Operation Overlord, the landings on the beaches of Normandy on D-Day, was the largest amphibious invasion in modern history, epic in every meaning of the word. Most Americans have been taught that this was the beginning of the end for Hitler’s reign of terror across Europe, that we were there to “personally shoot that paper-hanging son of a bitch” as General Patton so pithily promised in his speech before his Third Army.

霸王行動(dòng)（諾曼底戰(zhàn)役），即D-Day在諾曼底海灘上的登陸行動(dòng)，是現(xiàn)代歷史上規(guī)模最大的兩棲登陸戰(zhàn)，無論從哪個(gè)方面來說都是史詩級(jí)的，大多數(shù)美國人都被教導(dǎo)說，這是終結(jié)希特勒在整個(gè)歐洲的恐怖統(tǒng)治的開始，正如巴頓將軍在他的第三集團(tuán)軍演講中簡練地承諾的那樣，我們?cè)谀抢锸菫榱恕坝H自射殺那個(gè)紙糊的狗娘養(yǎng)的”。

But the key is the date D-Day took place: June 6th, 1944.
There is no doubt that almost every man and woman among the Allied nations would have heartily agreed with the general’s statement and would happily have bought tickets to watch the spectacle. By then, the decision among the Allies was “unconditional surrender” (which decision may well have prolonged the war). No cease-fire, no treaty, no letup in combat until the defeated surrendered without any promises of leniency or clemency by the victorious. We were going all-out for the blood of our enemies.

但關(guān)鍵是諾曼底登陸日（D-Day）的日期: 1944年6月6日。
毫無疑問，同盟國中幾乎每一個(gè)男人和女人都會(huì)衷心地贊同將軍的聲明，甚至樂于買票觀看這一壯觀場(chǎng)面。當(dāng)時(shí)，盟軍的決定是納粹德國必須“無條件投降”( 這個(gè)決定很可能延長了戰(zhàn)爭)。沒有?；?，沒有條約，沒有停戰(zhàn)，直到戰(zhàn)敗者投降，也不會(huì)有任何寬大和仁慈的承諾，我們將全力以赴，讓我們的敵人血流成河。

And hadn’t America and the United Kingdom moved heaven and earth to bring Nazi Germany to heel? There was the Battle of the Atlantic where we had to overcome Admiral D?nitz’ U-boat wolfpacks from 1942 through the end of 1943; Operation Torch where we invaded French North Africa in Nov. 1942 and our still-green troops were handily defeated by General Rommel’s Afrika Korps at the Battle of Kasserine Pass in Feb. 1943; and the invasion of Italy in Sep. 1943 which culminated in the occupation of Rome on June 4th, 1944, a mere two days before the Normandy invasion. Who could possibly claim we hadn’t done all we could to defeat Hitler? This guy could:

難道美國和英國沒有竭盡全力讓納粹德國臣服？
從1942年到1943年底，我們?cè)诖笪餮髴?zhàn)役中戰(zhàn)勝了德尼茨海軍上將的U型潛艇“狼群”;
1942年11月，我們?cè)诨鹁嫘袆?dòng)中攻入法屬北非，1943年2月，我們的軍隊(duì)在凱賽林隘口戰(zhàn)役輕松地被隆美爾將軍的非洲軍團(tuán)擊敗;
1943年9月，我們進(jìn)攻意大利，最終在1944年6月4日占領(lǐng)了羅馬，此時(shí)距離諾曼底登陸只有兩天時(shí)間，那誰能說我們沒有盡全力打敗希特勒呢？這個(gè)人可以：
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Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, one of the most cruel, murderous, and sociopathic humans to have ever lived.
So many Americans to this day don’t realize how the war on the Eastern Front was much greater by orders of magnitude than what our grandfathers faced on the Western Front. All by itself, the Eastern Front is considered the largest and deadliest military confrontation in human history, with nearly twice the total military death toll as in the entirety of World War I, which total does not include up to 24M civilian deaths. This was why as early as summer 1942, Stalin officially requested — begged, in diplomatic terms — both Churchill and FDR to open a second front by invading France. For a bit of perspective, here’s a graphic representation of the price Soviet Russia paid compared to our own (again, not counting the even greater number of civilian lives lost):

蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人約瑟夫 · 斯大林
許多美國人至今沒有意識(shí)到，東線的戰(zhàn)爭比我們的祖先在西線所面臨的戰(zhàn)爭要大得多。單就東線而言，它被認(rèn)為是人類歷史上最大和最致命的軍事對(duì)抗，軍隊(duì)死亡人數(shù)幾乎是整個(gè)第一次世界大戰(zhàn)的兩倍，這還不包括多達(dá)2400萬的平民死亡。這就是為什么早在1942年夏天，斯大林就正式要求——用外交術(shù)語說是乞求——丘吉爾和羅斯福通過進(jìn)攻法國以開辟第二戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)。為了了解情況，這里有一張?zhí)K維埃俄國與我們所付出代價(jià)的圖表（ 同樣，沒有計(jì)算平民死亡）：


So why didn’t we invade earlier? Was it even possible to do so while the Battle of the Atlantic still raged? And if we had been able to carry out such an invasion, could we have done so without setting our green troops up to be massacred by the Nazis, many of whom were hardened veterans blooded on the steppes of the Eastern Front?
Yes, it does seem we could have, but chose not to do so. Why?

那么，我們?yōu)槭裁床辉琰c(diǎn)進(jìn)攻？在大西洋戰(zhàn)役仍在進(jìn)行的時(shí)候，有可能這樣做嗎？如果我們能夠發(fā)起這樣的進(jìn)攻，我們能否做到不使我們的部隊(duì)被納粹屠殺，其中許多人是在東線大草原上浴血奮戰(zhàn)的老兵？
是的，看來我們確實(shí)可以這樣做，但卻選擇不這樣做，為什么呢？

Operation Torch — the invasion of French North Africa — was largely unnecessary. The Afrika Korps had been soundly defeated at the Second Battle of El Alamein by General Montgomery’s Desert Rats and no longer presented a real danger to Egypt, the crucial Suez Canal, and the Persian oil fields.The Battle of the Atlantic was not an obstacle to the invasion itself. One must bear in mind that during the Battle of the Atlantic, U-boats almost never attacked British or U.S. Navy vessels. Their targets were the merchantmen, the cargo vessels carrying not just military supplies, but also the food, fuel, and raw materiel needed so badly by the civilian population of the United Kingdom. The U-boat commanders refrained from attacking Navy vessels because to do so was to court death from the destroyers, cruisers, and — later — the aircraft carriers whose pilots increasingly specialized in sub-hunting. Instead of being used to invade French North Africa in late 1942, they could have been used in the North Atlantic to more safely shepherd the convoys and bring the U-boat threat to an end much more quickly.

“火炬行動(dòng)”——進(jìn)攻法屬北非——基本上是沒有必要的。非洲軍團(tuán)在第二次阿拉曼戰(zhàn)役被“沙漠之狐”蒙哥馬利將軍徹底擊敗，不再對(duì)埃及、至關(guān)重要的蘇伊士運(yùn)河和波斯的油田構(gòu)成真正的威脅。
大西洋之戰(zhàn)并不是進(jìn)攻本身的一個(gè)障礙。我們必須牢記，在大西洋之戰(zhàn)期間，U型潛艇幾乎從未攻擊過英國或美國海軍的船只。
他們的目標(biāo)是商船，這些貨船不僅運(yùn)送軍事物資，而且還運(yùn)送英國平民急需的食品、燃料和原材料。U型潛艇指揮官避免攻擊海軍艦艇，因?yàn)檫@樣做會(huì)招致驅(qū)逐艦、巡洋艦以及后來的航空母艦的致命打擊，而航空母艦的飛行員也越來越擅長獵殺潛艇，在1942年末，他們沒有被用來進(jìn)攻法屬北非，而是可以在北大西洋被用來更安全地護(hù)送護(hù)航船隊(duì)，并更快地結(jié)束U型潛艇的威脅。

After losing the Battle of Britain in September 1940, Hitler had effectively ceded air superiority over the English Channel to the Royal Air Force and had sent most of Goering’s vaunted Luftwaffe to support the ongoing invasion of the Soviet unx.In his history of World War II, Churchill stated that one of the major obstacles to Operation Sea Lion — Hitler’s planned invasion of England itself — was that it had to occur before the end of summer, before the notorious weather of the English Channel became unpredictable and made any large-scale crossing impossible. The same dynamic would have applied in the opposite direction as well, so, combined with the ongoing Battle of the Atlantic, it would be understandable for the Allies to not be able to invade in 1942.

