Why our pursuit of happiness may be flawed？

為什么我們對幸福的追求可能是有缺陷的

(Image credit: Mike Kemp/Getty Images)

(圖片來源:邁克·肯普/蓋蒂圖片社)


Modern society seems to be obsessed with finding happiness, but if some philosophers are to believed, this could be a fruitless pursuit (Credit: Mike Kemp/Getty Images)
By Nat Rutherford

作者：納特·盧瑟福

It is an emotion lixed to improved health and well-being, but is our obsession with being happy a recipe for disappointment, asks Nat Rutherford.

納特·盧瑟福問道，快樂是一種與改善健康和幸福有關(guān)的情緒，但我們對快樂的癡迷是失望的根源嗎?

What do you want from life? You’ve probably had the opportunity and the cause to ask yourself that question recently. Perhaps you want to spend more time with your family, or get a more fulfilling and secure job, or improve your health. But why do you want those things?

你想從生活中得到什么?最近你可能有機(jī)會也有理由問自己這個(gè)問題。也許你想花更多的時(shí)間和家人在一起，或者想找一份更有成就感和安全感的工作，或者想改善你的健康狀況。但你為什么想要那些東西?

Chances are that your answer will come down to one thing: happiness. Our culture’s fixation on happiness can seem almost religious. It is one of the only reasons for action that doesn’t stand in need of justification: happiness is good because being happy is good. But can we build our lives on that circular reasoning?

你的答案很可能會歸結(jié)為一件事:幸福。我們的文化對幸福的執(zhí)著幾乎可以說是非常虔誠的。這是唯一一個(gè)不需要辯解的行動理由:幸福是好的，因?yàn)榭鞓肪褪呛玫摹５?，我們能在這種循環(huán)推理的基礎(chǔ)上建立我們的生活嗎?

Considering the importance of the question, there’s remarkably little data on what people want from life. A survey in 2016 asked Americans whether they would rather "achieve great things or be happy" and 81% said that they would rather be happy, while only 13% opted for achieving great things (6% were daunted by the choice and weren’t sure). Despite the ubiquity of happiness as a goal, it’s hard to know how to define it or how to achieve it.

考慮到這個(gè)問題的重要性，關(guān)于人們想從生活中得到什么的數(shù)據(jù)卻非常少。在2016年的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查中，美國人被問及他們是寧愿“取得偉大的成就還是獲得快樂”，81%的人說他們寧愿快樂，而只有13%的人選擇取得偉大的成就(6%的人被這個(gè)選擇嚇到了，不確定)。盡管幸福是無處不在的目標(biāo)，但人們很難知道如何定義它或如何實(shí)現(xiàn)它。

Yet more and more aspects of life are judged in terms of their contribution to the phantom of happiness. Does your relationship, your job, your home, your body, your diet make you happy? If not, aren’t you doing something wrong? In our modern world, happiness is the closest thing we have to a summum bonum, the highest good from which all other goods flow. In this logic unhappiness becomes the summum malum, the greatest evil to be avoided. There is some evidence that the obsessive pursuit of happiness is associated with a greater risk of depression.

然而，越來越多的生活的方方面面都被用來衡量它們對幸?；糜暗呢暙I(xiàn)。你的人際關(guān)系、工作、家庭、身體、飲食讓你快樂嗎?如果沒有，你是不是做錯(cuò)了什么?在我們的現(xiàn)代世界，幸福是我們所擁有的最接近至善的東西，它是所有善的源頭。在這個(gè)邏輯中，不快樂則成為了極惡，是人們要避免的最大的邪惡。有證據(jù)表明，對幸福的過分追求可能導(dǎo)致更大的抑郁風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。


Entire sections of book shop shelving are often dedicated to self-help books that promise to make us happier (Credit: Gerry Walden/Alamy)

書店的書架上常常擺滿了自救類書籍，這些書承諾會讓我們更快樂。(來源:格里.瓦爾登/阿拉米)

In his recent book, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness, historian Ritchie Robertson argues that the Enlightenment should be understood not as the increase in value of reason itself, but instead as the quest for happiness through reason. The determining intellectual force of modernity was about happiness and we are still grappling with the limits of that project today.

