烏克蘭的難民和西方的解體

The Russian war in Ukraine—now into its fourth month and with no end in sight—has exposed some of the fault lines that divide the nations of the West. Most analyses, however, focus on material considerations such as troop counts and artillery capacity and neglect to notice the profound lack of effective leadership at every level. As a result, the West, led by the European unx in principle and the United States in practice, suffers from the lack of a strategic vision that could unite the disparate interests of its constituent nations and drum up enough pathos to convince them to hold the line. Nowhere is this lack of leadership more evident than in Europe’s policies on Ukrainian refugees. Neither the president of the United States nor any of the presidents of the European unx seem capable of balancing both the quotidian needs of their citizens and the strategic demands of the conflict against the greatest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the Second World War.

俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰(zhàn)爭——現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)進(jìn)入第四個月，而且沒有結(jié)束的跡象——已經(jīng)暴露了分裂西方國家的一些斷層線。然而，大多數(shù)分析都集中在部隊(duì)人數(shù)和火炮能力等物質(zhì)方面的考慮上，而忽視了在各個層面上嚴(yán)重缺乏有效的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。因此，原則上以歐盟為首、實(shí)際上以美國為首的西方國家缺乏戰(zhàn)略眼光，無法團(tuán)結(jié)其成員國的不同利益，也無法鼓動足夠的悲情來說服他們堅持到底。這種領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力的缺失在歐洲對烏克蘭難民的政策中表現(xiàn)得最為明顯。無論是美國總統(tǒng)還是歐盟的任何一位總統(tǒng)，似乎都沒有能力在二戰(zhàn)以來歐洲最大的人道主義危機(jī)中平衡其公民的日常需求和沖突的戰(zhàn)略需求。

I recently spent a few weeks studying this issue in Poland, both in the border city of Przemy?l and Kraków, in Poland’s heartland. In my many conversations with Poles, foreign volunteers, and Ukrainian refugees, a clear narrative emerged: Despite their amazement at the heroic generosity of individual Poles, my interlocutors were troubled by the lack of a unified European unx response to the refugee crisis and worried that waning popular interest in the conflict would deliver most, if not all, of Ukraine into the hands of a relentless Russia. Almost everyone expressed concern over the sustainability of the response, especially as news began to emerge of Ukraine’s setbacks in the Donbas.

我最近花了幾周時間在波蘭研究這個問題，包括在邊境城市普熱梅希爾和波蘭中心地帶的克拉科夫。在我與波蘭人、外國志愿者和烏克蘭難民的多次交談中，出現(xiàn)了一種清晰的敘述。盡管他們對個別波蘭人的英勇慷慨感到驚訝，但我的對話者對歐盟缺乏對難民危機(jī)的統(tǒng)一反應(yīng)感到不安，并擔(dān)心民眾對沖突的興趣減弱會使烏克蘭的大部分（如果不是全部）落入無情的俄羅斯手中。幾乎所有人都對應(yīng)對措施的可持續(xù)性表示擔(dān)憂，尤其是當(dāng)烏克蘭在頓巴斯地區(qū)開始出現(xiàn)不利的消息時。

To assess the West’s response to the more than five million refugees who fled Ukraine, one must first dismantle the false assumption that there exists a “typical” Ukrainian refugee. The bulk of Ukraine’s refugees—not knowing where to flee and lacking the resources to flee far—remained in Ukraine. Nonetheless, no one doubted that the Ukrainians who crossed into Poland in the first days of the Russian invasion had indeed fled violence and the obliteration of their ways of life. They were mostly women and children who had gathered their lives into a single backpack. One could see them loitering in large groups outside Ukrainian cultural centers and Greek Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox churches in search of basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter. As the military situation stagnated and Polish largesse grew, however, a different type of Ukrainian began to arrive: the economic migrant. Such people headed directly to Poland’s bigger cities, such as Kraków, Warsaw, and Wroc?aw, where they collected government benefits and took up low-skilled jobs, largely alongside other Ukrainians in the food-service and hospitality industries.