1940年9月不列顛戰(zhàn)役失敗后，希特勒實(shí)際上已將英吉利海峽的空中優(yōu)勢(shì)讓給了英國皇家空軍，并將戈林吹噓的大部分德國空軍派去支持正在進(jìn)行的對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的入侵。
丘吉爾在他的二戰(zhàn)史中說，希特勒計(jì)劃入侵英國本土的"海獅行動(dòng)" 的主要障礙之一是，它必須在夏末之前發(fā)生，在英吉利海峽臭名昭著的天氣變得不可預(yù)測(cè)并使任何大規(guī)模穿越變得不可能之前。同樣的情況也會(huì)發(fā)生在相反的方向，因此，結(jié)合正在進(jìn)行的大西洋之戰(zhàn)，盟軍無法在1942年進(jìn)攻是可以理解的。

In other words, an invasion of the northern coast of France in the spring or summer of 1943 was entirely doable, especially had it been given the additional resources — men, materiel, supply, and naval support — which had instead been sent to conduct and support the invasions of French North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.
But what was the condition of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of 1943? Did FDR and Churchill have reason to believe an invasion of the northern coast of France was doomed to failure?
Invasion of Sicily by British and American troops. “Sir, I think Hitler’s not here, but in Germany. Why are we here instead, sir?”

換句話說，在1943年春季或夏季進(jìn)攻法國北部海岸是完全可行的，特別是如果它得到了額外的資源：人員、物資、補(bǔ)給和海軍支持，而這些資源卻被派去進(jìn)行和支持對(duì)法屬北非、西西里和意大利的進(jìn)攻。
但在1943年初，德國國防軍的狀況如何？羅斯福和丘吉爾是否有理由相信對(duì)法國北部海岸的進(jìn)攻注定要失??？



圖：英國和美國軍隊(duì)進(jìn)攻西西里島，"長官，我認(rèn)為希特勒不在這里，而是在德國，為什么我們反而在這里，長官？"

December 1941, the beginning of the long, slow death of the Wehrmacht

1941年12月，德國國防軍漫長而緩慢的死亡的開始

The first major defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front was not at Stalingrad, but at the Battle of Moscow, which had ended almost exactly a year earlier. The Germans had pushed to the very outskirts of Moscow by late November 1941, but the Red Army’s counteroffensive, spearheaded by eighteen fresh divisions from the Soviet Far East, was launched on nearly the same day that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7th, 1941. Those divisions — all long-accustomed to and trained to fight in the bitter Siberian cold — had been hurriedly transferred after Soviet spy Richard Sorge had informed the Kremlin that Japan was certainly not planning any invasion of Siberia, and by January 7th, 1942, those fresh and winter-hardened Soviet divisions had driven the Wehrmacht nearly 100 miles away from the Soviet capital.

德國國防軍在東線的第一次重大失敗不是斯大林格勒戰(zhàn)役，而是幾乎整整一年前結(jié)束的莫斯科戰(zhàn)役。1941年11月底，德軍已經(jīng)推進(jìn)到莫斯科的外圍，但遭到紅軍的反攻，由蘇聯(lián)遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)的十八個(gè)新編師率領(lǐng)，幾乎就在1941年12月7日日本偷襲珍珠港的同一天發(fā)動(dòng)。這十八個(gè)師長期適應(yīng)并受訓(xùn)在西伯利亞的嚴(yán)寒中作戰(zhàn)，并在蘇聯(lián)間諜理查德索爾格告知克里姆林宮，日本肯定沒有計(jì)劃入侵西伯利亞后被匆匆調(diào)走，到1942年1月7日，這些新加入的、經(jīng)過冬季磨練的蘇聯(lián)師已經(jīng)將德國國防軍趕到離蘇聯(lián)首都近100英里遠(yuǎn)的地方。

