烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)：一項(xiàng)地緣戰(zhàn)略評(píng)估

Ukraine War: A Geostrategic Assessment

對(duì)正在進(jìn)行的烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的地緣戰(zhàn)略評(píng)估

A geostrategic assessment of the ongoing Ukraine war.

擴(kuò)張--入侵--叛亂

Expansion – Invasion – Insurgency

正在進(jìn)行的俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的入侵可以被看作是美國(guó)、北約和俄羅斯之間二十多年來(lái)地緣政治緊張關(guān)系的最新升級(jí)。更具體地說(shuō)，它可以被看作是俄羅斯對(duì)美國(guó)-北約軍事聯(lián)盟二十年來(lái)東擴(kuò)的第一次軍事回應(yīng)。

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine may be seen as the latest escalation of over two decades of geopolitical tensions between the US, NATO and Russia. More specifically, it may be seen as a first Russian military response to two decades of eastern expansion of the US/NATO military alliance.

1991年前蘇聯(lián)烏克蘭共和國(guó)獨(dú)立后，美國(guó)最初希望在大約20年內(nèi)和平地掌握作為一個(gè)附屬?lài)?guó)的烏克蘭，這與東歐的其他前蘇聯(lián)或華沙條約國(guó)類(lèi)似。在下面這個(gè)基于政治學(xué)教授大衛(wèi)·西爾萬(wàn)和斯蒂芬·馬耶斯基開(kāi)發(fā)的模型流程圖中，這樣的發(fā)展將是情景J——這是整個(gè)圖表中最和平的情景。

After the independence of the former Soviet republic of Ukraine in 1991, the US initially hoped to peacefully acquire Ukraine as a client state within about 20 years, similar to other former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe. In the flow chart shown below, which is based on a model developed by political science professors David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski, such a development would have been scenario J – the most peaceful scenario of the entire chart.


美國(guó)外交政策的邏輯。烏克蘭可能會(huì)變成情景C、E或R。
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The Logic of US Foreign Policy. Ukraine may turn out to be scenario C, E or R. (Sylvan&Majeski)

然而，就烏克蘭的情況而言，這種努力變成了比預(yù)期的更困難，特別是由于在普京擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)期間，俄羅斯地緣政治野心的重新抬頭。因此，美國(guó)不得不發(fā)動(dòng)兩次政權(quán)更迭或革命——2004年的“橙色革命”和2014年的“歐洲獨(dú)立運(yùn)動(dòng)”——以掌握作為附屬?lài)?guó)或代理國(guó)的烏克蘭（上文情景L）。
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In the case of Ukraine, however, this endeavor turned out to be more difficult than expected, especially due to the resurgence of Russian geopolitical ambitions during the Putin presidency. Thus, the US had to stage two regime changes or revolutions – the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and the “EuroMaidan” in 2014 – to acquire Ukraine as a client or proxy state (scenario L above).

2014年，俄羅斯的回應(yīng)是吞并或重新整合克里米亞（俄羅斯黑海艦隊(duì)的基地所在地），并支持烏克蘭東部俄語(yǔ)區(qū)事實(shí)上的分離運(yùn)動(dòng)。此外，俄羅斯警告稱(chēng)，不要把烏克蘭作為成員或伙伴納入北約，這被認(rèn)為是對(duì)俄羅斯的直接軍事和戰(zhàn)略威脅——類(lèi)似于美國(guó)對(duì)于俄羅斯或中國(guó)與墨西哥或古巴結(jié)成軍事聯(lián)盟的看法。
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Russia responded, in 2014, by annexing or re-integrating Crimea (base of the Russian Black Sea fleet) and by backing the de facto secession of Russian-speaking parts of Eastern Ukraine. In addition, Russia warned against adding Ukraine as a member or partner to NATO, which was perceived as a direct military and strategic threat to Russia – similar to how the United States might perceive a Russian or Chinese military alliance with Mexico or Cuba.

在特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)期間（2017-2020年），烏克蘭沖突基本上停滯不前（見(jiàn)下文討論）。然而，隨著拜登總統(tǒng)任期的到來(lái)，他在許多方面奉行更傳統(tǒng)的美國(guó)外交政策，烏克蘭沖突再次升溫。特別是恢復(fù)了關(guān)于將烏克蘭作為伙伴或成員納入北約的會(huì)談，并重新啟動(dòng)了收復(fù)烏克蘭東部分離領(lǐng)土的計(jì)劃，甚至可能是收復(fù)克里米亞。最近，烏克蘭總統(tǒng)討論了獲得核武器以威懾俄羅斯的可能性。

During the Trump presidency (2017-2020), the Ukraine conflict essentially stalled (see discussion below). Yet with the advent of the Biden presidency, which in many ways pursues a more traditional US foreign policy, the Ukraine conflict heated up again. In particular, talks about adding Ukraine as a partner or member to NATO resumed and plans to recapture the breakaway territories in Eastern Ukraine and possibly even Crimea were reactivated. More recently, the Ukrainian President discussed the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons to deter Russia.

