[二]為什么中國在發(fā)明火藥、印刷術(shù)、造紙術(shù)、指南針和遠(yuǎn)洋航行船后,沒有比西方更早成為世界超級大國?
?Why didn''t China become a world superpower when it first invented gunpowder, printing, paper, the compass, and great ocean sailing ships, before the West did?譯文簡介
你的評價還算公正,但過于嚴(yán)厲,在某種程度上也符合“中國從來不偉大”的流行說法,這種說法似乎主導(dǎo)了某些圈子。
正文翻譯
Why didn't China become a world superpower when it first invented gunpowder, printing, paper, the compass, and great ocean sailing ships, before the West did?
為什么中國在發(fā)明火藥、印刷術(shù)、造紙術(shù)、指南針和遠(yuǎn)洋航行船后,沒有比西方更早成為世界超級大國?
評論翻譯
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Your assessment is somewhat fair. But too harsh and somewhat fits the vogue “China was never great” narrative that seems to dominate some circles.
The glassware part is true. It was a major hinderance. We had ceramics, which became important much later on, but by that I mean more close to today.
The part about not having scientific method is quite hazy, as ancient Chinese math was quite on par with the rest of the world or better. I have personally read some ancient Chinese manuals and guides for science and engineering and they were surprisingly scientific (I am an engineer by trade, I would know). HOWEVER! The official “state philosophy (not even mysticism)” heavily disregarded the natural sciences as nothing more than mere tricks, which was a major setback. Even great works of geography did not have a super high standing, though it is still well remembered. Even today, when studying Chinese classics, the more STEM oriented ones are almost never the main focus.
Chinese mathematics - Wikipedia
Commentary on the Water Classic - Wikipedia
Classic of Mountains and Seas - Wikipedia
你的評價還算公正,但過于嚴(yán)厲,在某種程度上也符合“中國從來不偉大”的流行說法,這種說法似乎主導(dǎo)了某些圈子。
玻璃器皿部分是對的,這是一個主要的障礙。
關(guān)于(中國)沒有科學(xué)方法的部分是相當(dāng)模糊的,因?yàn)橹袊糯鷶?shù)學(xué)與世界其他地方相當(dāng),甚至更好。我個人讀過一些古代中國的科學(xué)和工程手冊和指南,它們是驚人的 (我是一名工程師,我知道)。然而,官方的“哲學(xué)(甚至不是神秘主義)”嚴(yán)重地忽視了自然科學(xué),認(rèn)為它只不過是一種把戲,這是重大挫折。即使是偉大的地理著作,也沒有超高的地位,盡管它仍然被很好地保留了下來。即使在今天,在學(xué)習(xí)中國古典文學(xué)的時候,以科學(xué)、技術(shù)、工程、數(shù)學(xué)為導(dǎo)向的古典文學(xué)幾乎從來都不是主要的關(guān)注點(diǎn)。
鏈接:《中國數(shù)學(xué)史》、《水經(jīng)注》、《山海經(jīng)》——維基
The compass is called “South pointing pin” in Chinese. I think it implies navigation. It has been documented to be used for navigation.
History of the compass - Wikipedia
As for the phonetic alphabet… thats where a major problem comes in. Too many words sound the same in Chinese. It just wouldn’t work.
On gunpowder:
“it becomes merely a poof powder, and much more a psychological weapon and an incendiary rather than a projectile propellant or explosive.”
Rocket History - (nasa.gov)
China also made extensive use of cannons too. During the Imjin war, Chinese cannons outranged the Japanese and helped secure victory.