America was soon informed of the Nazi defeat at the Battle of Moscow — the Soviets made sure of it by releasing a propaganda film named “Moscow Strikes Back” in New York City in February of 1942, less than two months after the end of the battle. In fact, the film was one of four winners at the 15th Academy Awards for Best Documentary. We now know that Hitler likely caused the defeat himself by delaying the initial advance on Moscow by two months, thus forcing the Wehrmacht to conduct an offensive to take the Russian capital just as the Russian winter was about to begin, and with precious little winter gear for the troops and equipment. His generals had to be thinking — but were too afraid for their lives to say out loud — “what the hell are you thinking, you blithering idiot?”

美國很快得知納粹在莫斯科戰(zhàn)役中失敗的消息——蘇聯(lián)于1942年2月在紐約發(fā)行了一部名為《莫斯科反擊戰(zhàn)》的宣傳影片，確保了這一消息的真實(shí)性，當(dāng)時(shí)距莫斯科戰(zhàn)役結(jié)束不到兩個(gè)月。事實(shí)上，這部電影是第15屆奧斯卡最佳紀(jì)錄片獎(jiǎng)的四個(gè)獲獎(jiǎng)影片之一。我們現(xiàn)在知道，可能是希特勒自己導(dǎo)致了這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)役的失敗，因?yàn)樗麑?duì)莫斯科的進(jìn)攻推遲了兩個(gè)月，迫使德國國防軍在俄羅斯嚴(yán)寒的冬季即將開始的時(shí)候發(fā)動(dòng)進(jìn)攻，以奪取蘇聯(lián)首都，而且裝備和冬裝都少得可憐。他手下的將軍們不得不思考——但他們太害怕丟了性命，不敢大聲說出來——“ 你到底在想什么，你這個(gè)喋喋不休的白癡? ”
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Soviet trenches outside Moscow, 1941.
At least they had winter clothing. Many of the German soldiers didn’t. (Pinterest)


圖：1941年，莫斯科郊外的蘇軍戰(zhàn)壕，至少他們有冬裝，許多德國士兵卻沒有

On a side note, in WWI, when Hitler was but a corporal yet to win his Iron Cross for courage under fire, the German Army was sent to war against France in August of 1914 without being supplied with proper winter clothing. They had been assured by Kaiser Wilhelm II (who assumed they would defeat France as easily as they had in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870) that “You’ll be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees.” It is truly ironic that Hitler, having lived with the results of that very blunder, would make the same mistake after having made the same assumption when he launched Operation Barbarossa.

順便說一下，在一戰(zhàn)中，當(dāng)時(shí)希特勒還只是一個(gè)下士，還沒有因?yàn)樵趹?zhàn)火中的勇氣贏得鐵十字勛章，德國軍隊(duì)于1914年8月被派往法國作戰(zhàn)，卻沒有獲得合適的冬裝。德皇威廉二世曾向他們保證: “你們會(huì)在樹葉落下之前回家?！蓖勒J(rèn)為，他們會(huì)像1870年在普法戰(zhàn)爭一樣輕易地?fù)魯》▏?，真正具有諷刺意味的是，希特勒是經(jīng)歷了這一失誤的嚴(yán)重后果的，但他還在發(fā)動(dòng)巴巴羅薩行動(dòng)時(shí)犯下了同樣的錯(cuò)誤。

In other words, by early 1942 both FDR and Churchill knew that history was likely beginning to rhyme once more, that the Wehrmacht were about to relive Napoleon’s greatest blunder. But in early 1942, America was still recovering, getting its wits together following the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was no real hope that they could invade the northern coast of Nazi-occupied France before the English Channel would make such a crossing untenable in September.
Seen in this light, the Battle of Stalingrad, in every respect the most terrible battle of the war, was not the turning point of the war as it has been considered for generations. Instead, it was more of a horrific speed bump on the way down the steepening decline of the once-invincible Wehrmacht. That, and it was — it had to be — final confirmation to the West that the Red Army was going to defeat the Wehrmacht, that it was only a matter of time before General Georgy Zhukov would be knocking back shots of vodka in Berlin.