為了評估西方對逃離烏克蘭的500多萬難民的反應(yīng)，我們必須首先破除存在“典型的”烏克蘭難民的錯誤假設(shè)。大部分烏克蘭難民——不知道該往哪里逃，也沒有資源逃得很遠(yuǎn)——仍然留在了烏克蘭。然而，沒有人懷疑，在俄羅斯入侵的最初幾天越過邊境進(jìn)入波蘭的烏克蘭人確實(shí)是在逃避暴力和他們生活方式遭到的毀滅。他們大多是婦女和兒童，他們將自己的生活物資集中在一個背包里。人們可以看到他們成群結(jié)隊(duì)地在烏克蘭文化中心和希臘天主教或?yàn)蹩颂m東正教教堂外徘徊，尋找食物、水和住所等基本必需品。然而，隨著軍事局勢的停滯和波蘭的慷慨解囊，一種不同類型的烏克蘭人開始到來：經(jīng)濟(jì)移民。這些人直接前往波蘭的大城市，如克拉科夫、華沙和弗羅茨瓦夫，他們在那里領(lǐng)取政府福利并從事低技能的工作，主要是與其他烏克蘭人一起從事餐飲服務(wù)和酒店業(yè)。

The path of Ukrainian migration into Europe runs through established centers of Ukrainian expatriates, which explains why roughly 80 percent of them took refuge in Poland. While nearly all passed through Przemy?l, very few stayed there, as those who had friends or relatives in Poland went to join them and those who had neither were assisted by the networks of Poles that had sprung up to provide humanitarian assistance and lodging.

烏克蘭人向歐洲移民的路徑貫穿了既定的烏克蘭僑民中心，這就解釋了為什么他們中大約80%的人在波蘭避難。雖然幾乎所有的人都經(jīng)過普熱梅希爾，但很少有人留在那里，因?yàn)槟切┰诓ㄌm有朋友或親戚的人去投奔了他們，而那些既沒有朋友也沒有親戚的人則得到了波蘭人網(wǎng)絡(luò)的幫助，這些網(wǎng)絡(luò)被建立起來提供人道主義援助和住宿。

As the conflict persisted and Poland’s government began to offer more free services, such as discounted or free lodging and monthly social security payments, the proportion of economic migrants increased. Such people may have been internally displaced refugees who needed the money, or they may have been opportunists who made the trip to supplement their incomes. It is difficult to tell in the first place, and the goodwill of Poles and their government continue to give Ukrainians the benefit of the doubt. Yet the presence of that doubt and the depth of the average European’s frustration over rising costs and proliferating refugee settlements belies the air of confident competence that E.U. and national leaders work so hard to project.

隨著沖突的持續(xù)和波蘭政府開始提供更多的免費(fèi)服務(wù)，如打折或免費(fèi)的住宿和每月的社會保障金，經(jīng)濟(jì)移民的比例增加了。這些人可能是需要錢的國內(nèi)流離失所的難民，也可能是為了貼補(bǔ)收入而進(jìn)行旅行的機(jī)會主義者。首先很難說，波蘭人及其政府的善意繼續(xù)給烏克蘭人以令人存疑的好處。然而，這種懷疑的存在，以及普通歐洲人對成本上升和難民安置點(diǎn)激增的挫敗感的深度，掩蓋了歐盟和國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人努力投射出的自信能力的氛圍。

Indeed, exasperation pervades Poland. It lurks in the tents set up for refugees and it sneaks into everyday conversation, not only among Poles but among foreigners as well. Everyone wonders how long Poland’s extraordinary generosity toward Ukrainian refugees will last and, more importantly, who will pay for it. The ruling Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, abbreviated PiS) Party has permitted Ukrainians entering Poland to obtain a PESEL number (the equivalent of a Social Security number in the U.S.) and to receive all the legal and financial entitlements afforded to Polish citizens without extending citizenship itself.

事實(shí)上，波蘭到處都存在著憤懣情緒。它潛伏在為難民搭建的帳篷里，并潛入到日常談話中，不僅在波蘭人之間，也在外國人之間。每個人都想知道，波蘭對烏克蘭難民的異?？犊畷掷m(xù)多久，更重要的是，誰會為此買單。執(zhí)政的法律和正義黨（Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc，縮寫為PiS）允許進(jìn)入波蘭的烏克蘭人獲得PESEL號碼（相當(dāng)于美國的社會保障號碼），并獲得波蘭公民享有的所有法律和財務(wù)權(quán)利，而無需提供公民身份。

As with any form of charity, this has led to abuse. In Przemy?l, I heard numerous anecdotes from a wide variety of sources about Ukrainian women entering the country to set up their PESEL, then promptly returning to Ukraine to enjoy the monthly family stipend, paid per child, under the “500 Plus” (500 PLN per month) program. While lingering at the train station in Przemy?l, I observed dozens of well-groomed women with fresh pedicures and children with iPhones disembarking from their trains, walking past the refugee station, and heading into town to dine out and do some shopping before returning to Ukraine. In Przemy?l, one taxi driver told me, enterprising Ukrainians had bought up all the used cars and driven them back over the border.