“中國人有指南針,但他們把它用于宗教儀式和風(fēng)水,而不是地理探索和海上航行。他們從來沒有理解過三角學(xué)、時間和航海之間的聯(lián)系,他們從來沒有把羅盤分為360度?!?br /> 這種指南針在漢語中被稱為“指南針”,它已被記錄用于導(dǎo)航。鏈接:《指南針的歷史》——維基
至于音標(biāo),這是一個大問題。中文里有太多的詞聽起來都一樣。
至于火藥,“它只是一種粉末,更像是一種心理武器和燃燒彈,而不是拋射推進(jìn)劑或炸藥?!辨溄樱骸痘鸺贰贰狽ASA
中國也大量使用大炮。在臨津江戰(zhàn)爭(萬歷朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭)中,中國大炮的射程超過了日本人,從而確保了勝利。
“According to Turnbull, "Chinese field artillery and siege cannon were the finest in the region".[105] Chinese artillery was made from cast iron, and were divided into several types, the most important were the "great general gun" and the folang zhi (佛朗支), the latter being breech-loaded artillery guns.[105]”
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“ They knew they were not superior, and they were constantly under attack - seaborne barbarians in North, horse nomads in the East, Islam from South - and there was a vast ocean in the West. In order not to get crushed, they were willing to learn from foreigners and carry their ideas and innovations even further “
This was actually the case for the Ming dynasty. They were willing to learn from Europeans too, as shown by the cannons used.
I personally believe one of the biggest problems was at some point in ancient Chinese history, life became too easy and the state philosophy became so ossified so they were unwilling to learn. (Mid - Late Qing dynasty)
據(jù)特恩布爾的說法,“中國野戰(zhàn)炮和攻城炮是該地區(qū)最好的”。 中國大炮是由鑄鐵制成,被分成幾種類型, 最重要的是“偉大將軍槍”(great general gun)和佛朗支。佛朗支實(shí)際上是進(jìn)口/西方化的大炮。
“他們(歐洲)知道自己并不優(yōu)越,而且不斷受到攻擊——北方是海上的野蠻人,東方是游牧民族,南方是伊斯蘭教,西方有一片廣闊的海洋。為了不被壓垮,他們愿意向外國人學(xué)習(xí),并進(jìn)一步發(fā)揚(yáng)他們的思想和創(chuàng)新”
明朝就是這樣。他們也愿意向歐洲人學(xué)習(xí),這從他們使用的大炮就可以看出。我個人認(rèn)為,最大的問題之一是在中國古代歷史的某個時刻,生活變得太容易,官派哲學(xué)變得如此僵化,所以他們不愿學(xué)習(xí)。(清朝中晚期)
From what I know, throughout China’s long history the theme of valuing peace and security often trumped all.
War and internal disintegration are a terrible disruption for a very large agricultural population. And much of China’s longevity as a singular culture and civilisation seems to be because China hated disorder and disintegration. With good reason. It almost destroyed them a number of times.
I see it as probably the most practical civilisation that has ever existed. If it doesn’t have a clear use for the greater benefit of society, it’s a risky pipe dream. And it was always practicality before risk. Capitalism and war are inherently risky.
據(jù)我所知,在中國悠久的歷史中,重視和平與安全的主題往往壓倒一切。
戰(zhàn)爭和內(nèi)部瓦解對一個龐大的農(nóng)業(yè)人口來說是一個可怕的破壞。中國作為一個獨(dú)特的文化和文明能夠長久存在,很大程度上似乎是因?yàn)橹袊鴧拹簾o序和解體。這是很好的理由,畢竟有好幾次差點(diǎn)就毀了他們。
我認(rèn)為它可能是有史以來最實(shí)用的文明。如果它對社會的更大利益沒有明確的用途,那它就是一個危險(xiǎn)的白日夢,而且總是實(shí)用性高于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。而資本主義和戰(zhàn)爭天生就有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
Yes, even today the many -isms are seen as impractical.
The so called “middle road” by Confucius actually refers to “whatever way that works”
是的,即使在今天,許多主義仍被(中國人)視為不切實(shí)際。
孔子所說的“中間道路”實(shí)際上是指“只要可行就行”。
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If the Chinese Emporer of the 15th century hadn’t ordered the Exploration Navy halted and burned… we’d probably all be speaking Mandarin now.
如果15世紀(jì)的中國皇帝沒有下令停止海軍的探索并將其焚毀,我們現(xiàn)在可能都在說普通話了。
I doubt. The Chinese could have crossed the oceans, but not return home. They lacked the required secondary powers to develop oceanic navigation.