換句話說，1942年初，羅斯福和丘吉爾都知道，歷史很可能再次重演，德國國防軍即將重蹈拿破侖犯下的最大失誤。
但在1942年初，美國仍在恢復(fù)中，在經(jīng)歷了珍珠港的襲擊事件之后，美國人開始變得機(jī)智起來，在英吉利海峽于9月使這種穿越無法維持之前，他們沒有真指望能夠進(jìn)攻納粹占領(lǐng)的法國北部海岸。
從這個(gè)角度來看，這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭中最可怕的戰(zhàn)役——斯大林格勒戰(zhàn)役，并不是幾代人所認(rèn)為的戰(zhàn)爭的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。相反，它更像是曾經(jīng)戰(zhàn)無不勝的國防軍在日益衰落的道路上的一個(gè)可怕的減速帶，這是——也必須是——向西方證明了蘇聯(lián)紅軍將打敗德國國防軍的最后證據(jù)，格奧爾基 · 朱可夫?qū)④娫诎亓执罂诤确丶又皇菚r(shí)間問題。
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The Red Army raises the Soviet flag above the Reichstag in Berlin

圖：紅軍在柏林國會(huì)大廈上方升起蘇聯(lián)國旗

Cruel calculus

殘酷的算計(jì)

Still, why would Churchill and FDR — being the two men in whose hands lay the final decision — decide to delay an invasion of Nazi-occupied France, but instead send the troops to places where they did not present a clear and present danger to the Third Reich? Because the cruel calculus of America’s and the UK’s national interests presented a serendipitous opportunity for payback — not just against Nazi Germany, but against the Soviet unx.The antipathy of the western democracies towards Com...ism was implacable long before Russia’s October Revolution in 1917. American captains of industry were continually on the watch for the next Eugene Debs or Huey P. Long, for the next demagogue who would push for socialist reforms in a capitalist nation. Both America and England had been horrified at Lenin’s successful revolution — we even sent a few thousand troops to support Kerensky’s White Army against Lenin’s Red Army in 1919.

盡管如此，為什么丘吉爾和羅斯福——這兩個(gè)掌握著最終決定權(quán)的人——會(huì)決定推遲對(duì)納粹占領(lǐng)下的法國的進(jìn)攻，而把部隊(duì)派往不會(huì)對(duì)第三帝國構(gòu)成明顯和現(xiàn)實(shí)威脅的地方？
因?yàn)檫@是美國和英國國家利益的殘酷考量，這提供了一個(gè)偶然的報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)會(huì)——不僅報(bào)復(fù)納粹德國，還報(bào)復(fù)蘇聯(lián)。
早在1917年俄國十月革命之前，西方民主國家對(duì)共產(chǎn)主義的反感就已經(jīng)不可調(diào)和。美國的工業(yè)巨頭們一直在密切關(guān)注下一個(gè)尤金 · 德布斯或休伊 · P · 朗，等待下一個(gè)在資本主義國家推行社會(huì)主義改革的煽動(dòng)家。美國和英國都對(duì)列寧成功的革命深感恐懼——1919年，我們甚至派出幾千人的軍隊(duì)支持克倫斯基的白軍對(duì)抗列寧的紅軍。
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So when America and the United Kingdom saw Nazi Germany making war on Soviet Russia, they didn’t see “bad guy versus good guy”, but “bad guy versus bad guy”. In fact, the future president Harry S. Truman stated:
“If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.”
Of course we never helped Nazi Germany as Truman suggested…unless it was by not invading France to start that second front that Stalin wanted so badly.
That, and Churchill wanted — in modern terms — payback. Up until the very month Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet unx had been sending hundreds of thousands of tons of raw materials for the Nazi war effort, even after the Wehrmacht had crushed France and the Luftwaffe was warring for supremacy in the skies over London. Churchill had to know that at least some of those aircraft dropping bombs on London were there because of the raw materials the Soviets had supplied to Hitler.