歷史學(xué)家里奇·羅伯遜在其新書《啟蒙運(yùn)動:對幸福的追求》中指出，啟蒙運(yùn)動不應(yīng)被理解為理性本身價(jià)值的增加，而應(yīng)被理解為通過理性尋找幸福的追求?，F(xiàn)代決定性的智力力量是關(guān)于幸福的，而我們今天仍在努力解決這個(gè)項(xiàng)目的局限性。

It’s easy to assume that happiness has always been valued as the highest good, but human values and emotions are not permanently fixed. Some values which once were paramount, such as honour or piety, have faded in importance, while emotions like "acedia" (our feeling of apathy comes closest) have disappeared completely. Both the language we use to describe our values and emotions and even the feelings themselves are unstable.

人們很容易認(rèn)為幸福一直事被視為最高的善，但人類的價(jià)值和情感并不是永久固定的。一些曾經(jīng)是至高無上的價(jià)值，如榮譽(yù)或虔誠，其重要性已經(jīng)消失了，而像“絕望”(我們的冷漠感最接近)這樣的情緒已經(jīng)完全消失了。我們用來描述我們的價(jià)值觀和情感的語言，甚至是情感本身都是不穩(wěn)定的。

Modern conceptions of happiness are primarily practical and not philosophical, focusing on what we might call the techniques of happiness. The concern is not what happiness is, but instead on how to get it. We tend to see happiness in medicalised terms as the opposite of sadness or depression, implying that happiness emerges from chemical reactions in the brain. Being happy means having fewer of the chemical reactions that make you sad and more of the reactions that make you happy.

現(xiàn)代關(guān)于幸福的概念主要是實(shí)用的，而不是哲學(xué)的，這些概念集中在我們所謂的獲得幸福的技巧上。我們關(guān)心的不是幸福是什么，而是如何得到它。我們傾向于把快樂從醫(yī)學(xué)角度看作悲傷或抑郁的對立面，這意味著快樂來自大腦中的化學(xué)反應(yīng)?？鞓芬馕吨僖恍┳屇惚瘋幕瘜W(xué)反應(yīng)，多一些讓你快樂的化學(xué)反應(yīng)。

Martha Nussbaum, a prominent virtue ethicist, claims that modern societies take happiness to "be the name of a feeling of contentment or pleasure, and a view that makes happiness the supreme goods is assumed to be, by definition a view that gives supreme value to psychological states". Self-help books and "positive psychology" promise to unlock that psychological state or happy mood. But philosophers have tended to be sceptical of this view of happiness because our moods are fleeting and their causes uncertain. Instead, they ask a related but wider question: what is the good life?

杰出的美德倫理學(xué)家瑪莎·努斯鮑姆聲稱，現(xiàn)代社會將幸福視為“一種滿足或愉悅的感覺，一種將幸福視為至善的觀點(diǎn)，根據(jù)定義，這種觀點(diǎn)賦予心理狀態(tài)以最高價(jià)值”。自助書籍和“積極心理學(xué)”承諾開啟這種心理狀態(tài)或快樂的心情。但哲學(xué)家們往往對這種幸福觀持懷疑態(tài)度，因?yàn)槲覀兊那榫w是短暫的，這種短暫的原因不確定。相反，他們問了一個(gè)相關(guān)但更廣泛的問題:什么是好生活?


A life with loving attachments has been shown to be lixed to happiness but it can also cause us great pain (Credit: Solstock/Getty Images)

有愛的生活被證明與幸福有關(guān)，但它也會給我們帶來巨大的痛苦。

One answer would be a life spent doing things you enjoy and which bring you pleasure. A life spent experiencing pleasure would, in some ways, be a good life.

（關(guān)于什么是好的生活這問題，）一個(gè)答案是一輩子做自己喜歡并會帶給自己快樂的事情。在某些方面來說，體驗(yàn)快樂的生活才是美好的生活。

But maximising pleasure isn’t the only option. Every human life, even the most fortunate, is filled with pain. Painful loss, painful disappointments, the physical pain of injury or sickness, and the mental pain of enduring boredom, loneliness, or sadness. Pain is an inevitable consequence of being alive.

