軍壇網(wǎng)友比較中美俄歐各家航天科技實力，展望未來中俄乃至與印度間的航天合作前景（二）

Richard Santos
would china trust russia to lunch it’s own prestige space hardware?
Russia’s Zarya module was constructed not by Russia but by the late soviet unx before it dissolved as an additional module for the Mir space station. Russia’s contribution was to repurpose inherited hardware for use in the ISS. Given the very spotty track record of Russian space endeavor with anything that was even partially developed after the dissolution of the USSR, I would not suppose Russia to be capable of developing a reliable follow on the Zarya today.
Also, keep in mind the only real collaborative joint space effort between china and russia up to today, the Fobos-Grunt mars mission, failed spectacularly because multiple elementary failures of Russian upper stage. Having many elementary systems fail does not lend confidence to Russian ability to make anything complex work with a reasonable number of tries.
The russian inability to get simple things it has done many times before working during actually mission contrasts sharply with the meticulous Chinese approach, which test the hell out of everything and then succeeds in acoompolishing multiple envelope pushing features simultaneously on the first try in space
One might say this culture difference is likely to make any serious collaborative effort between Rosocosmos and CNSA a marriage made in hell.
BTW, the russian space culture of not testing throughly before hand and accepting many mission failures actually dates to the very beginning of the Soviet Space program. So it is not something that even if Rosocomos shape up in the next 5 years, it is likely to completely move away from.

中國真的能放心讓俄羅斯來大量發(fā)射自己昂貴無比的航天硬件設(shè)備嗎？
俄羅斯的曙光艙（Zarya）可不是俄羅斯制造的，那是在蘇聯(lián)解體前，為和平號空間站設(shè)計制造的附加模塊。俄羅斯的貢獻(xiàn)，只是將蘇聯(lián)留下的這一遺產(chǎn)，搬到了國際空間站上。鑒于蘇聯(lián)解體后俄羅斯太空計劃的表現(xiàn)，我不認(rèn)為今天的俄羅斯還能開發(fā)出可靠的曙光艙后續(xù)型號。
還有，不要忘了，迄今為止中俄間唯一一次真正的太空合作——即螢火一號（由俄羅斯“福布斯－土壤（Fobos Grunt）”探測器搭載），就因為俄羅斯火箭上面級一系列基本功能故障而離奇地失敗了。這無疑讓我對俄羅斯人更沒信心。
他們甚至做不到在一次實際任務(wù)執(zhí)行前，先把自己已經(jīng)使用過多次的某些基本裝置調(diào)試好——這簡直和中國人做事細(xì)致入微的習(xí)慣形成了極端反差。要知道，中國人常常是通過海量地測試一切可測試數(shù)據(jù)，然后在首次實際太空任務(wù)中就成功地讓多個（新）系統(tǒng)、多種（新）功能同時正常工作。
至少在部分人看來，這種文化差異很可能導(dǎo)致俄聯(lián)邦宇航局（ROSCOSMOS）和中國國家航天局之間開展的任何實質(zhì)性合作，變成一場災(zāi)難般的聯(lián)姻。
順帶說一句，俄羅斯人的航天文化——在實際上手前不愛進(jìn)行徹底全面的測試、并似乎對大量任務(wù)失敗容忍度極高——可以直接追溯到蘇聯(lián)太空計劃早期。因此就算俄羅斯聯(lián)邦航天局在未來五年里大力整頓一番，這種文化風(fēng)氣也很難被徹底移除。

Nutrient
Yet Russia's Proton launchers are quite reliable; they have made access to the ISS routine. For many years, the only way for US astronauts to visit the ISS was to go Russia first. You like to laugh at the alleged Russian incompetence, but keep the Proton in mind -- it has an excellent record for reliability.
As I mentioned earlier about the moon base, let's not forget launch rate. With Russia's involvement, twice as many launches will be possible than China could probably do by itself. The extra launches will be very important for supplying a large lunar base.

但俄羅斯的質(zhì)子火箭還是相當(dāng)可靠的；它們已經(jīng)是定期往返于國際空間站的運載工具。在過去很多年里，美國宇航員要上國際空間站唯一的途徑，就是先去俄羅斯。你大可嘲笑你口中俄羅斯的“無能”，但你不能否認(rèn)質(zhì)子火箭——它在可靠性方面記錄極佳。
比如我前面提到的為建立月球基地而不能不考慮的發(fā)射頻次問題。在俄羅斯的參與下，可能可以把中國自身能承擔(dān)的發(fā)射數(shù)量直接翻倍。這一發(fā)射增量對支撐一個大型月球基地將至關(guān)重要。

Richard Santos
As i said, the primary value of Russia in any space endeavor is a fleet of efficient boosters, and the soyuz capsule, inherited from the soviet unx.
both of these achieved their eventual reliability by being allowed to fail many times in actual service, bespeaking a cultural approach to reliability that differs sharply from those of CNSA.

