為什么納粹德國(guó)沒(méi)有從拿破侖試圖入侵俄國(guó)的錯(cuò)誤中吸取教訓(xùn)?（二）

Alexander Lovatt
Hitler had the same strategic problem as Napoleon. If he was going to dominate Europe he needed to neutralise Russia. The problem is that neither man appreciated the immensity of Russia and the severity of its climate. Neither had sufficient resources to achieve their aim.

希特勒和拿破侖有同樣的戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題。如果他想統(tǒng)治歐洲他就必須消滅俄國(guó)。問(wèn)題是，兩人都沒(méi)有意識(shí)到俄羅斯的遼闊和氣候的嚴(yán)峻。兩國(guó)都沒(méi)有足夠的資源來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)他們的目標(biāo)。

Ronald Isaacs
Primarily it's Hitler's fault. He was suffering from the “victory disease” of overconfidence. He knew of Stalins murderous purges of the Red Army officer corps and he saw the difficulty they had with little Finland. From that he figured it would be easy.
Later he came about as close to an apology as a megalomaniac dictator can. He said if he would have known the Soviet unx had 20,000 plus operational tanks he would not have invaded. Another fact he didn't mention was he underestimated the sheer size of the Red Army. I've read something like 300+ Red Army divisions were identified by 1943, that's a full 100 divisions more than what the OKW estimated. Like being off by an entire moderately strong countries Army!!!

這主要是希特勒的錯(cuò)。他患了過(guò)度自信的“勝利病”。他知道斯大林對(duì)紅軍軍官團(tuán)的血腥清洗，也看到了他們?cè)谛》姨m遇到的困難。從這一點(diǎn)來(lái)看，他認(rèn)為這很容易。
后來(lái)，作為一個(gè)狂妄自大的獨(dú)裁者，他幾乎要道歉了。他說(shuō)，如果他知道蘇聯(lián)有2萬(wàn)多輛可用坦克，他就不會(huì)入侵了。另一個(gè)他沒(méi)有提及的事實(shí)是他低估了紅軍的規(guī)模。據(jù)我所知，到1943年，大約有300多個(gè)師被確定為紅軍，這比OKW估計(jì)的還要多整整100個(gè)師。就像被整個(gè)中等強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家軍隊(duì)打敗了一樣！

John Dewar Gleissner
Hitler was blinded by ideological and racial hatred of Jews and Bolsheviks, thought the Soviet unx would collapse due to its inherent weaknesses, and believed he was a man of destiny whose will was paramount.
Hitler’s blitzkrieg European conquests before June 22, 1941 went rapidly, much faster than most of his generals thought possible, and never degenerated into a war of attrition. Because Hitler successfully overcame his top generals’ pre-invasion obxtions, he received or took much of the credit for those early successes, swelling his confidence beyond reason.
Hitler did not fully realize his summer blitzkrieg warfare would be limited by the immense terrain, poor roads, dust, wet and winter weather, the huge population of the Soviet unx and his attempt to invade, without substantial reserves, with the longest warfront in history, which got longer the farther the Germans drove into Russia.

希特勒被對(duì)猶太人和布爾什維克的意識(shí)形態(tài)和種族仇恨蒙蔽了雙眼，認(rèn)為蘇聯(lián)會(huì)因?yàn)槠涔逃械娜觞c(diǎn)而崩潰，并相信自己是一個(gè)命定的人，他的意志是至高無(wú)上的。
希特勒在1941年6月22日之前對(duì)歐洲的閃電戰(zhàn)進(jìn)展迅速，比他的大多數(shù)將軍想象的要快得多，而且從未退化為消耗戰(zhàn)。由于希特勒成功地克服了他的高級(jí)將領(lǐng)在入侵前的反對(duì)意見(jiàn)，他獲得早期成功的大部分功勞，使他的信心大增。
希特勒沒(méi)有完全意識(shí)到，他的夏季閃電戰(zhàn)將受到巨大地形、糟糕的道路、塵土、潮濕和冬天的天氣、蘇聯(lián)龐大的人口和他的入侵企圖的限制，沒(méi)有大量的儲(chǔ)備，面對(duì)歷史上最長(zhǎng)的戰(zhàn)線，德國(guó)人越深入俄羅斯，戰(zhàn)線就越長(zhǎng)。

Hitler thought his invasion was different from Napoleon’s because Hitler (a) had air power and internal combustion engines in his modern planes, vehicles and tanks, (b) thought the war on the Eastern Front would be over by winter, (c) minimized the importance and weariness of the bulk of his army that marched and had horses carry equipment, (d) did not account for the tanks getting so far ahead of the marchers, (e) underestimated how hard the Red Army would fight, and (f) did not think that Stalin would have time to draft, train and equip soldiers from the Soviet manpower reserves of 14,000,000 available warriors.
Hitler never agreed with his top generals as to the primary obxtive. His generals wanted to drive on Moscow; Hitler made the German Army spread out along the entire front.

