Welfare in the 21st century

21世紀(jì)的福利

How to make a social safety-net for the post-covid world

如何構(gòu)建后新冠時代的社會保障體系
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Governments must remake the social contract for the 21st century

政府必須為21世紀(jì)重新締結(jié)社會契約


After the Depression and the second world war, voters and governments in rich countries recast the relationship between the state and its citizens. Now the pandemic has seen the old rules on social spending ripped up. More than three-quarters of Americans support President Joe Biden’s $1.9trn stimulus bill, which is due in the Senate and includes $1,400 cheques for most adults. And in the budget on March 3rd Britain extended a scheme to pay the wages of furloughed workers until September, even as public debt hit its highest level since 1945 (see article). Such boldness brings dangers: governments could stretch the public finances to breaking-point, distort incentives and create sclerotic societies. But they also have a chance to create new social-welfare policies that are affordable and which help workers thrive in an economy facing technological disruption. They must seize it.

在經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條和二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后，發(fā)達(dá)國家的選民和政府重塑了國家與公民的關(guān)系。現(xiàn)在社會支出的舊規(guī)則在大流行中失效。四分之三以上的美國人支持喬·拜登總統(tǒng)即將在參議院提交的1.9萬億美元經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激法案，包括為大多數(shù)成年人發(fā)放1400美元支票。英國在3月3日提交的財政預(yù)算案中，為待業(yè)工人發(fā)放薪水的計劃被延期至9月份，同時公共債務(wù)已達(dá)到1945年以來的最高水平。這種勇敢?guī)砹孙L(fēng)險：政府可能使公共財政達(dá)到臨界點，扭曲激勵機(jī)制，形成僵化社會。但也可能開創(chuàng)新的社會福利政策，不僅負(fù)擔(dān)得起，而且?guī)椭と嗽诒患夹g(shù)顛覆的經(jīng)濟(jì)中取得成功，他們必須抓住這個機(jī)會。

The past year has seen a wild experiment in social spending. The world launched at least 1,600 new social-protection programmes in 2020 (see article). Rich countries have provided 5.8% of gdp on average to help record numbers of workers. Government debts are piling up, but so far low interest rates mean that they are cheap to service. The public’s mood had already been shifting. Britons used to grumble that layabouts sponged off the welfare state; now they are more likely to say help is too stingy. Last year over two-thirds of Europeans said they supported a universal basic income (ubi), an unconditional recurring payment to all adults. Affluent professionals have had their gaze drawn to the working conditions of those who deliver food and look after the sick. The struggles of women who have dropped out of the workforce to care for children and the elderly have become impossible to ignore.

去年，社會支出經(jīng)歷了一場瘋狂的試驗。2020年，全世界至少新出臺了1600項社會保障計劃。發(fā)達(dá)國家平均支出GDP的5.8%去幫助人數(shù)創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的工人。政府債務(wù)不斷攀升，但迄今為止的低利率意味著償還債務(wù)的成本很低。公眾的情緒一直在發(fā)生變化，過去英國人抱怨無業(yè)游民的生活依賴福利國家；現(xiàn)在可能抱怨救濟(jì)太吝嗇。去年三分之二的歐洲人說支持全民基礎(chǔ)收入，即無條件向所有的成年人反復(fù)發(fā)錢。富裕的專業(yè)人士關(guān)注食品運輸和護(hù)理人員的工作環(huán)境。照顧子女的失業(yè)女性和老年人的困境已經(jīng)不容忽視。

The social safety-net in many rich countries was creaking before covid-19 struck. Modelled on the ideas of Otto von Bismarck and William Beveridge, it had often failed to cushion workers from globalisation and technological and social change. In 1999-2019 the number of Americans aged 25-54 outside the labour force grew by 25%, or 4.7m, over six times more than the number who received help from the main assistance programme for displaced workers. As health-care and pension costs soared in recent years, governments cut back support for working-age people. Between 2014 and 2018 Britain’s state-pension bill grew in real terms by ￡4bn ($5.8bn), even as the rest of its welfare budget shrank by ￡16.5bn. A dwindling share of middle-income jobs and the growth of the gig economy fuelled fears that labour markets were changing faster than flat-footed governments could.