對此我表示懷疑。中國人可以漂洋過海,但不會回國。
他們?nèi)狈Πl(fā)展海洋航行所必需的次級力量。
I read your “secondary power” list. It’s a Eurocentric list of bullshit. The Chinese empire boasted great centers of learning and thought but expressed in an Oriental fashion, not a Euro-Latin one.
The main failing of the Chinese Empire was ironically it’s own success. It encouraged an inward-looking mentality. When those ships were burned it was from the collective sense that “Why look for anything beyond what we possess here in The Middle Kingdom?” From China’s viewpoint at the time the only thing the outside world offered was hordes of uncouth invading barbarians.
我讀了你關(guān)于“次級力量”的觀點(diǎn)。
這是一份以歐洲為中心的清單,沒什么價值。中華帝國以擁有偉大的學(xué)術(shù)和思想中心而自豪,但卻是以東方的方式表達(dá)的,而不是歐洲的拉丁式。
具有諷刺意味的是,中華帝國的主要失敗在于它自己的成功。它鼓勵了一種內(nèi)向的心態(tài)。當(dāng)這些船被燒毀的時候,人們的集體意識是:“為什么要尋找我們在中國以外的東西呢?”
在當(dāng)時的中國看來,外部世界所能提供的唯一的東西就是成群的野蠻人入侵。
Please prove with factual arguments why my list of those required powers is bullshit. Remember I am an INTJ, and as such, immune to emotional language and arguments.
Of course complacence can stultify any kind of progress, but so will lacking in foundations. Ever wondered why ‘qi’ (氣) is so omnipresent in the Chinese philosophy?
請用事實(shí)證明,為什么我列出的那些次級力量清單都是胡扯。記住,我是一個INTJ,因此,對于情緒化的語言和爭論我是免疫的。
當(dāng)然,自滿會阻礙任何一種進(jìn)步,但缺乏基礎(chǔ)也是如此。有沒有想過為什么“氣”在中國哲學(xué)中無處不在?
I don’t have to.. your presentation of these things as being a magical list of properties unique to Europeans is typical racist trash. Marco Polo reports a culture that was in a rapid process of reinventing itself from it’s status as a collection of the barbaric consolidation of Genghis Khan to a strong push for cultural innovation by his son Kublai Khan which is very reminiscent of the same kind of push made by the Peter of Russia during his time as Czar.
Now the mindset of China at the time was different culturally but they still had their periods of advancement and scientific inquiry. They just went about things differently because of the differences in culture.
The cropping most important part of what held things back was China’s crippling authoritarianism. We’re actually seeing that here in America as most of the anti-science brigade comes from a culture that reveres the kind of authoritarianism that took over China back then and rules over countries like Russia and North Korea now.
我不需要證明。你把這些東西說成是歐洲人獨(dú)有的神奇清單,這是典型的種族主義廢話。
馬可·波羅說過,一種文化正處于一個快速的重塑過程中,從成吉思汗野蠻統(tǒng)一,到他的兒子忽必烈大力推動文化創(chuàng)新。這讓人想起了俄國沙皇彼得在他執(zhí)政期間所做的同樣的努力。
當(dāng)時的中國在文化上的心態(tài)是不同的,但他們?nèi)匀挥凶约旱倪M(jìn)步和科學(xué)探索時期。他們只是因?yàn)槲幕牟煌惺虏煌?br /> 阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的最重要因素是中國嚴(yán)重的威權(quán)主義。我們實(shí)際上看到,在美國,大多數(shù)反科學(xué)團(tuán)體都來自一種崇尚威權(quán)主義的文化,這種威權(quán)主義當(dāng)時接管了中國,現(xiàn)在也主導(dǎo)著俄羅斯和朝鮮等國家。
In other words, you cannot prove me wrong with factual arguments.
That is why you resort to emotional argumentation and insisting factual arguments as “racistic trash”. Yet those bullet points which I presented are the pre-requisites to evolve to higher stage on cultural evolution, and they are same for all civilizations, Western or Eastern. Without fulfilling those, no further evolution will happen.