我想我前面已經(jīng)說過了，俄羅斯在任何聯(lián)合太空任務(wù)中如果還有什么大的價值，也就只剩一批高性能發(fā)動機(jī)了，或許還有從蘇聯(lián)繼承下來的聯(lián)盟號飛船。
而這兩樣?xùn)|西，都是通過前期粗放式地進(jìn)行大量任務(wù)、承受多次失敗后才最終換來的可靠性——而這完全是一種與中國國家航天局截然不同的“可靠性”認(rèn)知文化。

Nutrient
Yet Russia's Proton launchers have remained reliable. If I were a cosmonaut or astronaut, I would certianly prefer to be launched by a Proton than by some flaky exploding SpaceX vehicle.
Russia could contribute far more than that. @plawolf mentioned low-g experience. I have added life support and doubled launch rate. Even if the Russians contributed only reliable launchers, that would be quite enough reason to partner with them: the launch is by far the most important step into space.
Nonsense. Early US launchers were famous for blowing up, and the Apollo 1 astronauts (Gus Grissom, Ed White, Roger Chaffee) burned to death; I doubt you would accuse the Americans of a cultural failing

然而你還是無法否定俄羅斯質(zhì)子火箭的可靠性。如果我是一名航天員，我絕對寧可乘坐質(zhì)子號，而不是動不動就炸成屑屑的SpaceX。
俄羅斯?jié)撛诘呢暙I(xiàn)價值也遠(yuǎn)不止這些，前面@plawolf已經(jīng)提到他們大量的低重力環(huán)境經(jīng)驗，相應(yīng)的生命維持系統(tǒng)，以及我說的發(fā)射次數(shù)翻倍！就算俄羅斯人只能提供一款可靠的火箭，這也足以構(gòu)成把他們納入合作的充分理由：火箭發(fā)射至今仍是人類進(jìn)入太空最重要的一環(huán)。
至于文化風(fēng)氣什么的就是胡扯了。早期的美國火箭同樣以動不動就爆炸聞名！我想你不會因為阿波羅1號的宇航員（維吉爾·格里森、愛德華·懷特、羅杰·查菲）被燒死就指責(zé)美國人“太空文化”有缺陷吧？

Richard Santos
early American launchers, when they were still mostly just a civilian face for the military ballistic missile programs, certainly did have the culture of let’s see what happens. But when the truly civilian side of US space program began to receive strong political and budgetary support, the culture of through exhaustive tests quickly took hold. That doesn’t mean there were no failures. Apollo one being one example. But the track record of high probability of 1 round success and relatively low probability of subsequent failure was impressive. Saturn 5, the most ambitious rocket attempted in that era or any other, succeeded on the first launch and never had a failure, because everything had been tested to death on the ground before the rocket was ever assembled. The soviet equivalent, the N-1, had a 100% failure rate. N-1’s complex first stage fuel distribution system had never been tested on the ground before the first launch. it blew up and destroyed the rocket.
yes, if the soviets didn’t give up, I am sure after a few more failures they would eventually iron out all the bugs and by now the N-1 would be quite impressively reliable. but the difference in early failure rate still illustrate the difference in engineering culture.
The chinese, if anything, is much more methodical and painstaking than NASA.

早期的美國火箭裝置，當(dāng)它們還只是軍用彈道導(dǎo)彈的一個民用化分支時，當(dāng)然也存在那種“行或不行先試試看”的風(fēng)氣。但當(dāng)美國太空計劃真正作為一項非軍事工程開始獲得強(qiáng)大的政治和預(yù)算支持后，“全面徹底測試驗收”的文化很快就確立起來了。當(dāng)然這并不意味著不發(fā)生事故。但就一次（首次）成功率、連續(xù)發(fā)射失敗概率等歷史記錄而言，他們的表現(xiàn)令人印象深刻。例如，土星5號火箭——人類有史以來最具雄心的一款巨型火箭——首次發(fā)射即成功，并且此后發(fā)射從未失敗——正是得益于在火箭組裝發(fā)射前，它的每一部分都已經(jīng)通過了細(xì)致到不能再細(xì)致的地面測試。與之相比，蘇聯(lián)的N-1火箭，發(fā)射成功率則是0%（共4次試射全部失敗，1976年取消）！N-1火箭錯綜復(fù)雜的第一級燃料分配系統(tǒng)，竟然在首次發(fā)射前從未進(jìn)行過地面測試！它在發(fā)射時爆炸并摧毀了整個火箭。
沒錯，如果蘇聯(lián)人沒有放棄N-1火箭，我相信在足夠多次失敗之后，他們最終能解決所有問題；今天的N-1火箭也將可能非常可靠。但早期失敗率的巨大反差，仍能說明兩國工程文化的不同。
如果把中國人也加入進(jìn)來比較的話，那么他們只會比美國宇航局更有條理、更勤奮。

