鐵路遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于國(guó)外。技術(shù)已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)，沒有改進(jìn)的欲望，所有的看起來(lái)就像20世紀(jì)中期的鐵路。
部分原因是美國(guó)大部分地區(qū)人口密度低，即使在西部和東部沿海地區(qū)，進(jìn)展也很緩慢。 來(lái)自聯(lián)邦或州政府的激勵(lì)措施很少，或根本不存在，因此各項(xiàng)計(jì)劃也就沒有什么雄心壯志。投資鐵路基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施可能并不吸引人，但它確實(shí)帶來(lái)了回報(bào)。中央計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家似乎更明白這一點(diǎn)，而美國(guó)則不明白。

Scott Connery
Passenger rail is pretty inefficient anywhere. It’s usually less efficient than cars or buses for short trips, and it’s almost always less efficient than airplanes for long trips.
HSR fans will swear up and down that this isn’t true, but the numbers don’t lie. HSR cannot operate profitably without heavy government subsidy after financing charges are taken into account. It’s an extraordinarily capital intensive option.
However the higher the population density is the closer it comes to effectiveness. Outside of the NorthEast Corridor, America has incredibly low population density. Rail is just a dumb proposal for the rest of the country. The cost doesn’t come close to meeting the potential usage of it. Passenger rail is really a technology that was obsolete by the 1950s with the development of the interstate highway system and jet powered airliners.
China has areas with much higher population density, and so HSR comes closer to operating efficiently.
However the main difference is that China is an autocratic country with a command economy that has no concern for profitability or efficiency.
China’s rail “works” because it is built by the government who is happy to lose 130 billion per year subsidizing it. Rail subsidies - Wikipedia That sort of subsidy is not a good sign that you have a viable efficient plan.

任何地方的客運(yùn)鐵路效率都相當(dāng)?shù)汀６掏韭眯械男释ǔ５陀谄嚮蚬财?，長(zhǎng)途旅行的效率幾乎都低于飛機(jī)。高鐵粉絲們會(huì)發(fā)誓這不是真的，但是數(shù)據(jù)不會(huì)說(shuō)謊?？紤]到融資費(fèi)用后，如果沒有大量的政府補(bǔ)貼，高鐵就無(wú)法盈利。這是一個(gè)非常資本密集型的選擇。
然而，人口密度越高，效果會(huì)更好。在美國(guó)東北走廊以外，人口密度低得令人難以置信。對(duì)于全國(guó)其他地方來(lái)說(shuō)，鐵路是一個(gè)愚蠢的提議。成本遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不能滿足它的潛在用途。20世紀(jì)50年代，隨著州際公路系統(tǒng)和噴氣式客機(jī)的發(fā)展，客運(yùn)鐵路實(shí)際上已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)了。
中國(guó)有一些人口密度高得多的地區(qū)，因此高鐵更能相對(duì)高效運(yùn)營(yíng)。
然而，主要的區(qū)別在于，中國(guó)是一個(gè)專制國(guó)家，實(shí)行計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)，不關(guān)心盈利或效率。
中國(guó)的鐵路之所以“有效” ，是因?yàn)樗怯烧ㄔO(shè)的，政府樂(lè)于每年為此補(bǔ)貼1300億美元。這種補(bǔ)貼不是表明你有可行的高效率計(jì)劃的一個(gè)好跡象。

Aaron Williams
Because they can basically make a decision to start infrastructure projects without being blocked by an opposing party, provincial government or their own citizens. When Obama tried to build it in America you Florida and Ohio turned down the money to spite Obama.
China can also take property much easier than you can in the US and I think they actually compensate property owners will above market rate. They obviously don''''t spend as much time on environmental reviews. They don''''t have any issues with frivolous lawsuits in their infrastracture projects (Maryland Purple Line and Beverly Hills Metro Rail subway)。
But the most important reason is that China made it National Effort. They invested hundreds of billions hell it''''ll probably be trillions before it''''s over. They put their money where their mouth is. If you see my post I will criticize the hell out of China . But they actually made a national effort to invest in HSR. From inviting Japanese, French, and German corporations to build (and agreeing to tech transfer) or planning lines all across their entire country. They made it a priority that''''s, why they are better and they are pretty good at building infrastructure too.
The last thing I''''ll say is the old population density thing. China is incredibly densely populated on its East Coast so that''''s makes it easier. But forget that California will soon have 40 million people, The midwest maybe has 65 million, Texas will soon have 30 million, The, eastern seaboard has over 100 million, a few states in the south could be lixed to the midwest, Texas, or East Coast and there you have HSR for 250 million people.This is why China will beat us because in these sectors we don''''t even compete.