Of course China has had periods of advancement and scientific inquiry. They just did not advance any further because of those lacking secondary powers. But our material universe, the scientific facts and the natural laws are obxtive; they do not care if they are observed by an Easterner or a Westerner. The differences in culture prevented attaining those secondary powers.
不需要證明換言之你沒法用事實(shí)證明我的論點(diǎn)是錯的。
這就是為什么你訴諸情緒化的爭論,并堅(jiān)持事實(shí)性的論點(diǎn),認(rèn)為這是“種族主義廢話”。 然而,我提出的這些要點(diǎn)是進(jìn)化到文化更高階段的先決條件,它們對所有文明都是一樣的,無論是西方還是東方。沒有實(shí)現(xiàn)這些,就不會發(fā)生進(jìn)一步的進(jìn)化。
當(dāng)然,中國也有過進(jìn)步和科學(xué)探索的時期。他們只是沒有進(jìn)一步發(fā)展,因?yàn)樗麄儧]有次級力量。但我們的物質(zhì)世界、科學(xué)事實(shí)和自然規(guī)律是客觀的;它們不關(guān)心它們是否被一個東方人或西方人觀察。文化上的差異阻止了這些次級力量的獲取。
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Of course an Authoritarian society and Authoritarian mindset can stultify any kind of cultural evolution. Add there lack of competition and lack of curiosity, and a blissful complacency is almost guaranteed. But that is a value-based choice, not one of material factors, and every religion creates a society of its image. The reason is simple: the religion is the source for the value set hegemonic to the society, and it dictates how people relate to the society and to the state. Already Max Weber observed this and explained well why Capitalism evolved just in the Protestant Europe.
China is today in the same situation as the Roman empire in the early and middle imperial era. The old Polytheism is dead as a doornail, and the domain is a venue of various wildly competing religions. The future will see which will be the winner - and how it and its value basis will form the Chinese society in the future.
發(fā)生在中國的最好的事情是辛亥革命。突然之間,中國開放了,吸收了外國的知識,獲得了所需的次級力量。這為科學(xué)進(jìn)步開辟了道路,甚至月球也不再是中國創(chuàng)新和探索的限制。就像把瓶塞從瓶子上拔下來一樣。
當(dāng)然,威權(quán)社會和威權(quán)心態(tài)會使任何一種文化進(jìn)化變得遲鈍。再加上缺乏競爭和好奇心,自滿幾乎是必然的。但這是一種基于價值的選擇,而不是物質(zhì)因素,每一種宗教都創(chuàng)造了一個其形象的社會。原因很簡單:宗教是社會霸權(quán)價值觀的來源,它決定了人們與社會和國家的關(guān)系。馬克思·韋伯已經(jīng)注意到了這一點(diǎn),并很好地解釋了為什么資本主義只在新教的歐洲發(fā)展。
今天的中國與羅馬帝國早期和中期的處境相同。古老的多神教已如死寂,而這片土地成了各種宗教激烈競爭的場所。未來將會看到誰是贏家,以及它和它的價值基礎(chǔ)將如何塑造未來的中國社會。
Wow, an excellent analysis!
The Chinese suffered from a historic mindset of believing theirs was the superior culture, and thus refusing to learn from other peoples. There is a difficult balance that must be maintained, wherein a nation must be true to its own unique origins and traditions, yet retain a judicious contact with the outside world to allow for the exchange of new trade, ideas, etc. Otherwise they run the risk of stagnation and ossification, which, sadly, was the case for China.
I do not mean to sound racist here (especially since I myself am of full Chinese heritage), but I think you hit the nail on the head in portraying the major differences between “Western" and “Chinese" civilization. This is a huge generalization, of course, but I think history bears out the statement that in general, while both are indisputably highly intelligent peoples, the Chinese lack a certain “something" in their thinking that put them at a disadvantage when compared with their European counterparts. You can call this “something" innovative thought, forward-thinking, “outside-of-the-box" thinking, ability to extrapolate, intuition, scientific precision, inquisitiveness, or whatnot--but whatever it is, Chinese in general do not possess it in great quantity. Whether this is due to their historic philosophical upbringing of “don't rock the boat" or a deeper, possibly genetic factor, I cannot say.