gelgoog
Ever heard the expression "if it isn't broke don't fix it"? The modern Soyuz 2 rocket has had major changes where it matters. It has fully digital avionics, and it has a staged combustion upper stage engine to increase performance. It also has an enlarged shroud to deliver larger volume commercial payloads. The modern Soyuz capsule also has fully digital avionics and larger usable internal volume. Lockheed had to buy Russian engines because they could not manufacture anything better. Do you really think they pay the Russians out of the goodness of their own hearts?
Russia in 2019 did 25 launches and the USA did 21 launches.

有沒有聽過這句老話：“東西沒有壞，就別急著修”？如今的聯(lián)盟-2火箭在一些關(guān)鍵技術(shù)上進(jìn)行了重大升級，它擁有全數(shù)字化航空電子設(shè)備，并配備了分級燃燒的高性能發(fā)動機(jī)。它還有一個放大的整流罩，以提供更大體積的商業(yè)有效載荷。
新版的聯(lián)盟號太空艙同樣升級了全數(shù)字化航天電子設(shè)備，擁有更大的可用內(nèi)部體積。洛克希德仍不得不購買俄羅斯發(fā)動機(jī)，因為他們自己造不出更好的。你難道認(rèn)為他們是看到俄羅斯太窮才好心付錢給他們？
2019年，俄羅斯成功進(jìn)行了25次航天發(fā)射，美國只進(jìn)行了21次。

anzha
China and Russia are seeking partners to join their moon effort
Should India join the Russo-Chinese lunar base?

中國和俄羅斯正在尋找其它合作伙伴加入他們的登月計劃。
你們認(rèn)為印度是否應(yīng)該參與中-俄月球基地項目？

plawolf
OH HELL NO


千萬不要！
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處

Richard Santos
India is even less likely than Russia to be willing to contribute what will de facto be a primarily Chinese endeavor. India also has less to contribute than even Russia. So it seems unlikely China will see any value in making any sort of concession to bring India onboard.
The only way India will participate is if there is some improbable seismic shift in India’s geopolitical outlook, and China feels india could be pried away from the American into the Chinese camp, in some Chinese equivalent of Nixon going to China.
But for India to participate would be a statement of fuck you from India to the US. India is in no position to make such a statement now or in the foreseeable future. While India may resent being treated high handedly and transactionally by the US, India fears anything China gains in the long run must be India’s loss.

相比俄羅斯，印度更不可能情愿為這種實際上就是中國主導(dǎo)的項目做貢獻(xiàn)。何況就算想，印度的價值恐怕還遠(yuǎn)不及俄羅斯。因此，中國似乎不太可能作出任何讓步以謀求印度的參與，這看不出任何意義。
讓印度參與的唯一可能是，如果印度的地緣政治前景發(fā)生某種（不大可能發(fā)生的）地震式變化，讓中國感覺到有可能把它從美國那邊拉到自己的陣營來——就像當(dāng)年尼克松拉攏中國那樣。
但對印度來說，如果能參與中俄主導(dǎo)的太空計劃，就如同對美國大喊一聲“去你M的”。印度在可預(yù)見的未來，能對美國如此硬氣的機(jī)會恐怕都不多。不過呢，雖然印度可能會因美國對待它時的高壓態(tài)度心懷不滿，但畢竟印度更擔(dān)心的仍然是中國——從長遠(yuǎn)看，中國獲得的任何收益，似乎都相當(dāng)于“印度的等量損失”。

weig2000
In any case, I doubt India would seek to join the joint China-Russia program given the state of relationship between India and China and India's perception that it is a strategic competitor with China in every front. China would probably be receptive to India joining the program, not so much to look for contribution either financially or technically; it would be mostly political and diplomatic.