但最大化快樂并不是唯一的選擇。每個(gè)人的生命，即使是最幸運(yùn)的人，也充滿了痛苦。失去的痛苦，失望的痛苦，受傷或疾病帶來的身體上的痛苦，以及忍受無聊、孤獨(dú)或悲傷帶來的精神上的痛苦。痛苦是活著必然的結(jié)果。

For the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE), a good life was one in which pain is minimised. The sustained absence of pain grants us tranquillity of mind, or ataraxia. This notion has something in common with our modern understanding of happiness. To be "at peace with yourself" marks the happy person out from the unhappy one and no one would imagine that a life filled with pain could be a good life. But is the minimisation of pain really the essence of happiness?

對于古希臘哲學(xué)家伊壁鳩魯(公元前341-270年)來說，美好的生活是將痛苦降到最低的生活。持續(xù)的無痛苦會給予我們心靈的平靜，或者說是氣定神閑。這個(gè)概念與我們現(xiàn)代對幸福的理解有一些共同點(diǎn)。他們都表明“與自己和平相處”與否可以將幸福的人與不幸福的人區(qū)分開來，沒有人會想象充滿痛苦的生活也會是美好的生活。但將痛苦最小化真的是幸福的本質(zhì)嗎?

What if living a good life increases the pain we experience? Studies have shown that having loving attachments correlates with happiness, but we know from experience that love is also the cause of pain. What if pain is necessary and even desirable? The painful death of parents, children, partners or friends could be obviated by ceasing to care about those people, or excising them from your life completely. But a life without loving attachments is deficient in important ways, even if it might free us from the rending pain of losing those you love. Less dramatically, all the good things in life entail suffering. Writing a novel, running a marathon, or giving birth all cause suffering in pursuit of the final, joyous result.

如果生活得好也會增加我們經(jīng)歷的痛苦呢?研究表明，有愛的依戀與幸福有關(guān)，但我們從經(jīng)驗(yàn)中知道，愛也是痛苦的原因。但如果疼痛是必要的，甚至是人類需要的呢?父母、孩子、伴侶或朋友的痛苦死亡可以通過停止關(guān)心這些人，或從你的生活中完全切除他們來避免。但是，沒有愛的依附的生活即使可能使我們從失去所愛的人的痛苦中解脫出來，但是在許多重要的方面是不足的。不那么引人注目的是，生活中所有美好的事情都少不了痛苦。寫小說，跑馬拉松，生孩子，都是為了追求最終的、歡樂的結(jié)果而引起的痛苦。

Epicurus might respond that the inevitability of suffering actually makes ataraxia more appealing. Accepting the inevitable, while trying to minimise its harm, is the only way to live. You can also use pain minimisation as a guide to action. If the process of writing a novel causes you more pain than the pleasure you anticipate from finishing it, then don’t write it. But if a little pain now will prevent greater pain later – the pain of giving up smoking to avoid the pain of cancer for example – then that pain can probably be justified. Epicurean happiness is a matter of being a good accountant and minimising pain in the most efficient way possible.

伊壁鳩魯可能會回答說，痛苦的不可避免性實(shí)際上讓氣定神閑更有吸引力。接受不可避免的事情，同時(shí)盡量減少它的危害，是唯一的生存之道。你也可以將疼痛最小化作為行動指南。如果寫小說的過程給你帶來的痛苦多于完成它所帶來的快樂，那就別寫了。但是，如果現(xiàn)在的一點(diǎn)痛苦可以防止以后更大的痛苦那么這種痛苦就可能是合理的，例如為了避免癌癥而戒煙的痛苦。伊壁鳩魯哲學(xué)理論的幸福就是成為一個(gè)優(yōu)秀的會計(jì)師，以最有效的方式將痛苦最小化。

But the accountant’s view of happiness is too simple to reflect reality. Friedrich Nietzsche, in The Genealogy of Morals, saw that we do not merely endure pain as a means to greater pleasure because "man…does not repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a purpose of suffering". In Nietzsche’s view, pain is not alleviated through pleasure, but instead through meaning. He was sceptical that we could find enough meaning to make the suffering worthwhile, but his insight points to the flaw in Epicurus’s view of the good life.