2021年12月，俄羅斯發(fā)表了一系列建議或要求，向美國(guó)和北約提出了關(guān)于相互安全保障的建議。特別是，俄羅斯要求美國(guó)和北約從1997年后加入北約的成員國(guó)（即所有東歐國(guó)家）中撤出其部隊(duì)和軍事基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施；不接納前蘇聯(lián)共和國(guó)加入北約（如烏克蘭和格魯吉亞）；從歐洲撤出美國(guó)的核武器；并恢復(fù)《中程核力量條約》（美國(guó)于2019年暫停）。在這些地方可以看到俄羅斯的全部提議。

In December 2021, Russia published a set of proposals or demands, addressed to the US and NATO, concerning mutual security guarantees. In particular, Russia asked the US and NATO to remove their forces and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance after 1997 (i.e. all of Eastern Europe); to not admit former Soviet republics into NATO (e.g. Ukraine and Georgia); to remove US nuclear weapons from Europe; and to reinstate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (suspended by the US in 2019). See the full Russian proposals here and here.

2022年1月，美國(guó)和北約都拒絕了這些提議或要求，認(rèn)為其不現(xiàn)實(shí)?！斑@個(gè)聯(lián)盟不會(huì)讓時(shí)間倒流，回到一個(gè)完全不同的時(shí)代，我們有一個(gè)非常不同的聯(lián)盟，它的規(guī)模更小，影響范圍也非常不同”，美國(guó)北約特使在2022年1月11日如是說(shuō)道。六周后，2022年2月24日，俄羅斯發(fā)動(dòng)了對(duì)烏克蘭的入侵（見(jiàn)下節(jié)更詳細(xì)的討論）。

In January 2022, both the US and NATO turned down these proposals or demands as unrealistic. “This alliance is not going to be rolling back time and returning to a completely different era, where we had a very different alliance with smaller and a very different footprint.”, the US NATO envoy said on January 11, 2022. Six weeks later, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine (see more detailed discussion in next section).

如果俄羅斯的軍事行動(dòng)實(shí)現(xiàn)了其目標(biāo)，這將導(dǎo)致烏克蘭失去作為美國(guó)附屬?lài)?guó)或代理國(guó)的地位（上述流程圖中的情景C）。然而，幾個(gè)北約成員國(guó)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始向?yàn)蹩颂m提供反坦克和防空武器，或考慮在烏克蘭部分地區(qū)設(shè)立“禁飛區(qū)”（即情景E：軍事支持）。此外，還有計(jì)劃支持針對(duì)俄羅斯占領(lǐng)的或俄羅斯控制的烏克蘭地區(qū)的武裝叛亂（情景R）。

If the Russian military operation achieves its goals, this would lead to the loss of Ukraine as a US client or proxy state (scenario C in the flow chart above). However, several NATO members have already started to provide anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine or consider a “no-fly zone” over parts of Ukraine (i.e. scenario E: military support). In addition, there are plans to support an armed insurgency against a Russian-occupied or Russian-controlled Ukraine (scenario R).

作為對(duì)其入侵烏克蘭的回應(yīng)，北約國(guó)家以前所未有的經(jīng)濟(jì)和外交制裁打擊俄羅斯，一些西方政治家呼吁在莫斯科進(jìn)行政權(quán)更迭或暗殺俄羅斯總統(tǒng)（情景L）。

In response to its invasion of Ukraine, NATO countries hit Russia with unprecedented economic and diplomatic sanctions, and some Western politicians have called for a regime change in Moscow or the assassination of the Russian President (scenario L).

侵略--先發(fā)制人--挑釁

Aggression – Preemption – Provocation

為了全面評(píng)估俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的入侵，我們可以將地緣政治層面和軍事層面區(qū)分開(kāi)來(lái)討論。

In order to assess the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a comprehensive way, one may distinguish between the geopolitical level and the military level.

在地緣政治層面，到目前為止，俄羅斯的干預(yù)可能不得不被看作是對(duì)北約20年來(lái)在東歐擴(kuò)張的一種防御性和近乎絕望的舉動(dòng)（一些俄羅斯分析家也許會(huì)把它看作是“擊退”北約擴(kuò)張的大膽防御性舉動(dòng)）。

At the geopolitical level, the Russian intervention may have to be seen, so far, as a defensive and almost desperate move in response to 20 years of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe (some Russian analysts might perhaps see it as bold defensive move to “roll back” NATO expansion).