鑒于中印關(guān)系的現(xiàn)狀以及印度“認(rèn)定”中國在幾乎所有方面都是它的戰(zhàn)略競爭對手，想遍一切可能場境我都不信印度會尋求加入中俄太空計劃。中國倒是有可能接受印度加入該項目（如果印度申請的話），不是為了尋求財政和技術(shù)上的“印度貢獻(xiàn)”，而主要是地緣政治和外交上的考慮。

ougoah
India does indeed consider any gain/progress China makes is at their loss because they see China as their number 1/2 adversary tied with Pakistan but Pakistan is a lower existential threat (in case of actual war). Therefore any gain your main enemy makes of course puts you at a greater gap. The chauvinistic Hindutva bhakts despise this, ignore, deny, self-delude, re-interpret, and dismiss all this, depending on the individual. Their state is thoroughly incompetent and wouldn't know how to even chase its own tail effectively. So there are layers of how and why India is not a fitting partner on any important cooperation because of government incompetence and an almost homogenous intolerance and hatred for anything China.

印度還真是把任何中國取得的進(jìn)步，都看作是自己的損失了。他們把中國視為和巴基斯坦同等優(yōu)先的首要敵人，而巴基斯坦（在實戰(zhàn)中）的威脅又低得多。因此，主要敵人獲得的任何收益當(dāng)然都會使你處于更落后的境地。
那些虔誠的沙文主義印度教信徒們痛恨這一點，他們無視、否認(rèn)中國的任何進(jìn)步，自欺欺人地對這一切進(jìn)行各求心安式的“重新解讀”。他們的國家則表現(xiàn)出徹頭徹尾的無能，甚至連“瞎忙活、白做工”的事都毫無效率。綜上，既有政府的絕對無能，又有個體層面上普遍的對“中國的一切”近乎同質(zhì)性的排斥、憎恨，在任何重大合作領(lǐng)域，印度都絕對不是中國理想的伙伴。

Richard Santos
Having had much contact with the Indian diaspora, I can say there is no homogenous intolerance or hatred for anything chinese. Amongst the particularly stridently nationalistic, there is a sense that India and China is locked in a zero sum game and China is the more ruthless, cohesive and disciplined player, therefore india must seize any opportunity to avoid falling behind. But amongst much of the educated class, there is respect and admiration of Chinese accomplishment, and jealousy.
In many ways, Indians, like the Chinese, tend to take a longer view than is prent amongst Americans. But uncontrolled media makes it more attractive for the politically opportunistic in the Indian ruling class to appeal to the rash, loud, easily excitable, here thinking and emotionally impulsive elements that is present in any society, and allow such appeal to drive action and policy beyond what might be considered prudent boundaries. The political opinion in India feels india has room to maneuver in a world where the US and China are antagonistic because US can give india a lot, and in the long run the US needs India at least as much as India needs the US.
There are opinions in India that says allying with the US against China is nonetheless dangerous, because the US can be fickle and transactional in how it treats India. If one day another serious threat to US hegemony arose elsewhere, the US may decide an rapprochement with China is in its better interest, so leaving an india that had been hostile to China on America’s behalf out in the cold. But prevailing opinion in India seem to attribute china’s faster growth over the last 4 decades to China having received a lot from the US as a result of China siding with the US during the last decade of the Cold War. Therefore just as China could bootstrap herself up during the last 40myears by being an de facto American ally during an US - USSR confrontation, so india could bootstrap herself up by being an American ally during an US - China confrontation.

我和印度僑民有過很多接觸，我并沒有觀察到你所說的“對中國的一切近乎一致的排斥、憎恨”。只是在部分民族主義情緒特別強(qiáng)的人中間，有一種認(rèn)為印度和中國被鎖定在了一場零和游戲里、而中國是一個更無情卻更有凝聚力和紀(jì)律性玩家的感覺——因此印度必須抓住一切可能機(jī)會以避免落后。但在他們受過良好教育的階層中的許多人那里，你都能感覺到他們對中國人成就的尊重和欽佩，甚至有那么點嫉妒。
在許多方面，印度人和中國人一樣，傾向于比美國人更長遠(yuǎn)地看待問題。但或許是在印度國內(nèi)，不受控的媒體讓其統(tǒng)治階級中那些政治機(jī)會主義者更容易出頭，他們通過煽動任何社會中都必然存在的無腦、囂張、情緒化、易沖動的那部分人，謀求其助推自己的個人目標(biāo)或政見，突破那些謹(jǐn)慎、合理的政治邊界。然而印度普遍的政治觀點還是，在中美相互敵對的世界里，印度才有回旋余地，美國可以提供給印度的更多，從長遠(yuǎn)看，美國需要印度至少和印度需要美國的程度相當(dāng)。
但印度也仍有觀點認(rèn)為，與美國結(jié)盟對抗中國是危險的，因為美國對待印度的方式可能變化無常、陰晴不定。如果有一天，美國霸權(quán)主義的另一個嚴(yán)重威脅出現(xiàn)在地球另一頭，美國可能又會決定和中國恢復(fù)關(guān)系，并把曾經(jīng)代表美國利益與中國正面沖突的印度晾在一邊。倒是有一種看法（在印度）挺普遍的，即似乎中國過去40年的快速增長，恰恰得益于中國在冷戰(zhàn)最后十年選擇站到了美國一邊，從美國那里得到了諸多好處——因此，印度當(dāng)然也可以通過在美中對抗中站到美國一邊，實現(xiàn)類似的“自我提升”。