但會計(jì)師對幸福的看法還是過于簡單，無法反映現(xiàn)實(shí)。弗里德里?！つ岵稍凇兜赖伦V系》一書中指出，我們并不僅僅把忍受痛苦作為獲得更大快樂的手段，因?yàn)椤叭祟悺⒉环裾J(rèn)痛苦本身;人類渴望痛苦，只要痛苦對人類有意義，人們甚至?xí)桃鈱ふ宜?，這就是受苦的目的?！?尼采認(rèn)為，痛苦不是通過快樂來減輕的，而是通過意義來減輕的。他懷疑我們能否真的可以找到足夠的意義來讓痛苦變得有意義，但他的洞察力指出了伊壁鳩魯對美好生活的看法的缺陷。

A life of meaningful pain then, might be more valuable than a life of meaningless pleasure. As if it weren’t hard enough to work out what happiness is, we now need to work out what a meaningful life is too.

那么，一個(gè)有意義的痛苦的生活可能比一個(gè)毫無意義的快樂的生活更有價(jià)值。好像弄清什么是幸福還不夠難，所以我們現(xiàn)在也需要弄清什么是有意義的生活。

But if we put the tricky question of what makes life meaningful to one side, we can still see that the modern view of happiness as the summum bonum – or highest good from which all other goods flow – is mistaken.

但是，如果我們把這個(gè)棘手的問題放在一邊，我們?nèi)匀豢梢钥吹?，現(xiàn)代觀點(diǎn)所認(rèn)為的幸福是至善，是所有其他的善的源頭的觀點(diǎn)是錯(cuò)誤的。


The majority of Americans would choose happiness over achieving great things, according to one recent survey (Credit: Michael Wheatley/Alamy)

根據(jù)最近的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查顯示，大多數(shù)美國人更愿意選擇幸福而不是成就大事。(來源:邁克爾·惠特利/阿拉米)

The American philosopher Robert Nozick came up with a thought experiment to make the point. Nozick asks us to imagine a "machine that could give you any experience you desired". The machine would allow you to experience the bliss of fulfilling your every wish. You could be a great poet, become the greatest inventor ever known, travel the Universe in a spaceship of your own design, or become a well-liked chef at a local restaurant. In reality though, you would be unconscious in a life-support tank. Because the machine makes you believe that the simulation is real, your choice is final.

美國哲學(xué)家羅伯特·諾齊克提出了一個(gè)思想實(shí)驗(yàn)來證明這一點(diǎn)。諾齊克讓我們想象一個(gè)“可以給你任何你想要的體驗(yàn)的機(jī)器”。機(jī)器會讓你體驗(yàn)到滿足你每一個(gè)愿望的幸福。在實(shí)驗(yàn)時(shí)，你可以成為一個(gè)偉大的詩人，成為有史以來最偉大的發(fā)明家，乘坐自己設(shè)計(jì)的宇宙飛船遨游宇宙，或者成為當(dāng)?shù)夭宛^受人喜愛的廚師。但在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，你會在生命維持箱中失去意識。因?yàn)闄C(jī)器讓你相信模擬是真實(shí)的，所以你的選擇是最終的。

Nozick says you wouldn’t because we want to actually do certain things and be certain people, not just have pleasurable experiences. This hypothetical situation might seem frivolous, but if we are willing to sacrifice limitless pleasure for real meaning, then happiness is not the highest good. But if Nozick is right, then the 81% of surveyed Americans who chose happiness over great achievements are wrong, and studies have shown that people would mostly choose not to enter the machine.