事實(shí)上，許多著名的美國(guó)地緣戰(zhàn)略家——包括喬治·凱南、亨利·基辛格、約翰·米爾斯海默和斯蒂芬·科恩——長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直建議反對(duì)北約向東歐，特別是向?yàn)蹩颂m擴(kuò)張，以避免與俄羅斯發(fā)生直接對(duì)抗。然而，其他美國(guó)地緣戰(zhàn)略家，如茲比格涅夫·布熱津斯基，則支持將烏克蘭納入北約，以限制俄羅斯在歐洲的影響。

Indeed, many leading US geostrategists – including George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Cohen – have long been advising against the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe and especially to Ukraine in order to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia. Other US geostrategists, however, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, supported the inclusion of Ukraine into NATO to limit Russian influence in Europe.

在軍事層面上，俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的干預(yù)一般被認(rèn)為是一種進(jìn)攻性行動(dòng)（即非法入侵），類(lèi)似于美國(guó)1983年入侵格林納達(dá)、1989年入侵巴拿馬和2003年入侵伊拉克（情景A和S）。美國(guó)/北約1999年對(duì)塞爾維亞、2001年對(duì)阿富汗、2011年對(duì)利比亞和2014年對(duì)敘利亞的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)主要包括空襲，并使用當(dāng)?shù)兀ɑ蛲鈬?guó)）民兵作為地面部隊(duì)（情景Q和R）。

At the military level, the Russian intervention in Ukraine is generally seen as an offensive move (i.e. an illegal invasion), similar to the US invasions of Grenada in 1983, of Panama in 1989, and of Iraq in 2003 (scenarios A and S). The US/NATO wars against Serbia in 1999, against Afghanistan in 2001, against Libya in 2011 and against Syria from 2014 consisted primarily of airstrikes and used local (or foreign) militias as ground forces (scenarios Q and R).

不過(guò)，俄羅斯政府似乎有一些不同的主張。據(jù)俄羅斯稱(chēng)，自2014年以來(lái)，基輔對(duì)烏克蘭東部的俄語(yǔ)分離共和國(guó)發(fā)動(dòng)了長(zhǎng)達(dá)8年的軍事行動(dòng)，這被俄羅斯描述為“種族滅絕”，造成多達(dá)14000人死亡。2022年2月21日，俄羅斯正式承認(rèn)這些分離主義共和國(guó)，并要求基輔停止其軍事行動(dòng)。俄羅斯認(rèn)為，由于西方在1991年斯洛文尼亞，特別是2008年科索沃制造的先例，正式承認(rèn)這些共和國(guó)的獨(dú)立地位得到了國(guó)際法的支持。最后，2月24日，俄羅斯通過(guò)對(duì)烏克蘭發(fā)動(dòng)“特別軍事行動(dòng)”（即入侵），回應(yīng)了自己的代理人共和國(guó)的“求援”。

The Russian government appears to argue somewhat differently, though. According to Russia, Kiev had been waging, since 2014, an eight-year military campaign against the Russian-language breakaway republics in Eastern Ukraine, described by Russia as a “GENO....” that had cost up to 14,000 lives. On February 21, 2022, Russia formally recognized the separatist republics and asked Kiev to halt its military campaign. Russia argued that the formal recognition of the republics was backed by international law due to the Western precedents of Slovenia in 1991 and especially Kosovo in 2008. Finally, on February 24, Russia responded to an “appeal for help” from its own proxy republics by launching a “special military operation” (i.e. an invasion) against Ukraine.

一些分析家最初預(yù)計(jì)，俄羅斯只會(huì)在烏克蘭東部發(fā)起有限的“維和”行動(dòng)（以保護(hù)這些“共和國(guó)”免受烏克蘭的攻擊）。然而，俄羅斯總統(tǒng)后來(lái)認(rèn)為，這樣的行動(dòng)無(wú)法解決俄羅斯對(duì)北約軍事支持和向?yàn)蹩颂m擴(kuò)張的戰(zhàn)略關(guān)切。

Some analysts initially expected that Russia would only launch a limited “peacekeeping” operation in Eastern Ukraine (to protect the “republics” against a Ukrainian offensive). However, the Russian President later argued that such an operation would not have solved Russia’s strategic concerns regarding NATO’s military support for and expansion into Ukraine.