希特勒認(rèn)為他的入侵不同于拿破侖，因?yàn)橄Ｌ乩眨?br /> 1. 擁有空中力量和現(xiàn)代飛機(jī)、車輛和坦克；2. 認(rèn)為東線戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)將在冬天結(jié)；3. 大軍行軍由馬匹來(lái)運(yùn)輸裝備，最大限度地減少了他的大軍的負(fù)擔(dān)。4. 沒(méi)有考慮到坦克跑在大部隊(duì)前面這么遠(yuǎn)；5. 低估了紅軍的戰(zhàn)斗強(qiáng)度；6. 認(rèn)為斯大林沒(méi)有時(shí)間從蘇聯(lián)1400萬(wàn)可用的戰(zhàn)士?jī)?chǔ)備中征召、訓(xùn)練和裝備士兵。
在主要目標(biāo)上，希特勒從未與他的高級(jí)將領(lǐng)達(dá)成一致。他的將軍們想進(jìn)攻莫斯科;希特勒讓德軍沿著整個(gè)戰(zhàn)線展開(kāi)。

Michael Beraka
This is an underrated question, and shows you exactly the difference between intelligence and cleverness.
The ‘moralistic’ theology of the West would have the world believe that a man like Hitler—a nihilist who truly believed—was impossible, a contradiction in terms. Nobody that wanton could be bright—mafioso are generally treated abusively in fiction (The Godfather and the Sopranos are the exceptions that prove the rule). And indeed, the idea that only an idiot would be a ‘nihilist’ was shared by both the pre and post Christian Greek inheritance of Europe. Hitler was not a happy man, and yet many of us would chose absolute power over happiness. In fact, it wouldn’t even be a question; most people would sell out whatever beliefs they convince themselves they hold in all of two seconds if they ever came anywhere near the corridors of real power—exactly this point is why the protagonist of House of Cards breaks the normally taboo rule of crossing the “4th wall”: talking to the audience. They are pulling for him, even though he’s proud to be the bad guy, because they get to be insiders, as long as he continues his rise.

這是一個(gè)被低估的問(wèn)題，它恰恰向你展示了智力和聰明之間的區(qū)別。
西方的“道德主義”神學(xué)會(huì)讓世界相信，一個(gè)像希特勒這樣的人，一個(gè)世人皆以為的虛無(wú)主義者是不可能成功的。但這在措辭上是矛盾的。在小說(shuō)中，黑手黨通常受到虐待(《教父》和《黑道家族》是證明這一規(guī)律的例外)。
希特勒不是一個(gè)幸福的人，然而我們中的許多人會(huì)選擇絕對(duì)的權(quán)力而不是幸福。事實(shí)上，這甚至都不是一個(gè)問(wèn)題。大多數(shù)人一旦接近真正權(quán)力的走廊，就會(huì)在兩秒鐘內(nèi)出賣自己的信念。這就是為什么《紙牌屋》的主角打破了通常禁忌的規(guī)則，越過(guò)“第四堵墻”: 與觀眾交談。他們推舉他，盡管他以做壞人為榮，因?yàn)橹灰^續(xù)攀升，他們就能成為圈內(nèi)人士。

But I digress. Hitler was obsessed with Napoleon’s failure in Russia. He ultimately came to believe that he made an idol of the capital ; and that the “Oriental” Russians did not have this pride and dignity attachment to the land; but rather a Mongol-esque austerity and pragmatism. Hitler was the completion of the Protestantism in European political and spiritual life that outlasted Christian Faith—above all, he was a puritanical opponent of idolatry. And like Kevin Spacey’s character, mocking the politicians and journalists clamoring for a presidential “pen” from a famous bill signing, he has contempt for people who think power exists in trinkets. All there is is power, and power can’t be hoarded.