諾齊克說你不會因?yàn)樽约合胱鎏囟ǖ氖露蔀樘囟ǖ娜?，因?yàn)槿藗冊谝獾牟粌H僅是獲得愉快的體驗(yàn)。這種假設(shè)的情形可能看起來很輕率，但如果我們愿意為了真正的意義而犧牲無限的快樂，那么幸福就不是最高的善。但如果諾齊克是對的，那么81%選擇快樂而非偉大成就的受訪美國人的數(shù)據(jù)就是錯(cuò)誤的，研究表明，大多數(shù)人會選擇不進(jìn)入機(jī)器。

Nozick’s experience machine aimed to disprove the essential claim of utilitarianism, "that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end". In 1826, the philosopher who wrote those words, John Stuart Mill, became mired in unhappiness. In his autobiography, Mill describes what we now recognise as depressive anhedonia: "I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to; unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasurable excitement; one of those moods when what is pleasure at other times, becomes insipid or indifferent."

功利主義的基本主張是“幸福是可取的，而且是唯一可取的，是人們做事的一個(gè)目的” 諾齊克的經(jīng)驗(yàn)機(jī)器則旨在反駁這一觀點(diǎn)。1826年，寫下這句話的哲學(xué)家約翰·斯圖亞特·密爾陷入了深深的不快之中。在他的自傳中，密爾描述了我們現(xiàn)在公認(rèn)的抑動性快感缺乏癥:“我處于一種神經(jīng)遲鈍的狀態(tài)，就像每個(gè)人偶爾都會有的那樣;我不容易享受到快樂，愉快和興奮感;一種在以往時(shí)候是快樂的情緒現(xiàn)在變得平淡或冷漠。”

Mill could take no pleasure from life. This would be bad for most people, but for Mill it pointed to something even more worrying. He had been taught from birth that the ultimate end of life is to maximise humanity’s pleasure and minimise its pain. Mill’s father was a follower of the classical utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, and had raised his son in accordance with Bentham’s views. Bentham went further than Epicurus by making happiness the ultimate appeal of an individual life and the ultimate appeal of morality. For Bentham, all moral, political, and personal questions can be settled by one simple principle – "the greatest happiness for the greatest number". But if that was the one principle to live by, how could Mill justify his own existence, devoid as it was of happiness?

密爾無法從生活中獲得樂趣。這對大多數(shù)人來說都是壞事，但對密爾來說，它指向了更令人擔(dān)憂的事情。他從出生起就被教導(dǎo)，生命的最終目的是最大化人類的快樂，最小化人類的痛苦。密爾的父親是古典功利主義哲學(xué)家杰里米·邊沁的追隨者，并按照邊沁的觀點(diǎn)撫養(yǎng)他的兒子。邊沁比伊壁鳩魯走得更遠(yuǎn)，他把幸福作為個(gè)人生活的終極訴求和道德的終極訴求。對邊沁來說，所有的道德、政治和個(gè)人問題都可以通過一個(gè)簡單的原則來解決，即“為最大多數(shù)人帶來最大的幸福”。但是，如果這是生活的唯一原則，那么密爾又如何為自己的存在辯護(hù)呢?

Through his depression, Mill realised that Bentham’s utilitarian viewpoint, which elevated pleasure to the supreme good, was a "swinish philosophy", suitable only for pigs. Dissatisfaction, unhappiness, and pain are part of the human condition and so "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied", according to Mill. He continued to believe that happiness was deeply important, but came to see that aiming at happiness will rarely lead to it.

通過他的沮喪情緒，密爾意識到邊沁的這種“把快樂提升到至上的善”的功利主義觀點(diǎn)是一種“豬玀哲學(xué)”，只適合豬。不滿、不快樂和痛苦是人類處境的一部分，因此，根據(jù)密爾的說法，“做一個(gè)不滿意的人，好過做一只滿意的豬”。他仍然相信幸福是極其重要的東西，但他逐漸發(fā)現(xiàn)，以幸福為目標(biāo)反而很少會帶來幸福。

Instead, Mill thought that you should aim for other goods, and happiness might be a felicitous by-product. But this also suggests that a good life can be an unhappy one. What Mill recognised was what Aristotle had argued two millennia earlier – the passing pleasure of happiness is secondary to living a good life, or of achieving what Aristotle called eudaimonia.