其他分析人士——主要是俄羅斯方面的分析人士——認(rèn)為，俄羅斯得知烏克蘭即將對(duì)分離主義領(lǐng)土發(fā)動(dòng)進(jìn)攻，因此決定對(duì)基輔發(fā)動(dòng)先發(fā)制人的打擊。雖然歐安組織確實(shí)報(bào)告說(shuō)，在俄羅斯干預(yù)之前的幾天里，軍事活動(dòng)和違反?；鸬那闆r有所增加，但現(xiàn)有的證據(jù)并不足以支持這一假說(shuō)。此外，有可信的證據(jù)表明，俄羅斯情報(bào)部門(mén)在入侵前上演了幾場(chǎng)所謂的“烏克蘭挑釁行動(dòng)”。

Other analysts, mostly on the Russian side, argued that Russia had learned of an imminent Ukrainian offensive against the separatist territories and, therefore, decided to launch a preemptive strike against Kiev. While it is true that the OSCE had reported an increase in military activity and ceasefire violations in the days leading up to the Russian intervention, the currently available evidence is not sufficient to support this hypothesis. Furthermore, there is credible evidence that Russian intelligence staged several supposed “Ukrainian provocations” prior to the invasion.

最后，還有一種假設(shè)是，美國(guó)可能故意將烏克蘭設(shè)為一個(gè)陷阱，迫使俄羅斯卷入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，然后利用戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)對(duì)俄羅斯實(shí)施破壞性的經(jīng)濟(jì)和外交制裁，并對(duì)俄羅斯發(fā)起可能是持久的武裝叛亂。
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Finally, there is the hypothesis that the US may have purposefully used Ukraine as a trap to force Russia into a war that could then be used to impose devastating economic and diplomatic sanctions and launch a potentially protracted armed insurgency against Russia.

這種情況確實(shí)有幾個(gè)歷史先例可循，盡管“官方歷史”和“電視紀(jì)錄片”經(jīng)常試圖無(wú)視或掩蓋這種隱蔽的挑釁行為。

There are indeed several historical precedents for such a scenario, even though “official history” and “TV documentaries” often try to disregard or conceal such covert provocations:

2008年，美國(guó)支持的格魯吉亞政府試圖奪回俄羅斯支持的分離主義領(lǐng)土阿伯卡茨共和國(guó)和南奧塞梯共和國(guó)的控制權(quán)，這引發(fā)了俄-格戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（南奧塞梯戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)），但美國(guó)和格魯吉亞可能沒(méi)有料到俄羅斯的反應(yīng)。

In 2008, the US-backed Georgian government tried to retake control of the Russian-backed separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which triggered the Russo-Georgian War, but the US and Georgia may not have expected the Russian response.

1999年，美國(guó)利用阿爾巴尼亞的科索沃解放軍民兵力量挑起了塞爾維亞在科索沃的行動(dòng)，并根據(jù)各種虛假的主張，對(duì)塞爾維亞發(fā)動(dòng)了科索沃戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

In 1999, the US used the Albanian KLA militia to provoke a Serbian operation in Kosovo and launch the Kosovo War against Serbia, based on various false claims.

1990年，美國(guó)欺騙伊拉克，讓它以為可以入侵科威特以解決石油爭(zhēng)端，然后發(fā)動(dòng)了第二次海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，其部分依據(jù)是虛假的“科威特恒溫箱嬰兒”的故事。

In 1990, the US tricked Iraq into assuming it could invade Kuwait to settle an oil dispute, only to then launch the Second Gulf War, based in part on the bogus “Kuwaiti incubator babies” story.

1979年，美國(guó)秘密武裝和部署阿拉伯圣戰(zhàn)者（包括本·拉登），以攻擊蘇聯(lián)在阿富汗的代理人政權(quán)（旋風(fēng)行動(dòng)），并引發(fā)了為期十年的蘇聯(lián)干預(yù)，這被當(dāng)作蘇聯(lián)的無(wú)端入侵向西方公眾大肆宣傳。

In 1979, the US covertly armed and deployed Arab Mujahideen (including Bin Laden) to attack the Soviet client regime in Afghanistan (Operation Cyclone) and trigger a ten-year Soviet intervention that was sold to the Western public as an unprovoked Soviet invasion.

1964年，美國(guó)在越南北部灣挑起了第一次海軍事件，并編造了第二次事件，以證明其加入越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的正當(dāng)性。

In 1964, the United States provoked a first naval incident and made up a second incident in the Vietnamese Gulf of Tonkin to justify its entry into the Vietnam war.

1950年，美國(guó)可能利用韓國(guó)的代理人政府對(duì)朝鮮進(jìn)行邊境挑釁，并發(fā)動(dòng)朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，最終因中國(guó)參戰(zhàn)而失敗。然而，朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的真正起源仍然相當(dāng)不確定。

In 1950, the US may have used the South Korean client government to stage border provocations against North Korea and launch the Korea War, which ultimately failed when the Chinese entered the war. The true origins of the Korea War remain rather uncertain, however.