因?yàn)樗麄兓旧峡梢詻Q定何時(shí)啟動(dòng)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目，而不會(huì)受到反對(duì)黨、州政府或自己公民的阻撓。當(dāng)奧巴馬試圖在美國(guó)建立高鐵的時(shí)候，你們佛羅里達(dá)州和俄亥俄州拒絕了這筆錢，來(lái)刁難奧巴馬。
中國(guó)也可以比美國(guó)更容易得到土地，我認(rèn)為他們實(shí)際上補(bǔ)償業(yè)主的損失將高于市場(chǎng)價(jià)格。他們顯然不會(huì)花那么多時(shí)間在環(huán)境評(píng)估上。在他們的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目中，他們沒有任何瑣碎的訴訟問(wèn)題。
但最重要的原因是中國(guó)付出了舉國(guó)上下的努力。他們投資了數(shù)千億美元，在完成之前可能是數(shù)萬(wàn)億美元，他們言出必行。如果你看到我的帖子，我曾批評(píng)中國(guó)。但是他們實(shí)際上為高鐵的投資舉全國(guó)之力做出了的努力。從邀請(qǐng)日本、法國(guó)和德國(guó)公司建設(shè)(并同意技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓)或規(guī)劃他們整個(gè)國(guó)家的所有線路。他們優(yōu)先考慮這個(gè)問(wèn)題，這就是為什么他們做得更好，他們也非常擅長(zhǎng)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)。
我要說(shuō)的最后一件事是人口密度問(wèn)題。中國(guó)東海岸的人口密度高得令人難以置信，所以這樣做更容易。但是別忘了加利福尼亞很快就會(huì)有4000萬(wàn)人口，中西部可能有6500萬(wàn)，德克薩斯州很快就會(huì)有3000萬(wàn)，美國(guó)東岸有超過(guò)1億的人口，南部的一些州可以連接到中西部，德克薩斯州，或者東海岸，在那里高鐵可以服務(wù)2.5億人口。這就是為什么中國(guó)會(huì)打敗我們，因?yàn)樵谶@些領(lǐng)域我們甚至沒有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。
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David Bourton
Because the US is currently not interested in investing in its people and their futures. From health care to education to infrastructure. The US currently sees that spending as socialism yadda yadda. So the US is currently stewing in its own ignorance as it slips backwards on all development index criteria. Life expectancy is falling and so are standards and international indexes in education, freedom, happiness and opportunity. The US once had reason to claim to be the greatest country in the world but those days are a long time gone. They don''''t look like returning any time soon either with the current political situation. Neither side of the divide can accomplish anything ambitious or life changing for its people. They see the defeat of political opponents as more important than making progress to catch up with the rest of the developed world on the many issues they have been left behind.