在新冠疫情爆發(fā)之前，許多發(fā)達(dá)國家的社會保障體系岌岌可危。效仿奧托·馮·俾斯麥和威廉·貝弗里奇的觀念，通常無法緩解工人受到全球化和技術(shù)與社會變革的沖擊。1999-2019年，25-54歲找不到工作的美國人口增長了25%，達(dá)到470萬人，是得到主要援助計劃幫助的失業(yè)工人的6倍。近年來隨著醫(yī)保和退休金成本的攀升，政府減少了對勞動年齡人口的援助。2014-2018年，英國的國家退休金扣除物價因素后增長了40億英鎊（58億美元），其他福利預(yù)算同期減少165億英鎊。中等收入工作的減少和零工經(jīng)濟(jì)的興起使人擔(dān)心，措手不及的政府進(jìn)行變革的速度趕不上勞動力市場的變化速度。

With the public and some economists cheering on, it is tempting for politicians to stoke the economy with more ad hoc spending, or put in place vast schemes such as ubi. Instead they need to take a measured, long-term view. The safety-net must be affordable. Tight budgets, not milk and honey, will define the 2020s. The annual deficit of big advanced economies was 4% of their combined gdp even before the pandemic—and much ageing is still to come. Already bond yields are rising again (see article). Social spending must flow quickly and automatically to those who need it—not, as in America, only during crises when a panicked government passes emergency legislation. And governments need to find mechanisms that cushion people more effectively against income shocks and joblessness without discouraging work or crushing economic dynamism.

在公眾和一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的鼓動下，政客傾向于用臨時性支出刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)，或者出臺全民基本收入這樣的龐大計劃。相反，他們需要審慎長遠(yuǎn)的眼光，社會保障體系必須量力而行。20世紀(jì)20年代將是預(yù)算吃緊而非寬裕的時代。即使在大流行爆發(fā)之前，主要發(fā)達(dá)國家的年度赤字已達(dá)到它們GDP總和的4%——并且人口老齡化仍在繼續(xù)。債券收益率再次攀升。社會支出必須快速自動流向有需要的人——例如美國，驚慌失措的政府不能只在危機(jī)期間出臺緊急法案。政府需要這樣一種機(jī)制：既能有效地緩解民眾受到收入和失業(yè)的沖擊，又不讓他們喪失工作的信心或破壞經(jīng)濟(jì)活力。

The first step towards satisfying these goals is to use technology to make ancient bureaucracies more efficient. Postal cheques, 1980s mainfrx computers and shoddy data need to be relegated to the past. In the pandemic many governments temporarily short-circuited their existing systems because they were too slow. In Estonia and Singapore digital-identification systems and a disdain for form-filling became an asset in the crisis. More countries need to copy them and also to ensure universal access to the internet and bank accounts. The call for efficient administration may sound like tinkering but one in five poor Americans eligible for wage top-ups fails to claim them. Nimbler digital-payment systems will reduce the need for costly universalism as a fail-safe, and allow better targeting and quicker response times. Digital systems also permit the emergency option of making temporary cash payments to all households.

實現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的第一步是利用科技提高古老官僚機(jī)構(gòu)的效率。郵政轉(zhuǎn)賬支票、上世紀(jì)八十年代的主機(jī)、垃圾數(shù)據(jù)應(yīng)該成為歷史。在大流行期間，許多政府臨時避開現(xiàn)有系統(tǒng)，因為它們太慢了。在愛沙尼亞和新加坡，數(shù)字識別系統(tǒng)和鄙棄填寫表格成為這場危機(jī)的財富。更多的國家應(yīng)該效仿它們，還要確?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)和銀行賬戶的普及。提高行政效率的訴求似乎無關(guān)痛癢，但五分之一有資格加薪的美國窮人申請不到。有了更靈活的數(shù)字支付系統(tǒng)，就沒必要為了保險起見采取昂貴的普遍主義做法，針對性更強(qiáng)，響應(yīng)速度更快。在緊急情況下，數(shù)字支付系統(tǒng)還能向所有的家庭發(fā)放臨時現(xiàn)金。