與任何形式的慈善一樣，這也導(dǎo)致了弊端的出現(xiàn)。在普熱梅希爾，我從各種渠道聽到了許多關(guān)于烏克蘭婦女進(jìn)入該國建立PESEL檔案，然后迅速返回烏克蘭，享受“每月500波蘭茲羅提”計劃下每個孩子的家庭月津貼的軼事。當(dāng)我在普熱梅希爾的火車站逗留時，我看到幾十個整潔干凈的婦女和拿著蘋果手機(jī)的孩子從火車上下來，走過難民站，到城里去吃飯和購物，然后返回烏克蘭。在普熱梅希爾，一位出租車司機(jī)告訴我，進(jìn)取的烏克蘭人買下了所有的二手車，并把它們開回了邊境。

Although the E.U. has granted Ukrainians the right to live and work in any of the bloc’s 27 nations for up to three years, it has left its member states to deal with the economic and social costs of the influx. Many in Poland gripe about the generosity extended to Ukrainians, pointing out that Ukrainians are receiving all the benefits of Polish citizenship without any of the tax burden or civic responsibilities. Most Ukrainians themselves have noticed this disparity. While some take it in hand as a sign of Poland’s Christian solidarity with the oppressed, others worry that it would lead to enmity in the future if the conflict continued to drag on.

盡管歐盟給予了烏克蘭人在該集團(tuán)27個國家中的任何一個國家生活和工作三年的權(quán)利，但它卻讓其成員國不得不面對難民涌入的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會成本。波蘭的許多人對烏克蘭人的慷慨表示不滿，指出烏克蘭人獲得了波蘭公民身份的所有好處，卻沒有任何稅收負(fù)擔(dān)或公民責(zé)任。大多數(shù)烏克蘭人自己也注意到了這種不平等。雖然有些人把它當(dāng)作波蘭對被壓迫者的基督教團(tuán)結(jié)的標(biāo)志，但其他人擔(dān)心，如果沖突繼續(xù)拖下去，這將導(dǎo)致未來的敵意。

One Slovakian woman I happened to meet at the train station told me that she worries what effect this influx of people will have on social cohesion and stability in the affected nations. She described the train ride from Vienna to Bratislava as a window into the Ukrainization of central Europe, driven by sprawling tent cities and festering with resentment for the lifestyles that were left behind and could not be replicated in Europe, despite the best efforts of host nations and their citizens. One of my interlocutors, an Austrian volunteer, described the E.U.’s policy in recent months as “a vanishing act” and wondered how it could delay so long in providing long-term solutions to the pressures posed by refugees in E.U. nations such as Poland, Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia.

我在火車站碰巧遇到的一位斯洛伐克婦女告訴我，她擔(dān)心這些人的涌入會對受影響國家的社會凝聚力和穩(wěn)定產(chǎn)生影響。她把從維也納到布拉迪斯拉發(fā)的火車旅程描述為歐洲中部烏克蘭化的一個窗口，在無邊無際的帳篷城市的推動下，對被拋棄的生活方式的怨恨不斷發(fā)酵，盡管收容國及其公民做出了最大努力，但這些生活方式在歐洲無法復(fù)制。我的一位對話者，一位奧地利志愿者，將歐盟最近幾個月的政策描述為“消失的行為”，并想知道它怎么能在為波蘭、羅馬尼亞、摩爾多瓦、匈牙利和斯洛伐克等歐盟國家的難民所帶來的壓力提供長期解決方案方面拖延這么久。

Nonetheless, it is telling that the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees have settled in Poland, where nearly 1.5 million have applied for temporary resident status, rather than proceed to the wealthier countries in the E.U. One Ukrainian woman told me about a news item circulating among her peers through WhatsApp, which relates that a Ukrainian woman in Germany had been raped by refugees from North Africa in a refugee-housing facility. This woman told me that she knew that such a thing would never happen in Poland, where she felt safe and welcome despite the relatively low amount of aid she was receiving.