因?yàn)槊绹?guó)目前對(duì)投資本國(guó)人民和他們的未來(lái)不感興趣。 從醫(yī)療保健到教育再到基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。 美國(guó)目前認(rèn)為這些類型的支出，是社會(huì)主義之類的東西。因此，美國(guó)目前正為自己的無(wú)知而煩惱，因?yàn)樗谒邪l(fā)展指數(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上都出現(xiàn)了倒退。預(yù)期壽命正在下降，教育、自由、幸福和機(jī)會(huì)方面的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和國(guó)際指數(shù)也在下降。美國(guó)曾經(jīng)有理由宣稱自己是世界上最偉大的國(guó)家，但那些日子已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了。在目前的政治形勢(shì)下，他們看起來(lái)也不會(huì)很快回到正軌。帶有分歧的任何一方都不能為人民實(shí)現(xiàn)任何雄心壯志或改變生活的目標(biāo)。他們認(rèn)為擊敗政治對(duì)手，比在許多問(wèn)題上趕上其他發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家更為重要。
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Terry Bodanski , former Armor Crewman at U.S. Army (2003-2008)
Because most people here have cars, and our infrastructure is designed to reflect that.
Has nothing to do with being good at it and everything to do with the overall design we’re shooting for. You get people out of their cars and into trains and you’re crippling a huge portion of the US economy that revolves around people in cars stopping for food or gas.
In contrast, the primary method of transportation in China for most of the 20th century was a bicycle. Good to zip around short distances but terrible at intercity transit. So creating a simple way to go from Beijing to Shanghai was in the national interest.
We already have a simple way to go from New York to LA; airplane.
And to top it all off? Our auto industry was an absolute monolith. So much so that it owned enough of the government to essentially murder public transportation systems. They’d do crazy shit like buy the trolley company and then dismantle it overnight and leave people in cities with little choice but to buy a new Model T. That kind of thing has lasting societal impact and it’s why we have a culture of ‘you ain’t nothing if you don’t have a shiny new car’ here.

美國(guó)陸軍前裝甲兵(2003-2008)
因?yàn)檫@里的大多數(shù)人都有汽車，我們的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施就是為此而設(shè)計(jì)的。
這與我們是否擅長(zhǎng)無(wú)關(guān)，而是與我們所追求的整體設(shè)計(jì)有關(guān)。你把人們從汽車?yán)锢鰜?lái)，讓他們坐上火車，這就削弱了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的很大一部分，這部分經(jīng)濟(jì)以人們?cè)谕＼嚭蟪燥埢蚣佑蜑橹行摹?br /> 相比之下，在20世紀(jì)的大部分時(shí)間里，中國(guó)的主要交通工具是自行車。短距離的時(shí)候很好，但城際交通就很糟糕了。因此，創(chuàng)造一種從北京到上海的簡(jiǎn)單方式符合國(guó)家利益。
從紐約到洛杉磯，我們已經(jīng)有了一條簡(jiǎn)單的線路：飛機(jī)。
最重要的是什么呢？我們美國(guó)的汽車工業(yè)是一個(gè)龐然大物。以至于它擁有足夠多的相關(guān)政府部門，從根本上扼殺了公共交通系統(tǒng)。他們會(huì)做一些瘋狂的事情，比如買下電車公司，然后一夜之間把它拆掉，讓城市里的人別無(wú)選擇，只能買一輛新的T型車。這種事情有著持久的社會(huì)影響，這就是為什么我們有這樣一種文化，“如果你沒有一輛锃亮的新車，你就什么也不是”。

Phillip Yallah , Worked across China for several years
USA (and Canada) have governments that would rather have each and every citizen spend tons of their own money buying private vehicles, repairing/maintaining/replacing them, paying for petrol, and paying for mandatory vehicle insurance and licensing than develop good public transportation systems that can transport people to places reliably, frequently, efficiently, and affordably, as is the case in Asian countries like Korea, Japan, and China.
This dependence on private transportation results in extra pollution, oil dependence, sprawl, traffic jams, increased rates of obesity, and prohibitively expensive barriers to entry for those who want to start working (but don’t yet have a personal vehicle or can’t afford all the associated costs of using one).
On the plus side, people don’t need to depend on the government if they can afford not to. If the government is doing a shitty job of giving people trans-city and trans-state/provincial means of transport (as most North American cities have been doing), driving is less expensive than it is in places where there is excellent public transit.
In Canada, I drove because it was a necessary evil. That’s because although each city has its own bus system, the buses are unreliable (most bus routes only see a bus come once every 45 minutes, and they are prone to arriving early and late), don’t go to where any jobs are, don’t operate early or late enough, and are too damned expensive.
In Asia, I save so much money because I don’t need a vehicle. Public transit is super reliable, frequent, affordable, and much safer than driving. I am subsidizing the networks with the taxes I pay, but unlike North American governments, the taxes are actually being put to good use instead of wasted on welfare programs and pointless make-work jobs.