因此，當(dāng)美國和英國看到納粹德國向蘇維埃俄國開戰(zhàn)時(shí)，他們看到的不是 "壞人vs好人"，而是 "壞人vs壞人"。
事實(shí)上，未來的總統(tǒng)哈里杜魯門曾表示：
" 如果我們看到德國贏了，我們就應(yīng)該幫助俄國，如果俄國贏了，我們就應(yīng)該幫助德國，這樣可以讓他們盡可能多地相互殺戮，盡管我在任何情況下都不想看到希特勒勝利。"
當(dāng)然，我們從來沒有像杜魯門建議的那樣幫助納粹德國......除非是不入侵法國來開辟斯大林非常希望的第二戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)。
這一點(diǎn)，以及丘吉爾想要--用現(xiàn)代的話說--回報(bào)。直到希特勒發(fā)動(dòng)巴巴羅薩行動(dòng)的那個(gè)月，蘇聯(lián)一直在為納粹的戰(zhàn)爭努力輸送數(shù)十萬噸的原材料，甚至在德國國防軍擊潰法國和德國空軍在倫敦上空爭奪霸權(quán)之后。丘吉爾必須知道，在那些向倫敦投擲炸彈的飛機(jī)中，至少有一部分是因?yàn)樘K聯(lián)向希特勒提供了原材料。

A political cartoon published after the German-Russian Nonaggression Pact was signed in 1939

《蘇德互不侵犯條約》1939年簽署后發(fā)表的政治漫畫

The western Allies knew that Hitler was beaten, that he had no hope of stopping the advance of the Red Army. By the end of April 1944, the Red Army had beaten the Wehrmacht back almost completely outside the Soviet unx, all the way to the Polish frontier. The problem, the Allies saw, was no longer Hitler, but the Soviet unx. Once the Soviets took over Nazi Germany, what was to stop them from continuing their march westward through the Low Countries into France, to “save” Western Europe from Nazi occupiers that still remained? They realized that if they did not invade France, it too would soon be behind what Churchill in a 1946 speech termed the “Iron Curtain”.

西方盟國知道，希特勒被打敗了，他沒有希望阻止紅軍的前進(jìn)。到1944年4月底，紅軍幾乎把德國國防軍完全打回了蘇聯(lián)境外，一直打到波蘭邊境。盟軍看到，問題不再是希特勒，而是蘇聯(lián)。一旦蘇聯(lián)占領(lǐng)了納粹德國，又有什么能阻止他們繼續(xù)向西進(jìn)軍，通過低地國家進(jìn)入法國，從仍然存在的納粹占領(lǐng)者手中 "拯救 "西歐？
他們意識(shí)到，如果他們不進(jìn)攻法國，法國也將很快被置于丘吉爾在1946年一次演講中所稱的 "鐵幕 "之后。

This, then, is why America, the United Kingdom, and the British Commonwealth invaded the beaches of Normandy on June 6th, 1944: not to defeat Hitler, but to prevent the Soviet unx from taking over the rest of continental Europe.
Addendum: Several readers disagreed with my article’s contention, and I was able to respond effectively (IMHO) to all of them…except for one. John Griswold pointed out that by invading Italy, we were able to keep 70 divisions pinned down and unable to assist the 33 German divisions sent to repel the invasion at Normandy. I don’t have a good argument against that, so I must admit that it looks like I could very well be mistaken, and he deserves the credit (and my gratitude) for pointing out my error. Give him a follow — the man knows whereof he speaks.

因此，這就是為什么美國、英國和英聯(lián)邦國家在1944年6月6日發(fā)起諾曼底登陸戰(zhàn)役的原因：
不是為了打敗希特勒，而是為了阻止蘇聯(lián)接管歐洲大陸的其余部分。
補(bǔ)充：有幾位讀者不同意我的文章的論點(diǎn)，我能夠有效地 ( 恕我直言 ) 回應(yīng)所有的讀者，只有一個(gè)人除外，John Griswold，他指出，通過進(jìn)攻意大利，我們能牽制住德軍70個(gè)師，使其無法協(xié)助被派去擊退諾曼底進(jìn)攻的33個(gè)德國師，我沒有很好的理由反對(duì)這一點(diǎn)，所以我必須承認(rèn)，看起來我很可能是錯(cuò)的，他指出了我的錯(cuò)誤，理應(yīng)得到贊揚(yáng) ( 和我的感激 )，請(qǐng)給他一個(gè)關(guān)注——這個(gè)人知道自己在說什么。