一篇優(yōu)秀的分析文!
中國人有一種歷史心態(tài),認(rèn)為自己的文化是優(yōu)越的,因此拒絕向其他民族學(xué)習(xí)。一個國家必須忠實(shí)于自己獨(dú)特的起源和傳統(tǒng),同時與外部世界保持明智的聯(lián)系,以便進(jìn)行新的貿(mào)易、思想等的交流,這是一種難以維持的平衡。若非如此,它們將面臨停滯和僵化的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),遺憾的是,中國正是如此。
我并不是有意在這里聽起來種族主義(尤其是我自己是完全的中國血統(tǒng)),但我認(rèn)為你在描述“西方”和“中國”文明之間的主要差異時,一針見血。當(dāng)然,這種概括過于簡化,但我認(rèn)為歷史證明了這樣一種說法,即總的來說,盡管兩方都是無可爭議的高智商人群,中國人的思維中缺少某種“東西”,與歐洲人相比,他們處于劣勢。
你可以把這個“東西”稱為創(chuàng)新思維、前瞻性思維、“打破常規(guī)”的思維、推斷能力、直覺、科學(xué)精確度、好奇心等等——但不管它是什么,一般來說,中國人并不大量擁有它。這究竟是由于他們“不要惹是生非”的歷史哲學(xué)教育,還是更深層次的,可能是遺傳因素,我不知道。
China is, and has been a large society. Your success in society does not depend on the inherent value of your ideas, but on how good you are at making others multiply them, and the more so, the bigger it is. It’s not about the product, it’s about the marketing, we see this everyday in academia and internet debates.
Furthermore, to be a successful business owner it is enough to design your product based on guesswork, trial and error and copying someone else’s intellectual property. In most trades, you need practicality and effort rather than deep theoretical understanding. Even mathematics and equations in mechanical engineering are something you can just memorize and learn how to apply, without truly understanding the deeper principles. I’ve met many STEM professionals who really cannot think outside of the box. You recognize those because when asked to explain their field to a layman, they will let off a torrent of unstructured details.
中國現(xiàn)在是,而且一直是一個龐大的社會。你在社會上的成功并不取決于你的想法的內(nèi)在價值,而是取決于你有多擅長讓別人復(fù)制你的想法,而且越擅長,你的想法就越大。這不是關(guān)于產(chǎn)品,而是關(guān)于營銷,我們每天都在學(xué)術(shù)界和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)辯論中看到這一點(diǎn)。
此外,要想成為一個成功的企業(yè)所有者,就必須基于猜測、反復(fù)試驗(yàn)和復(fù)制他人的知識產(chǎn)權(quán)來設(shè)計(jì)你的產(chǎn)品。在大多數(shù)交易中,你需要的是實(shí)用性和努力,而不是深刻的理論理解。即使是機(jī)械工程中的數(shù)學(xué)和方程,你只需要記住并學(xué)習(xí)如何應(yīng)用,而不需要真正理解更深層次的原理。我遇到過很多理工科專業(yè)人士,他們真的無法跳出框框思考。你能認(rèn)出他們,是因?yàn)楫?dāng)被要求向外行解釋他們的領(lǐng)域時,他們會滔滔不絕地說出一些毫無條理的細(xì)節(jié)。
I hope I am not racist here, I think these are anthropological constants.
中國非常重視社會地位。你不能責(zé)怪他們,這對生存是必不可少的。社會死亡和肉體死亡基本上是一樣的。在任何社會中都是如此。只有在一個法律公正的國家,你才有資格做一個局外人。但中國非常關(guān)注當(dāng)下,而不是超凡脫俗的東西和來世。
什么是對的,什么是錯的,是由你的家庭和社交圈來認(rèn)可,而歐洲的倫理觀念是建立在絕對的形而上學(xué)基礎(chǔ)之上的。因此,中國人的思維方式不太贊成對抽象概念和假設(shè)的探索。真理對他們來說重要的是它能以實(shí)際的方式被應(yīng)用,而不是它本身。但最重要的是規(guī)模效應(yīng)。每個社會都會發(fā)展成一個中國,因?yàn)樯鐣鞯娜藭仙巾敹?,而假裝盛行。我希望我不是種族主義者,我認(rèn)為這些是人類學(xué)的常量。
In my view: China is/was very peace loving country, they still believe and believed in living and let live. They did not have big ambitions, China is/was great civilization well advanced far more than rest of the ancient world, in my primary school in India our teachers used to tell us when rest of the world was living in caves China was making calendar/s and studying astronomy.