That is the easy part. Balancing generosity and dynamism is harder. Part of the solution is to top up the wages of low-paid workers. Anglo-Saxon countries have done this well since reforms in the 1990s and 2000s. But wage top-ups are of little use to the jobless and are often scant compensation for people who lose good jobs to forces beyond their control. Paltry support for the unemployed in Britain and America preserves incentives to work but at high human cost. The sparsity of social insurance has undermined political support for creative destruction, the catalyst for rising living standards. Continental Europe tends to underwrite traditional workers’ incomes more generously. But the distortion of incentives leads to higher unemployment and divisions between coddled insiders and a precariat. Both sides of the Atlantic lack a permanent safety-net that insures gig workers and the self-employed.

這是容易的一面，難點是在慷慨與活力之間取得平衡。其中一個解決方案是給低收入工人加薪，自上世紀(jì)90年代和本世紀(jì)初實施改革以來，盎克魯-撒克遜國家在這方面一直做得很好。但是，加薪對于失業(yè)人員來說沒用，對于因不可抗力而失去好工作的人來說不夠用。英國和美國給予失業(yè)人員的救濟(jì)微不足道，雖然保住了他們的工作動力，但耗費了很高的人力成本。低水平的社會保障削弱了創(chuàng)造性破壞在政治上得到的支持，后者是提高生活水平的催化劑。歐洲大陸傾向于更慷慨地為傳統(tǒng)工人的收入提供保障，但激勵扭曲會導(dǎo)致更高的失業(yè)率，并且在被溺愛的內(nèi)部人士與不穩(wěn)定無產(chǎn)者之間形成對立。大西洋兩岸缺少針對臨時工和個體經(jīng)營者的長期保障體系。

There is one country that combines labour-market flexibility with generosity: Denmark, which spends large sums—1.9% of gdp in 2018—on retraining and on advising the jobless. These interventions stop the unemployed from falling into dependency. The inadequacies of policies elsewhere are often glaring. Britain’s efforts have flopped. America’s comparable spending is less than a 20th as large as Denmark’s, even though the few lucky beneficiaries of its “trade-adjustment assistance” earn $50,000 more in wages, on average, over a decade.

有一個國家結(jié)合了勞動力市場的靈活與慷慨：丹麥耗費巨資——2018年達(dá)到GDP的1.9%——為失業(yè)人員提供再培訓(xùn)和和咨詢，這些干預(yù)措施避免了失業(yè)人員產(chǎn)生依賴。其他國家的政策明顯不完備，英國徹底失敗，美國的類似支出不到丹麥的二十分之一，只有少數(shù)幸運的“貿(mào)易調(diào)整援助”受益者十年來的平均工資達(dá)到5萬美元以上。

Bungee economics

蹦極經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處


For years social spending has favoured the elderly and an outdated safety-net. It should be rebuilt around active labour-market policies that use technology to help everyone from shopworkers who are victims of disruption to mothers whose skills have atrophied and those whose jobs are replaced by machines. Governments cannot eliminate risk, but they can help ensure that if calamity strikes, people bounce back.

多年以來，社會支出一直側(cè)重于老年人和落后的保障體系。國家應(yīng)當(dāng)圍繞積極的勞動力市場政策重建保障體系，利用技術(shù)幫助每一個人：成為技術(shù)顛覆犧牲品的店員、工作技能退化的母親、工作被機(jī)器搶走的工人。政府無法杜絕風(fēng)險，但有助于確保當(dāng)災(zāi)難降臨時，人們能夠重整旗鼓。