相反，密爾認(rèn)為，你應(yīng)該以其他東西為目標(biāo)，而幸福可能只是一種恰當(dāng)?shù)母碑a(chǎn)品。但這也表明，美好的生活也可能是不快樂的生活。密爾所認(rèn)識到的，正是亞里士多德在兩千年前提出的觀點(diǎn)，即相對于過上美好的生活，或者達(dá)到亞里士多德所謂的“eudaimonia”，短暫的快樂是次要的。

Eudaimonia is difficult to translate into our contemporary concepts. Some, like the philosopher Julia Annas, translate it directly as "happiness", while others scholars prefer "human flourishing". Whatever the translation, it marks a distinctive contrast to our modern conception of happiness.

eudaimonia很難轉(zhuǎn)化為我們當(dāng)代的概念。包括哲學(xué)家朱莉婭·安納斯在內(nèi)的一些學(xué)者直接將這個(gè)詞翻譯為“幸?！保硪恍W(xué)者更傾向于翻譯為“人類繁榮”。無論翻譯成什么，它都與我們現(xiàn)代對幸福的理解形成了鮮明的對比。

Aristotle’s view of flourishing is complex and complicated because it incorporates individual satisfaction, moral virtue, excellence, good fortune, and political engagement. Unlike Epicurus’s accounting view of pain or Bentham’s "swinish" view of pleasure, Aristotle’s idea of flourishing is as messy as the humans it describes.

亞里士多德關(guān)于繁榮的觀點(diǎn)是復(fù)雜而難懂的，因?yàn)樗藗€(gè)人滿足、道德美德、卓越、好運(yùn)和政治參與。與伊壁鳩魯對痛苦的會計(jì)觀或邊沁對快樂的“豬玀”觀不同，亞里士多德對繁榮的看法就像它所描述的人類一樣混亂。

Like our modern conception of happiness, eudaimonia is the ultimate purpose of life. But unlike happiness, eudaimonia is realised through habits and actions, not through mental states. Happiness is not something you experience or obtain, it’s something you do.

就像我們現(xiàn)代的幸福觀念一樣，eudaimonia是生活的最終目的。但與幸福不同的是，eudaimonia是通過習(xí)慣和行動實(shí)現(xiàn)的，而不是通過精神狀態(tài)實(shí)現(xiàn)。幸福不是你經(jīng)歷或獲得的東西，而是你做的事。


Rather than being a mental state, happiness may be something we obtain from doing things and our habits (Credit: Chris Gorman/Getty Images)
Rather than being a mental state, happiness may be something we obtain from doing things and our habits (Credit: Chris Gorman/Getty Images)

幸?？赡懿皇且环N精神狀態(tài)，而是我們從做事和習(xí)慣中獲得的東西。

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote: "As it is not one swallow or a fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy." In other words, to flourish is the undertaking of a lifetime because it’s something you must cultivate daily through your actions. Like the utilitarians, Aristotle argued that happiness and virtue were inextricably lixed.

亞里士多德在他的《尼各馬可倫理學(xué)》中寫道:“正如不是一只燕子或一個(gè)晴天造就了一個(gè)春天，也不是一天或短時(shí)間內(nèi)就能使一個(gè)人幸運(yùn)和幸福。”換句話說，繁榮是一生的事業(yè)，因?yàn)樗悄惚仨毭刻焱ㄟ^行動來培養(yǎng)的東西。和功利主義者的觀點(diǎn)一樣，亞里士多德認(rèn)為幸福和美德是密不可分的。

For Aristotle, virtue is a characteristic which achieves a mean or middle position between extremes. For example, between the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness lies bravery, between the extremes of the miser and spendthrift lies generosity. Acting so to maintain a balance between extremes is virtuous action. But where the utilitarians reduced morality down to happiness, Aristotle held that virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia. We cannot flourish unvirtuously, but nor is being virtuous a shortcut to eudaimonia. Rather, virtuous action is itself a part of eudaimonia.