1939年，美國(guó)和英國(guó)似乎利用波蘭挑起了德國(guó)的進(jìn)攻并發(fā)動(dòng)了第二次世界大戰(zhàn)，后來(lái)在華沙找到的外交文件表明了這一點(diǎn)。1941年，美國(guó)似乎挑起了日本對(duì)珍珠港的攻擊——由于他們已經(jīng)破譯了日本的密碼，所以提前知道了這一點(diǎn)——以積極加入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
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In 1939, the US and Britain appear to have used Poland to provoke a German attack and launch World War II, as diplomatic documents recovered in Warsaw later showed. In 1941, the US appears to have provoked the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor – of which they knew in advance as they had already broken Japanese codes – to actively enter the war.

1914年，俄羅斯情報(bào)部門(mén)可能利用塞爾維亞民族主義者暗殺了奧匈帝國(guó)的王位繼承人弗朗茨·斐迪南大公，與英國(guó)和法國(guó)一起發(fā)動(dòng)了第一次世界大戰(zhàn)，對(duì)抗德意志帝國(guó)和奧斯曼（土耳其）帝國(guó)。1915年，英國(guó)和美國(guó)挑起盧西塔尼亞號(hào)沉沒(méi)事件，開(kāi)始準(zhǔn)備讓美國(guó)參戰(zhàn)。

In 1914, Russian intelligence may have used Serbian nationalists to assassinate Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, to launch World War I together with Britain and France against Imperial Germany and the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire. In 1915, Britain and the US provoked the Lusitania naval incident to start preparing the US entry into the war.

雖然美國(guó)之前肯定在考慮俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭的可能性——畢竟他們?cè)趲讉€(gè)星期前就發(fā)出了警告——但仍然不能確定這是否是他們的真實(shí)意圖，或者他們是否希望在俄羅斯未作出反應(yīng)的情況下重新奪回頓巴斯地區(qū)。無(wú)論如何，俄羅斯決定入侵似乎不僅僅是由于東烏克蘭的局勢(shì)，而是由于更大的地緣戰(zhàn)略考慮，正如俄羅斯總統(tǒng)自己所描述的那樣。

While it is certainly true that the US was considering the possibility of a Russian invasion in Ukraine – after all, they were warning of it for several weeks – it remains uncertain if this was in fact their intention, or if they hoped to retake the Donbas region without a Russian response. At any rate, it appears that the Russian decision to invade was not just due to the situation in Eastern Ukraine, but due to larger geostrategic considerations, as described by the Russian President himself.

特朗普-寡頭-民族主義者

Trump – Oligarchs – Nationalists

上文已經(jīng)提到，在特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)期間（2017-2020年），烏克蘭沖突基本上停滯不前。有幾個(gè)原因可以解釋這種地緣政治的停滯。

It has been mentioned above that during the Trump presidency (2017-2020), the Ukraine conflict essentially stalled. Several reasons might explain this geopolitical hiatus:

總的來(lái)說(shuō)，特朗普不贊成干預(yù)主義的外交政策，盡管他的政府試圖在委內(nèi)瑞拉和玻利維亞進(jìn)行政權(quán)更迭；暗殺伊朗將軍卡西姆·蘇萊曼尼；并對(duì)敘利亞發(fā)動(dòng)（相當(dāng)象征性的）導(dǎo)彈打擊，以回應(yīng)北約支持的伊斯蘭武裝力量發(fā)動(dòng)的化學(xué)武器襲擊。

In general, Trump was not in favor of an interventionist foreign policy, even though his administration attempted regime changes in Venezuela and Bolivia; assassinated Iranian general Qasem Soleimani; and launched (rather symbolic) missile strikes against Syria in response to chemical weapons attacks staged by NATO-backed Islamist militias.

更具體而言，特朗普不是北約聯(lián)盟以及該聯(lián)盟涉及的美國(guó)國(guó)際軍事和財(cái)政義務(wù)的重要支持者。

More specifically, Trump was not a big supporter of the NATO alliance and the international US military and financial obligations the alliance involves.

特朗普和他的幾個(gè)同伴與烏克蘭和俄羅斯的大部分猶太商人和寡頭有密切聯(lián)系，他們幫助這些商人和寡頭將資金投入美國(guó)的房地產(chǎn)項(xiàng)目。這些寡頭是烏克蘭沖突的最大金融輸家之一，無(wú)論是烏克蘭方面（由于入侵）還是俄羅斯方面（由于制裁）。在烏克蘭方面，他們中的大多數(shù)人在俄羅斯入侵的前幾天就逃離了該國(guó)。

Trump and several of his companions have had close lixs to mostly Jewish businessmen and oligarchs in Ukraine and Russia, whose money they helped invest into US real estate projects. These oligarchs are among the biggest financial losers of the Ukraine conflict, both on the Ukrainian side (due to the invasion) and on the Russian side (due to the sanctions). On the Ukrainian side, most of them fled the country in the days prior to the Russian invasion.