1. Under such conditions fully advanced civilization, the question is: why on earth will attack other human beings and take over rest of the uncivilized world, as a liability, educate them, feed them and train them?
2. Lord Buddha preached total peace, nonviolence, family values, and Karma. Present young generation of Chinese may not know it, I being Indian and during my recent visit. I saw and felt more reverence to these peace loving principals practiced by Chinese in day to day life, because for thousands of years, it has become part of their permanent habits, without any efforts to show off.
3. Chinese being incredibly hard working people themselves born and brought up in the same land, so they did not have to adjust to high/low temperatures. And China being an agriculture based economy, they believed in big families, they had enough workforce of their own, they had no curiosity to bring outside help to work in their fields, and again this illiterate, more or less uncivilized human resources could have been a burden to them.
4. In short, China was self-sufficient, advanced, and by nature, they are very content in themselves and due to a religious conviction of total peace and harmony. There were no ambitions, to become a world power, I felt, and sincere belief in these thoughts, during my first recent trip to China, next one is coming soon.
5. Chinese as I see them through my lot of dealings with them in Canada, and visits to China, convinced me one thing, Chinese do not play politics, and they have very well balanced lives. Usually, most of them do not want to catch up with Jones. For example, every ethnicity in Canada got in the Canadian parliament, except Canadian Chinese, because they have a very gentle way of living. They are model citizens where ever they go across the globe, hardly the Chinese ever involve any crime, education is number 1, and they mind their own business, that is their culture and training, they respect their teachers, parents, and worship their grandparents.
6. whether they and some others like it or not now China is a super power when the world owes them trillions of dollars, and they are investing around the globe, without fighting, sending any soldier across the border, that in fact are Super Power, now, and this is only the start.
With best regards.
Sam
在我看來:中國是一個非常熱愛和平的國家,他們?nèi)匀幌嘈派?,也讓別人生活。他們沒有大的野心,中國是偉大的文明,比其他古代世界先進(jìn)得多,在我在印度上小學(xué)的時候,我們的老師告訴我們,當(dāng)世界其他地方還住在洞穴里的時候,中國在制作日歷和學(xué)習(xí)天文學(xué)。
1. 在這種完全先進(jìn)的文明條件下,問題是: 究竟為什么要攻擊其他人類,并接管其他未開化的世界,作為一種責(zé)任,教育他們,養(yǎng)活他們,訓(xùn)練他們?