然而，絕大多數(shù)烏克蘭難民都在波蘭定居，那里有近150萬人申請了臨時居民身份，而不是前往歐盟中較富裕的國家，這很能說明問題。一位烏克蘭婦女告訴我，她的同齡人中通過WhatsApp流傳著一則新聞，說德國的一名烏克蘭婦女在一個難民安置設(shè)施中被來自北非的難民強(qiáng)奸了。這位婦女告訴我，她知道這樣的事情在波蘭絕對不會發(fā)生，盡管她得到的援助相對較少，但她在波蘭感到安全和受歡迎。

At a playground in Krakow, where I went with a friend and his kids, a Ukrainian woman who had been living in Poland for several years before the war told us that most of the refugees she had met intended to stay in Poland for the long term. This woman, who had always spoken Russian as her first language, also noted that Putin’s aggression had led most Ukrainians she knew to begin speaking Ukrainian instead of Russian. Furthermore, Putin seems to have rekindled amity between Poles and Ukrainians despite the historical trauma that has cast a pall on relations between the two nations since the Ukrainian nationalist uprising and ethnic cleansings of Poles during the Second World War. Now Putin has provided both nations with a common adversary.

在克拉科夫的一個游樂場，我見到了一個朋友以及他的孩子，她是一個戰(zhàn)前就已經(jīng)在波蘭生活了幾年的烏克蘭婦女，她告訴我們，她遇到的大多數(shù)難民都打算長期留在波蘭。這位一直以俄語為第一語言的婦女還指出，普京的侵略行為導(dǎo)致她認(rèn)識的大多數(shù)烏克蘭人開始說烏克蘭語而不是俄語。此外，普京似乎重新推動了波蘭人和烏克蘭人之間的友好關(guān)系，盡管自第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間烏克蘭民族主義起義和對波蘭人的種族清洗以來，歷史創(chuàng)傷給兩國關(guān)系蒙上了一層陰影?，F(xiàn)在，普京為這兩個國家提供了一個共同的對手。

Despite the complexity of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its ramifications for all of Europe, two questions illuminate the behavior of every actor: “Who benefits?” and “What are the stakes?” For nations like Poland and Czechia, which have donated impressive amounts of military equipment and humanitarian aid, the stakes are no less than the current global balance of power. Should Ukraine defeat Russia and send its once-formidable army back over the border, it will shift the whole balance of power in Europe. Countries like France and Germany, whose interests largely define those of the European unx as a whole, depend on a secure and regionally influential Russia for cheap and stable energy to power their economies, which depend on industrial output and a commuter workforce. If an ascendant bloc of Central and Eastern European nations, led by Poland and Ukraine, were to assume Russia’s current role in the geopolitical order, their new power would displace that of a weakened France and Germany.

盡管俄羅斯對烏克蘭的入侵及其對整個歐洲的影響十分復(fù)雜，但有兩個問題照亮了每個行為者的行為?！罢l受益？”和“利害關(guān)系是什么？”。對于像波蘭和捷克這樣捐贈了大量軍事裝備和人道主義援助的國家來說，其利害關(guān)系不亞于當(dāng)前的全球力量平衡。如果烏克蘭擊敗俄羅斯并將其曾經(jīng)強(qiáng)大的軍隊(duì)遣送出境，它將改變歐洲的整個力量平衡。像法國和德國這樣的國家，其利益在很大程度上決定了整個歐盟的利益，它們依賴于一個安全的、具有區(qū)域影響力的俄羅斯，以獲得廉價和穩(wěn)定的能源，為其經(jīng)濟(jì)提供動力，而這些經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴于工業(yè)產(chǎn)出和通勤勞動力。如果以波蘭和烏克蘭為首的中歐和東歐國家集團(tuán)在地緣政治秩序中承擔(dān)起俄羅斯目前的角色，他們的新力量將取代被削弱的法國和德國的力量。

The United States stands to benefit from either outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The U.S., of course, won the Cold War with Ukraine a part of the Soviet unx, so it does not need Ukraine or its resources to pursue a successful Russia policy. On the other hand, a Ukrainian victory would see the U.S.’s investment in Ukraine pay off handsomely in terms of goodwill, political cooperation, and perhaps even access to resources in the mineral-rich Donbas region. Furthermore, the ascendancy of Poland, one of the most pro-American nations in Europe, would give the United States more influence over the politics of Europe writ large. At present, the E.U. seems to prefer the status quo of dealing with Russia as a regional power rather than ceding more ground to the United States. This might explain the European Commission’s reluctance on the issue, except for the occasional platitude or grandstanding declaration that everyone knows is less a policy prescxtion than a reflexive attempt at ensuring the E.U.’s relevance.