關(guān)于最后一點(diǎn)，值得注意的是，猶太裔烏克蘭寡頭伊戈?duì)枴た坡迥了够粌H是現(xiàn)任烏克蘭總統(tǒng)澤連斯基（他也是猶太人）的財(cái)政贊助商，也是所謂的“新納粹”亞速營(yíng)和其他幾個(gè)反俄民族主義軍事單位的贊助商。這些軍事力量可能持有或不持有反猶觀點(diǎn)，但無(wú)論如何，他們似乎在一個(gè)更大的政治和地緣政治游戲中充當(dāng)棋子。

On this last point, it is interesting to note that Jewish-Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky is the financial sponsor not only of current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (who is also Jewish), but also of the so-called “neo-nazi” Azov battalion and several other anti-Russian nationalist battalions. These battalions may or may not hold anti-Jewish views, but at any rate they appear to serve as pawns in a much larger political and geopolitical game.

因此，當(dāng)俄羅斯政府今天聲稱(chēng)要對(duì)烏克蘭“去納粹化”時(shí)，這可能主要指的不是納粹意識(shí)形態(tài)的反猶太方面，而是納粹德國(guó)是最后一個(gè)試圖入侵和征服（蘇聯(lián)）俄羅斯的大國(guó)。

Thus, when the Russian government today claims to “de-nazify” Ukraine, this may refer not primarily to the anti-Jewish aspects of NS ideology, but to the fact that NS Germany was the last power that attempted to invade and conquer (Soviet) Russia.

事實(shí)上，在二戰(zhàn)期間，許多東歐國(guó)家——從芬蘭到波羅的海國(guó)家、匈牙利和烏克蘭——寧愿與德國(guó)并肩作戰(zhàn)，對(duì)抗當(dāng)時(shí)與英國(guó)和美國(guó)結(jié)盟的蘇聯(lián)。特別是烏克蘭，由于可怕的“大饑荒”導(dǎo)致數(shù)百萬(wàn)烏克蘭人喪生，它在早期對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的看法極為負(fù)面。芬蘭在1939/40年受到了蘇聯(lián)的攻擊，波羅的海國(guó)家在1940年被蘇聯(lián)占領(lǐng)。

In fact, during World War II, many Eastern European countries – from Finland to the Baltic states, Hungary and Ukraine – preferred fighting alongside Germany against the Soviet unx, which at the time was allied with Britain and the United States. Ukraine, in particular, had an extremely negative early Soviet experience due to the horrific “Holodomor” famines that killed millions of Ukrainians. Finland got attacked by the USSR in 1939/40 and the Baltic states got occupied by the USSR in 1940.

諷刺的是，雖然烏克蘭民族主義者希望與德國(guó)一起對(duì)抗蘇聯(lián)，但當(dāng)時(shí)的德國(guó)并不支持烏克蘭民族主義者（他們尋求獲得烏克蘭獨(dú)立），因?yàn)榈聡?guó)對(duì)戰(zhàn)后烏克蘭有自己的計(jì)劃。因此，烏克蘭民族主義領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人斯捷潘·班德拉最終被關(guān)進(jìn)了德國(guó)集中營(yíng)，直到1944年才被釋放，幫助對(duì)抗最終打敗了德國(guó)的蘇聯(lián)大規(guī)模反攻。

Ironically, while Ukrainian nationalists hoped to fight alongside Germany against the Soviet unx, Germany at the time wasn’t supportive of Ukrainian nationalists (who sought to gain Ukrainian independence), as Germany had its own plans for post-war Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera ended up in a German concentration camp and was released only in 1944 to help fight the massive Soviet counter-attack that ultimately defeated Germany.

今天，所有前華沙條約國(guó)和許多前蘇聯(lián)共和國(guó)都傾向于與西方北約國(guó)家結(jié)盟，而不是與俄羅斯結(jié)盟或保持中立地位（白俄羅斯、哈薩克斯坦和烏克蘭東部地區(qū)除外）。再者，目前的俄羅斯政府本身在20多年前就試圖與北約國(guó)家合作，甚至試圖成為北約成員，但由于地緣戰(zhàn)略的原因，被美國(guó)和英國(guó)回絕了，因?yàn)槎砹_斯顯然不打算成為西方的一個(gè)代理人國(guó)。

Today, all former Warsaw Pact states and many former Soviet unx republics favor an alliance with Western NATO countries over an alliance with Russia or a neutral status (exceptions include Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Eastern Ukraine). Then again, the current Russian government has itself tried to cooperate with NATO countries or even become a NATO member for over 20 years, but was rebuffed for geostrategic reasons mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom, since Russia obviously does not intend to become a Western client state.