在亞里士多德看來，美德是一種在兩個(gè)極端之間達(dá)到中庸或中間地位的特性。例如，在懦弱和蠻勇這兩個(gè)極端之間有勇敢，在守財(cái)奴和揮金如土這兩個(gè)極端之間有慷慨。在兩個(gè)極端之間保持平衡是一種美德。但當(dāng)功利主義者將道德歸結(jié)為幸福時(shí)，亞里士多德認(rèn)為美德是幸福的必要條件，但不是充分條件。我們不能無德地繁榮，但有德也不是通往幸福的捷徑。相反，道德行為本身就是幸福的一部分。

Aristotle argued that the questions of what makes someone happy and what makes someone a good person aren’t separate. The relationship between ethical goodness and living a good life was, Annas claims, the defining question of ancient philosophy. And it’s still our question today.
For Aristotle, we flourish by exercising our uniquely human capabilities to think and reason. But thinking and reasoning are as much social activities as they are individual: "men are not isolated individuals, and the human excellences cannot be practised by hermits". If flourishing requires others, then so does happiness. Happiness is not an emotional state so much as it is the excellence of the relations we cultivate with other people.

亞里士多德認(rèn)為，關(guān)于什么讓“一個(gè)人快樂”和“什么讓一個(gè)人成為好人”這兩個(gè)問題并不是分開的。亞納斯認(rèn)為，道德善與美好生活之間的關(guān)系是古代哲學(xué)的決定性問題。而且這仍然是我們今天的問題。在亞里士多德看來，我們之所以繁榮，是因?yàn)槲覀冞\(yùn)用了人類特有的思考和推理能力。但思考和推理既是社會活動，也是個(gè)人活動?！叭瞬皇枪铝⒌膫€(gè)體，隱士不能實(shí)踐人類的優(yōu)點(diǎn)”。如果繁榮需要別人來實(shí)現(xiàn)，那么幸福也需要別人來實(shí)現(xiàn)。幸福與其說是一種情緒狀態(tài)，不如說是我們與他人建立的良好關(guān)系。

But even that cannot guarantee flourishing. Aristotle recognised that our happiness is hostage to fortune. Events beyond any individual’s control – war, unrequited love, poverty, and global pandemics – will often make flourishing (and happiness with it) impossible.

但即便有了良好關(guān)系，也不能保證繁榮。亞里士多德認(rèn)為我們的幸福是命運(yùn)的人質(zhì)，是任何個(gè)人都無法控制的事件，戰(zhàn)爭、單相思、貧窮和全球流行病等東西往往會使繁榮(以及隨之而來的幸福)成為不可能。

This idea of moral luck does not undermine the pursuit of eudaimonia even when it frustrates it. Happiness is not a mental state that can be permanently won, but instead it’s a practice which we hone, imperfectly, in circumstances only partly of our making.

這種道德運(yùn)氣的觀念并不會破壞人們對幸福的追求，即使這種追求確實(shí)會讓人們感到沮喪。幸福不是一種可以永久獲得的精神狀態(tài)，而是一種我們在不完美的環(huán)境中磨練出來的實(shí)踐。

Recognising this will not secure a good life, but it will dispel the illusory hope of eternal contentment. By misunderstanding happiness, the modern conception increases the likelihood of disappointment. No life worth living should meet the standard set by Epicurean or utilitarian views of happiness, and so its modern adherents are destined to be disillusioned by the blemishes of human life. Instead, aim with Aristotle to embrace those blemishes and to flourish in spite of them.

認(rèn)識到這一點(diǎn)并不能保證美好的生活，但它將驅(qū)散永恒滿足的虛幻希望。由于誤解了幸福，現(xiàn)代觀念增加了失望的可能性。任何有價(jià)值的生活都不應(yīng)該達(dá)到享樂主義或功利主義幸福觀所設(shè)定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，因此現(xiàn)代的追隨者注定會因人類生活的缺陷而幻滅。相反，與亞里士多德一樣，擁抱這些缺陷，并在它們面前茁壯成長才是正解。