美國將從俄烏沖突的任何一種結(jié)果中獲益。當(dāng)然，美國是在烏克蘭成為蘇聯(lián)一部分的情況下贏得冷戰(zhàn)的，所以它不需要烏克蘭或其資源來推行成功的俄羅斯政策。另一方面，烏克蘭的勝利將使美國在烏克蘭的投資得到豐厚的回報，包括善意、政治合作，甚至可能在礦產(chǎn)豐富的頓巴斯地區(qū)獲得資源。此外，作為歐洲最親美的國家之一，波蘭走上前臺將使美國對整個歐洲的政治產(chǎn)生更大的影響。目前，歐盟似乎更傾向于將俄羅斯作為一個地區(qū)大國來處理的現(xiàn)狀，而不是將更多的地盤讓給美國。這可能解釋了歐盟委員會在這個問題上的不情不愿，除了偶爾的陳詞濫調(diào)或嘩眾取寵的聲明，大家都知道這與其說是一個政策處方，不如說是為了確保歐盟的相關(guān)性而做出的反射性嘗試。

On one side, Poland, Czechia, and other states have thrown money and materiel at Ukraine in the hope of bringing about an order defined by a weakened Russia, a humbled Franco-German axis, and an ascendant Central-Eastern Europe. Even the United Kingdom has grasped the potential of such a shift and rushed to play a part in the dismantling of Russian power, in a series of plays that evokes its support for the White Russian armies during the Russian civil war. On the other side, France, Germany, and Italy have conducted diplomacy that seeks nothing more than the immediate restoration of the status quo of cheap fuel and ready access to Russia’s enormous consumer market. Meanwhile, somewhere on the sidelines, the European unx and its commissioners make increasingly desperate plays for relevance by announcing some ineffectual sanctions package or other.

一方面，波蘭、捷克和其他國家向?yàn)蹩颂m投入資金和物資，希望帶來一個由被削弱的俄羅斯、被削弱的法德軸心和上升的中東歐組成的秩序。甚至英國也抓住了這種轉(zhuǎn)變的潛力，急于在瓦解俄羅斯力量的過程中發(fā)揮作用，這一系列的好戲讓人想起它在俄羅斯內(nèi)戰(zhàn)期間對白俄軍隊(duì)的支持。在另一邊，法國、德國和意大利開展了外交活動，其目的只是為了立即恢復(fù)廉價燃料和隨時進(jìn)入俄羅斯巨大消費(fèi)市場的現(xiàn)狀。與此同時，在某個地方，歐盟和它的委員們通過宣布一些無效的制裁方案，為爭取相關(guān)性做出了日益絕望的努力。

Ukraine’s refugees, then, are not ground between the gears of a revanchist Russia and an indifferent West; rather, they are suffering the birth pangs of a new geopolitical order struggling to tear itself out of the old one. In either case, the United States will benefit from stability in Europe and the restoration of brittle global supply chains. The U.S. must decide, however, which countries to side with as we head toward a multipolar world. To that end, Joe Biden and his administration would do well to look at the five million Ukrainian refugees who have already made their choice.

那么，烏克蘭的難民并不是被遺忘在一個反叛的俄羅斯和一個冷漠的西方的齒輪之間；相反，他們正在忍受一個新的地緣政治秩序的誕生的陣痛，該秩序正在努力從舊秩序中撕裂出來。無論是哪種情況，美國都將從歐洲的穩(wěn)定和脆弱的全球供應(yīng)鏈的恢復(fù)中受益。然而，美國必須決定在我們走向多極世界的過程中與哪些國家站在一起。為此，喬·拜登和他的政府最好看看已經(jīng)做出選擇的500萬烏克蘭難民的情況。