圖片：2019年，烏克蘭總統(tǒng)澤連斯基和烏克蘭寡頭科洛莫伊斯基?？坡迥了够脖徽J(rèn)為是Burisma天然氣控股公司的真正所有者，該公司在2014年至2016年間向其“董事會(huì)成員”亨特·拜登（時(shí)任美國(guó)副總統(tǒng)喬·拜登的兒子）支付了數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


Image: Ukrainian President Zelensky and Ukrainian oligarch Kolomoisky in 2019. Kolomoisky is also believed to be the true owner of the Burisma gas holding, which between 2014 and 2016 paid millions to its ‘board member’ Hunter Biden, son of then US Vice President Joe Biden.


烏克蘭總統(tǒng)澤連斯基（中）和烏克蘭寡頭科洛莫斯基（中右）

Ukrainian President Zelensky (center) and Ukrainian oligarch Kolomoisky (center-right) (Reuters)

媒體和宣傳

Media and Propaganda

2月24日，俄羅斯的入侵立即在全球新聞中取代了持續(xù)兩年的“致命的新冠病毒大流行”。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


The Russian invasion on February 24 immediately and almost completely displaced the two-year “deadly coronavirus pandemic” from global news.

符合美國(guó)外交關(guān)系協(xié)會(huì)/北約要求的西方媒體，包括自由派和保守派，立即轉(zhuǎn)入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)宣傳模式?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō)，西方的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)宣傳試圖掩蓋或淡化北約擴(kuò)張和頓巴斯安全問(wèn)題，并且試圖將俄羅斯的干預(yù)描繪成“無(wú)端入侵”，同時(shí)關(guān)注平民傷亡、烏克蘭的抵抗和（臆想的）俄羅斯遭遇到的挫折。要了解一些常見(jiàn)的宣傳故事的概況，請(qǐng)參見(jiàn)此處的案例。

CFR/NATO compliant Western media, both liberal and conservative, immediately switched into war propaganda mode. Overall, Western war propaganda tries to conceal or downplay the issues of NATO expansion and Donbas security and instead tries to depict the Russian intervention as an “unprovoked invasion” while focusing on civilian casualties, Ukrainian resistance and (supposed) Russian setbacks. To get an overview of some common propaganda stories, see e.g. here and here.

俄羅斯和親俄媒體則試圖將入侵描繪成合法的、幾乎是人道主義的干預(yù)，有點(diǎn)類(lèi)似于西方媒體對(duì)2011年美國(guó)/北約對(duì)利比亞和1999年對(duì)塞爾維亞的非法戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的描繪。

Russian and pro-Russian media, in turn, try to portray the invasion as a legitimate and almost humanitarian intervention, somewhat similar to the Western media portrayal of the illegal US/NATO wars against Libya in 2011 and against Serbia in 1999.

許多獨(dú)立媒體討論了北約擴(kuò)張、俄羅斯安全利益和烏克蘭的附屬?lài)?guó)或地理人地位等復(fù)雜問(wèn)題，并揭穿了各種戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)宣傳故事。然而，許多和平主義者和“反帝國(guó)主義”的記者，即使同情俄羅斯，也發(fā)現(xiàn)自己在俄羅斯的軍事干預(yù)方面陷入了困難的雙重困境。一些曾經(jīng)的“新冠懷疑論者”，尤其是保守派，很快就與美國(guó)/北約的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)宣傳保持了一致。

Many independent media outlets have discussed the complex issues of NATO expansion, Russian security interests and the Ukrainian client or proxy status, and have debunked various war propaganda stories. However, many pacifist and ‘a(chǎn)nti-imperialist’ journalists, even if sympathetic to Russia, have found themselves in a difficult double bind concerning Russia’s military intervention. Some former “covid skeptics”, especially on the conservative side, quickly aligned themselves with US/NATO war propaganda.

與此同時(shí)，約50%的美國(guó)選民似乎支持“美國(guó)即將加入一場(chǎng)歐洲就烏克蘭問(wèn)題可能爆發(fā)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”；德國(guó)政府設(shè)法利用大規(guī)模的“反戰(zhàn)抗議”，宣布史無(wú)前例地增加1000億歐元的軍費(fèi)開(kāi)支；瑞士放棄了其200年的中立地位，支持對(duì)俄羅斯的制裁。西方的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)宣傳還導(dǎo)致了對(duì)俄羅斯藝術(shù)家、運(yùn)動(dòng)員及其在西方國(guó)家的平民的攻擊和歧視，這些人之前已經(jīng)被兩年多的大肆宣傳所殘害。

Meanwhile, about 50% of US voters appear to support “the US joining a potential war in Europe over Ukraine”; the German government managed to leverage large “anti-war protests” to announce an unprecedented 100 billion Euro increase in military spending; and Switzerland abandoned its 200-year neutrality to back sanctions against Russia. Western war propaganda has also led to attacks and discrimination against Russian artists, athletes and civilians in Western countries whose citizens have already been brutalized by two years of pandemic propaganda.