2. 佛陀宣揚(yáng)全面和平、非暴力、家庭價值觀和因果報(bào)應(yīng)?,F(xiàn)在的年輕一代中國人可能不知道。我在最近的旅行中,看到和感受到中國人在日常生活中所踐行的這些愛好和平的原則,因?yàn)閹浊陙?,它已?jīng)成為他們永久習(xí)慣的一部分,沒有任何炫耀的感覺。
3. 中國人在同一塊土地上出生和長大,所以他們不需要適應(yīng)高溫或低溫。中國是一個以農(nóng)業(yè)為基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體,他們相信大家庭。他們自己有足夠的勞動力,他們沒有興趣在自己的領(lǐng)域里尋求外界的幫助,同樣,這種不識字的,或多或少不文明的人力資源對他們來說可能是一種負(fù)擔(dān)。
4. 總之,中國是自給自足的,先進(jìn)的,他們對自己非常滿意,并追隨宗教信仰中的全面和平與和諧。在我最近的第一次中國之旅中,我感到中國并沒有成為世界強(qiáng)國的雄心,我真誠地相信這些想法,下一次中國之旅很快也會成行。
5. 通過我在加拿大和華人的交往,以及對中國的訪問,我相信一件事,中國人不玩政治,他們的生活很平衡。通常,他們中的大多數(shù)人都不想趕上“瓊斯”。例如,加拿大的每個種族都會進(jìn)入加拿大議會,除了加拿大華人,因?yàn)樗麄兊纳罘绞椒浅睾汀o論他們走到哪里,他們都是模范公民,中國人很少犯罪,教育是第一位的,他們只關(guān)心自己的事情,那是他們的文化和規(guī)訓(xùn),他們尊敬他們的老師,父母,崇拜他們的祖父母。
6. 無論他們自己以及其他人是否想要或者喜歡,如今中國都是一個超級大國,全世界都欠了中國數(shù)萬億美元,他們在全球投資、不打仗也沒有派遣士兵越過邊界,然而實(shí)際上他們是超級大國。現(xiàn)在是,而且這只是開始。
謹(jǐn)致問候。
原創(chuàng)翻譯:龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處
That's actually a fascinating question. The history behind it is pretty complex, but I tend to look for a set of simple, causal reasons. Other answers about Chinese culture and the limitations of Chinese technology are fine, as far as they go, but cultures tend to evolve the way they do for a reason. In Europe, there were plenty of peace-loving philosophies, but more warlike groups general rolled over and knocked that tendency right out of them. Why didn't it happen in China?
The theory I find the most compelling (apparently espoused in Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers") is that it was driven by geographical differences between Europe and the rest of Eurasia. He argues that Europe is particularly shot through with natural barriers, like lakes, rivers, forests and mountain ranges, that are inconvenient but never impassable. That meant that Europe was highly politically fragmented (even now, you can see the large numbers of small countries that continue to exist), but none of those kingdoms was ever safe from conquest by a neighbor. That led to a condition where European powers were either at war or at risk of war, all the time. The consequence was an evolutionary process in which you had to advance quickly or risk being destroyed. That led to rapid weapons development, but also to scientific and economic advances, because a kingdom that couldn't afford to hire gunsmiths and mercenaries would be at risk. If a kingdom didn't support its craftsmen and merchants enough, they could pack up and move to the next country. If a nation-state tried to cut itself off from trade, then the countries around it would do all the trading and leave them behind, economically. There were plenty of leaders who were dumb or short-sighted, and plenty who were peace-loving and trusting, but those didn't tend to last so long.
By contrast, empires like the Ottomans and the Ming Dynasty could pretty easily rule territory to their natural limits of conquest. Within that area, they were fairly safe from outside conquests, which meant they could rule as they liked. If an emperor issued a decree that turned out to hold back progress, for any reason, the empire could still survive, their need to advance was far less urgent. The decisions of a single leader had a huge effect over the fortunes of the whole empire, instead of a lot of things being tried at once.
In short, the effects of direct and driving competition within Europe could very well have driven them to advance their technology (particularly, but not limited to, military technology), faster than anyone else in Eurasia. Such competition is harsh, but it's hard to argue with results.
這個問題很有意思。這背后的歷史是相當(dāng)復(fù)雜的,但我傾向于尋找一組簡單的因果原因。其他關(guān)于中國文化和中國技術(shù)局限性的答案都不錯,但文化傾向之所以以這樣的方式發(fā)展是有原因的。在歐洲,有很多愛好和平的哲學(xué),但更多好戰(zhàn)的團(tuán)體推翻了這一傾向。為什么它沒有發(fā)生在中國?