在中國(guó)各地工作了幾年
美國(guó)(和加拿大)的政府寧愿讓每個(gè)公民花費(fèi)大量的錢購(gòu)買私家車，然后修理 / 維護(hù) / 更換它們，支付油錢，支付強(qiáng)制性車輛保險(xiǎn)和許可證費(fèi)用，而不是發(fā)展良好的公共交通系統(tǒng)，能夠可靠、頻繁、高效、經(jīng)濟(jì)地將人們運(yùn)送到各地，就像韓國(guó)、日本和中國(guó)這樣的亞洲國(guó)家。
這種對(duì)私人交通工具的依賴導(dǎo)致了額外的污染、對(duì)石油的依賴、無(wú)序擴(kuò)張、交通堵塞、肥胖率上升，以及對(duì)那些想要開始工作(但尚未擁有私家車或無(wú)法承擔(dān)私家車的所有相關(guān)費(fèi)用)的人來(lái)說(shuō)，昂貴的門檻令人望而卻步。
從好的方面來(lái)說(shuō)，如果人們能夠承受壓力不依賴政府。如果政府在為人們提供跨城和跨州 / 省級(jí)交通工具方面做得很糟糕(就像大多數(shù)北美城市那樣)，那么開車的成本就要低于那些公共交通條件優(yōu)越的地方。
在加拿大，我開車是因?yàn)檫@是一種無(wú)奈的舉措。因?yàn)?，盡管加拿大每個(gè)城市都有自己的公交系統(tǒng)，但公交車并不可靠(大多數(shù)公交路線每45分鐘才能看到一輛公交車開來(lái)，而且公交車很容易早到晚到)，去不了工作的地方，而且太貴了。
在亞洲，我存了很多錢，因?yàn)槲也恍枰?。公共交通超?jí)可靠，頻繁，負(fù)擔(dān)得起，而且比開車安全得多。我用我繳納的稅款補(bǔ)貼網(wǎng)絡(luò)，但與北美政府不同的是，在亞洲這些稅款實(shí)際上被用在了正確的用途上，而不是浪費(fèi)在福利項(xiàng)目和毫無(wú)意義的東西上。
Deepak Bhimaraju , New immigrant to Canada加拿大移民

This is an apples to oranges comparison due to vast differences in societal behavior (i.e., individualism in the United States vs collectivism in China) and also, population densities.
The real comparison should be between China and India. India has a pretty consistent population density as well as a demand for better public transport. I do not think any technology used in a bullet train is impossible to build in India either.
As public transport is a usually a money losing business, the will power is lacking in both the public and private sectors. It is to be seen who will bite the bullet and take the first step.

由于社會(huì)行為的巨大差異(比如，美國(guó)的個(gè)人主義和中國(guó)的集體主義) ，以及人口密度的差異，這是一個(gè)蘋果和橙子的比較。
真正的比較應(yīng)該是中國(guó)和印度之間。印度的人口密度相當(dāng)穩(wěn)定，同時(shí)也需要更好的公共交通。我也不認(rèn)為印度建造不了任何子彈頭列車的技術(shù)。
由于公共交通通常是一項(xiàng)賠錢的生意，公共和私營(yíng)部門都缺乏意志力。誰(shuí)愿意咬緊牙關(guān)邁出第一步，這是可以看出來(lái)的。

Bill Boyd , former Mechanical Transport Fitter at Royal Australian Air Force (1962-1973)
to start with all of china is government land so there is not the price jacking that occurs in america whne deciding where rail goes
Next the chinese government is capable of running a rail business profitably where the american government doesn’t want to be involved in running a busiuness
Lastly it is a culture problem, in that americans are in love with the idea of owning a car and polluting the environment where the chinese have to be some where fast and high speed rail beats cars hands down
Japan is running high speed rail profitably as is France and Italy

澳大利亞皇家空軍前機(jī)械運(yùn)輸裝配工(1962-1973)
首先，整個(gè)中國(guó)都是政府土地，所以不會(huì)像美國(guó)那樣決定鐵路的走向時(shí)，價(jià)格上漲。
然后，中國(guó)有能力在美國(guó)政府不想?yún)⑴c經(jīng)營(yíng)的領(lǐng)域，經(jīng)營(yíng)一家有利可圖的鐵路企業(yè)。
最后，這是一個(gè)文化問(wèn)題，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)人熱衷于擁有一輛汽車并污染環(huán)境，而中國(guó)人必須在快速和高速的鐵路上擊敗汽車。日本、法國(guó)、意大利也一樣，正在運(yùn)營(yíng)高速鐵路并且都盈利。

Robert Brown
Why are high-speed trains working well in China but not in the US?
Because of the popularity of personal vehicles, the US is ideologically committed to a 19th century railroad system powered by 1950’s technology.