ougoah
It's strange. I too have quite a lot of contact with Indian diaspora living in a western nation and my experience isn't that.
When I mean intolerance and hatred for anything Chinese, I'm not only talking about products... which btw India has little to no choice over in the short to medium term because... economics 101. Joining China in any important project is certainly going to meet more opposition from Indians than it would from Chinese (as intense as that would also be).
I have regularly encountered "fair minded" lol Indians who absolutely cannot stand China being talked about in ANY sort of positivity. It's almost illegal to and any discussion that comes up where "oh China has done well here with this" is always met with "no way they're awful and that's all stolen!/copied!/fake propaganda!" No Chinese person ever be bothered passionately opposing any conversation that includes India in a positive light. They just don't know or don't care enough about it. Maybe a chauvinist/ pro China person would only if that discussion also involved China but if it's just "India has pretty good space capabilities" no Chinese person would feel the need to spread total lies and unfounded nonsense about how India is evil and ought to be feared while also put down.
An example from this month would be an interaction with an Indian receptionist who wasn't even a part of the conversation by the way. The conversation was between a friend of mine and her husband who was talking positively about his son's education in China (they are not Chinese but live there) and lamenting about how poor the educational standard is in his native country in comparison to what his son received in China. The receptionist felt the need to then say "why don't you guys stay in China then if it's so good there".
This line is pretty typical. No Chinese person could be bothered saying that to an Indian. The intense dislike for China isn't only promoted by media and propaganda .

這就怪了。我也接觸過很多生活在西方的印度僑民，我的經(jīng)驗可不是這樣。
我所說的“對‘中國的一切’近乎同質(zhì)性的排斥、憎恨”，可不僅僅指中國商品……況且就商品而言，印度至少在中短期內(nèi)，幾乎沒有別的選擇……這是基本經(jīng)濟(jì)常識。和中國共同參與任何重大項目，在印度國內(nèi)引起的反對聲音肯定遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于在中國國內(nèi)。
我經(jīng)常遇到一些所謂“公正客觀的印度人”，他們絕對受不了任何積極贊揚中國的談話。任何關(guān)于“哦，中國在這方面做得挺好”的討論總會遇到“不可能，他們糟透了，這些都是偷來的/虛假宣傳！”相比之下，我還沒碰到過任何一個中國人，會如此熱情地對有關(guān)印度的討論發(fā)表類似的反對意見。他們要么不清楚印度的情況到底怎樣，要么根本不關(guān)心?；蛟S只有在話題牽涉中國時，比較沙文主義的中國人支持中國的人才會參與進(jìn)來；但如果話題僅僅是“印度的太空能力相當(dāng)不錯”，那就不會有中國人覺得有必要發(fā)表一些類似“印度多么多么邪惡、應(yīng)該對它感到擔(dān)心、應(yīng)該對它進(jìn)行遏制”的話。
以我這個月剛碰到的一件事為例：那是我們遇到的一名印度接待員，順便說一句，我們本來甚至并沒有和這名接待對話。只是我的一位朋友在和她丈夫聊天，她積極地稱贊她兒子在中國接受的教育（他們不是中國人，但居住在那兒）并哀嘆他們自己國家的教育水平和他們兒子在中國接受的教育水平相比多么落后。此時，該印度接待員似乎是突然感到有必要說些什么：“既然中國這么好，你們?yōu)槭裁床涣粼谥袊?？?br /> 非常典型的印度式對白！沒有一個中國人會費心去在一場關(guān)于印度的討論中，插上這樣一句話。對中國的強(qiáng)烈厭惡，絕不僅僅是媒體和官方宣傳的結(jié)果。