我認(rèn)為最令人信服的理論(顯然在保羅·肯尼迪(Paul Kennedy)的《大國興衰》(The Rise and Fall of Great Powers)中得到了支持)是,歐洲和歐亞大陸其他地區(qū)之間的地理差異推動了這一理論。他認(rèn)為,歐洲到處都是自然屏障,如湖泊、河流、森林和山脈,雖然不方便,但并非不可逾越。這意味著歐洲在政治上是高度分裂的(即使是現(xiàn)在,你還可以看到大量的小國繼續(xù)存在),但沒有一個王國能幸免于鄰國的征服。
這導(dǎo)致歐洲列強(qiáng)要么處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài),要么一直處于戰(zhàn)爭風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之中。結(jié)果是一個進(jìn)化過程,在這個過程中,你必須快速進(jìn)步,否則就有被摧毀的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這導(dǎo)致了武器的快速發(fā)展,同時也促進(jìn)了科學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,因?yàn)橐粋€王國如果不能支付雇傭軍械工匠和雇傭兵的費(fèi)用,就會處于危險(xiǎn)之中。如果一個王國不能支持足夠的工匠和商人,他們會收拾行囊搬到另一個國家。如果一個民族國家試圖切斷自己的貿(mào)易,那么它周圍的國家就會攬下所有的貿(mào)易,在經(jīng)濟(jì)上把他們甩在后面。有很多領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人要么愚蠢要么目光短淺,也有很多熱愛和平、信任他人,但他們往往不會持續(xù)太久。
相比之下,像奧斯曼帝國和明朝這樣的帝國可以很容易地將領(lǐng)土統(tǒng)治到他們自然征服的極限。在這個地區(qū),他們可以免受外來征服,這意味著他們可以隨心所欲地統(tǒng)治。如果皇帝頒布了一項(xiàng)阻礙進(jìn)步的法令,不管出于什么原因,帝國仍然可以生存,他們進(jìn)步的需要就不那么緊迫了。一個領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的決定對整個帝國的命運(yùn)有著巨大的影響,而不是同時嘗試很多事情。
簡而言之,歐洲內(nèi)部直接競爭的影響很可能促使他們比歐亞大陸的任何國家更快地發(fā)展技術(shù)(特別是但不限于軍事技術(shù))。這樣的競爭是殘酷的,但結(jié)果也很難去爭論。
Actually China did solve its own problems sometime much better than Europe.
For example current day China is equivalent to certain degree to EU. This may sound shocking, but please consider this - the differences between languages, religions and traditions inside China are at least as big, as they are inside Europe. And we see how divided and ineffective is Europe even nowadays. China managed to unite in one centralized state all these people - something Europe is not sure to accomplish ever. Such unification in Europe was many times on the horizon, but it never happened. The last two appear to be Hitler and Napoleon. China finished these tasks long time ago - also in extremely bloody way.
Also the question what exactly is superpower is not very clear. There was/is Great Britain. IT was a superpower for sure. Is it now? Probably not. Same for France, Spain…. Rome…. Greece. Same will be for Russia. There is USA. It is a superpower now, but will it be after 10,20,50 years? Nothing is forever.
I remember also reading that in all human history, except for the last 200 years, that living standard of the average Chinese was higher that the average European. They were living longer, eating better. Is is this not a superpower?
Based on this, China looks actually very comparable to any other superpower, whatever this is.
事實(shí)上,中國有時確實(shí)比歐洲更好地解決了自己的問題。
例如,今天的中國在一定程度上相當(dāng)于歐盟。這聽起來可能令人震驚,但請考慮一下——在中國,語言、宗教和傳統(tǒng)之間的差異至少和在歐洲一樣大。即使在今天,我們也能看到歐洲是多么分裂和低效。中國成功地將所有這些人統(tǒng)一為一個中央集權(quán)的國家——這是歐洲永遠(yuǎn)不可能做到的。這樣的統(tǒng)一曾多次出現(xiàn)在歐洲的地平線上,但從未發(fā)生。最后兩個似乎是希特勒和拿破侖。中國很久以前就完成了這些任務(wù),而且是以極其血腥的方式。
另外,如何定義“超級大國”也不是很清楚。過去/現(xiàn)在是英國,毫無疑問,它曾是一個超級大國。至于現(xiàn)在?可能不是。法國、西班牙也是如此,還有羅馬和希臘。俄羅斯也是如此。還有美國,后者現(xiàn)在是一個超級大國,但10年、20年、50年后呢?沒有東西是永恒的。
我還記得在整個人類歷史上,除了過去200年,中國人的平均生活水平高于歐洲人。他們活得更長,吃得更好。這不是超級大國嗎? 基于此,中國看起來和其他超級大國差不多,不管這是什么。