為什么高鐵在中國(guó)發(fā)展良好，而在美國(guó)卻不行？
由于美國(guó)私家車的流行，美國(guó)在意識(shí)形態(tài)上，致力于建設(shè)用上世紀(jì)50年代技術(shù)為動(dòng)力的19世紀(jì)鐵路系統(tǒng)。

Ji Liu , works at Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis
Besides the population density, most US rail crossings are level crossings, so the rail is not electrified. Increasing speed would replace all those crossings which is too expensive.
That being said, there is no extraordinary hardship for US to build commute railways around big cities, or a higher speed railway on the Eastern seaboard. The problem is that the commuter railway is still too slow. (and it charges no less than Chinese HSR)
The fastest train route in US: DC->New York->Boston, is on par with Chinese T level express train, slower than the HSR of Japan, France and China.

就職于印第安納大學(xué)-普渡大學(xué)印第安納波利斯分校
除了人口密度，大多數(shù)美國(guó)鐵路交叉口是平交道口，所以鐵路沒有通電。提高速度的話，將取代所有那些交叉口，過(guò)于昂貴。
話雖如此，對(duì)于美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，在大城市周圍修建通勤鐵路或者在美國(guó)東岸修建高速鐵路并沒有什么特別的困難。問(wèn)題是通勤鐵路仍然太慢。(它的收費(fèi)不低于中國(guó)的高鐵)
美國(guó)最快的列車線路：華盛頓——紐約——波士頓，與中國(guó)的T級(jí)特快列車相當(dāng)，比日本、法國(guó)和中國(guó)的高鐵慢。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Faux Ami
It''''s not that we can''''t, but more that we don''''t want to. America has a staunch anti government stance that tends to impede too many major interstate developments. Many Americans own automobiles, unlike in China. Couple that with the interests of the car manufacturing, petroleum industries, the airlines, and the constant financial drain of Amtrak.

不是我們不能，而是我們不想這樣做。 美國(guó)有一個(gè)堅(jiān)定的反政府立場(chǎng)，往往會(huì)阻礙發(fā)展。與中國(guó)不同，許多美國(guó)人擁有汽車。再加上汽車制造業(yè)、石油工業(yè)、航空公司的利益，以及美國(guó)鐵路公司不斷的資金流失。

Mike Smith , BS Computer Science, Polytechnic University (1991)
How would you know whether the US is “good at” building high-speed rail systems, when it hasn’t actually built any yet? I’m sure that, if we ever actually decided to build any true high-speed rail, we could do it as well as anyone else.

理工大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)學(xué)士(1991)
你怎么知道美國(guó)是否“擅長(zhǎng)”建設(shè)高鐵系統(tǒng)，而實(shí)際上它還沒有建設(shè)任何高鐵系統(tǒng)呢？ 我相信，如果我們真的決定建造任何真正的高速鐵路，我們可以做得和其他人一樣好。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Chris Eckerson
Same reason they can build the three gorges dam. They can tell people what to do. In the US every time someone wants to do something a bunch of people protest and sue to stop it. New Highways, not in my neighborhood. New pipeline ,not through the wilderness.
People here want progress but they only want it if it’s convenient for them. In China they don’t care about people’s feelings they just say so and it is done.

同樣的原因，中國(guó)可以建造長(zhǎng)江三峽水利樞紐工程。他們可以告訴人們?cè)撟鍪裁?。而在美?guó)，每當(dāng)有人想做某件事時(shí)，一群人就會(huì)抗議并起訴以阻止這件事。新高速公路，不能穿過(guò)我家附近。 新的管道，不能穿越荒野。
這里的人們想要進(jìn)步，但只有對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)方便的時(shí)候他們才想要。在中國(guó)，他們不在意人們的感受，他們只是說(shuō)出來(lái)，然后就做了。