最后，烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)還導(dǎo)致西方國(guó)家和俄羅斯的審查制度達(dá)到了前所未有的水平，這可以通過(guò)使用替代平臺(tái)、非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)DNS配置和VPN連接來(lái)繞過(guò)。要快速了解雙方使用的主要戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)宣傳和媒體操縱技術(shù)，請(qǐng)了解SPR宣傳要點(diǎn)。

Finally, the Ukraine war has also led to an unprecedented level of censorship in both Western countries and in Russia, which can be bypassed by using alternative platforms, non-standard DNS configurations and VPN connections (see here). To get a quick overview of major war propaganda and media manipulation techniques, used by both sides, see the SPR Propaganda Key.

圖片：《時(shí)代》周刊關(guān)于波斯尼亞戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（1995年）和烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（2022年）的報(bào)道。諷刺的是，一張將普京與希特勒相提并論的假《時(shí)代》周刊封面在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上瘋傳。

Image: TIME Magazine on the Bosnia war (1995) and the Ukraine war (2022). Ironically, a fake TIME Magazine cover, comparing Putin to Hitler, has gone viral on the internet.


升級(jí)的可能性

Potential for Escalation

雖然烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)本身已經(jīng)是地緣政治緊張局勢(shì)的一次重大升級(jí)，但這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)可能導(dǎo)致進(jìn)一步的經(jīng)濟(jì)或軍事升級(jí)。

While the Ukraine war itself is already a major escalation of geopolitical tensions, the war could lead to further economic or military escalation.

例如，北約國(guó)家可能決定直接或間接干預(yù)烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)；俄羅斯已經(jīng)警告說(shuō)，它將以“前所未有的”（即可能是核武器的）方式回應(yīng)這種企圖，即可能會(huì)打擊德國(guó)或波蘭等無(wú)核國(guó)家。

For instance, NATO countries could decide to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the Ukraine war; Russia has already warned that it would respond in an “unprecedented” (i.e. possibly nuclear) way to such attempts, which could hit non-nuclear countries such as Germany or Poland.

烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)本身可能變成一場(chǎng)曠日持久的叛亂或內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，對(duì)鄰國(guó)或整個(gè)歐洲都有潛在影響。

The Ukraine war itself could turn into a protracted insurgency or a civil war with potential implications for neighboring countries or all of Europe.

俄羅斯可能決定將其“非軍事化”運(yùn)動(dòng)從烏克蘭擴(kuò)大到其他前蘇聯(lián)共和國(guó)（如格魯吉亞或波羅的海國(guó)家）或前華沙條約組織成員（如波蘭或羅馬尼亞，這兩個(gè)國(guó)家都有美國(guó)/北約的重要軍事基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施）。

Russia could decide to expand its “demilitarization” campaign from Ukraine to other former Soviet republics (e.g. to Georgia or the Baltic states) or to former Warsaw Pact members (e.g. to Poland or Romania, both of which host important US/NATO military infrastructure).

另一方面，對(duì)俄羅斯前所未有的經(jīng)濟(jì)和外交制裁可能導(dǎo)致俄羅斯的社會(huì)動(dòng)蕩、政權(quán)更迭或更多的民族主義。它還可能導(dǎo)致俄羅斯-中國(guó)或俄羅斯-伊朗更緊密的聯(lián)盟。

On the other hand, the unprecedented economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia could lead to social turmoil, regime change or more nationalism in Russia. It could also lead to a closer Russian-Chinese or Russian-Iranian alliance.

制裁和反制裁還可能導(dǎo)致全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的重大不穩(wěn)定，特別是在金融市場(chǎng)、能源供應(yīng)、農(nóng)業(yè)和各種金屬市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)域。

The sanctions and counter-sanctions could also lead to major global economic instability, especially in the fields of financial markets, energy supply, agriculture and various metals.

俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的入侵也可能成為中國(guó)大陸收復(fù)臺(tái)灣或（中國(guó)支持的）朝鮮入侵韓國(guó)的一個(gè)范本。

The Russian invasion of Ukraine might also serve as a template for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or for a (Chinese-backed) North Korean invasion of South Korea.

最后，烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)有可能被利用來(lái)創(chuàng)造一個(gè)新的全球“恐怖威脅”，類(lèi)似于20世紀(jì)80年代中央情報(bào)局管理的阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)后建立的“基地組織”，或者加強(qiáng)打擊“國(guó)內(nèi)恐怖主義”和國(guó)內(nèi)異見(jiàn)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

Finally, it is possible that the Ukraine war could be leveraged to create a new global “terrorist threat”, similar to the creation of “Al Qaeda” after the CIA-run Afghanistan war in the 1980s, or to enhance the war against “domestic terrorism” and domestic dissent.

在更確定的情況下，烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)可能導(dǎo)致俄羅斯和北約國(guó)家之間新的相互理解和新的地緣政治平衡或合作。