我跑題了。
希特勒癡迷于拿破侖在俄國(guó)的失敗。他最終相信自己會(huì)與眾不同?！皷|方”的俄羅斯人對(duì)這片土地沒(méi)有這樣的自豪感和尊嚴(yán)感，有的是蒙古式的節(jié)儉和實(shí)用主義。在歐洲的政治和精神生活中，希特勒是超越基督教信仰的新教的完人——最重要的是，他是一個(gè)反對(duì)偶像崇拜的清教徒。就像凱文·史派西飾演的角色一樣，他嘲笑那些吵著要總統(tǒng)的“筆”的政客和記者們，嘲笑那些認(rèn)為權(quán)力存在于飾品中的人。那里只有權(quán)力，而權(quán)力是無(wú)法囤積的。

This is all well and good middlebrow Nietzscheanism—but the whole point of studying philosophy, of knowing enough about theology to actually understand the problem with idolatry, is to avoid making theorems out of incidents. Hitler wanted the oil fields in the Caucasus; but the situation and the world were immeasurably different from Napoleon’s time. Aside from squandering the strongest weapon the Nazis had, the aura of invincibility, inevitability, the futility of resistance (exactly the same one shared by Napoleon), by routing his own advance; Hitler did not factor in the importance of communications in the 20th century, of which Moscow was of course the center.

這是非常好的尼采之道，但學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)，了解足夠多的神學(xué)知識(shí)以真正理解偶像崇拜的問(wèn)題的全部要點(diǎn)，會(huì)讓人無(wú)法從事件中總結(jié)出教訓(xùn)。希特勒想要高加索地區(qū)的油田，但是當(dāng)時(shí)的形勢(shì)和世界與拿破侖時(shí)代已經(jīng)有了顯著的不同。除了浪費(fèi)納粹所擁有的最強(qiáng)大的武器，不可戰(zhàn)勝的光環(huán)，徒勞的抵抗(拿破侖也擁有同樣的光環(huán))，挫敗了自己的前進(jìn)，希特勒沒(méi)有考慮到20世紀(jì)通訊的重要性，莫斯科當(dāng)然是通訊的中心。

Ultimately, he did the exact same thing as Napoleon. The difference in his campaign was cosmetic, incidental; he didn’t *really* have clear obxtives; he bet the ranch on the lightning swiftness of the campaign, and then obstructed exactly this for a hazy goal. He never *really appraised things soberly; his delusions were too intertwined with the source of his (very veritable) political and strategic strength. People that are obsessed with being clever usually end up looking foolish.

最終，他做了和拿破侖一樣的事，他們的區(qū)別不過(guò)是表面和偶然的。他沒(méi)有清晰的目標(biāo)。
他把整個(gè)寶都押在了這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)役的閃電般的迅捷上，結(jié)果恰恰是目標(biāo)的模糊而阻撓了這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)役。他從不真正冷靜地評(píng)價(jià)事物，他的妄想與他(非常真實(shí)的)政治和戰(zhàn)略實(shí)力的來(lái)源糾纏在一起。
沉迷于變得聰明的人通常最終會(huì)看起來(lái)很愚蠢。

Toma? Vargazon
Napoleon’s blunder of trying to invade Russia was quite irrelevant.
They were basing their plans on a more recent result of an invasion of Russia.
Germany, with their Austrian allies, utterly defeated Russia in the previous war. Russia was forced to make huge territorial concessions, including most of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics. Russia was defeated and eviscerated, it could not recover from the loss in a generation or more.
It was only the defeat of Germany at the hands of the Entente that allowed Russia to recover the most critical of the lost territories. Germany simply assumed they would be able to do again what they were already able to do when their generals and field marshalls were still lieutenants and captains.

拿破侖試圖入侵俄國(guó)的錯(cuò)誤完全無(wú)關(guān)緊要。他們（希特勒）的計(jì)劃是基于最近入侵俄國(guó)的結(jié)果。

圖：布列斯特-立托夫斯克條約，1917年
德國(guó)及其盟友奧地利在前一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中徹底擊敗了俄國(guó)。俄羅斯被迫在領(lǐng)土上做出巨大讓步，包括烏克蘭、波蘭和波羅的海的大部分領(lǐng)土。俄國(guó)被打敗了，被掏空了，一代人甚至更久都無(wú)法從損失中恢復(fù)過(guò)來(lái)。
只有在協(xié)約國(guó)手中擊敗了德國(guó)，俄國(guó)才得以收復(fù)最關(guān)鍵的失地。德國(guó)人只是想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為，當(dāng)他們的將軍和陸軍元帥還是中尉和上尉時(shí)，他們就已經(jīng)可以再次重演一戰(zhàn)時(shí)的場(chǎng)景。

It wasn’t an unreasonable assumption at all. The lines of advance in WW2 went above and beyond the limits of Brest-Litovsk, the only difference was that com...st Russia under Stalin fought like they had nothing to lose, in no small part because they didn’t. In WW1 they fought for an empire that didn’t care about them, the alternative was to live in a different empire that also didn’t care about them. In WW2 the option was an empire that didn’t care about them and death. That was the key motor of incessant Soviet resistance that enabled the state to survive the war.
Napoleon didn’t even factor into it. Not only that but the way Napoleon was defeated - through starvation, exposure and exhaustion - was entirely avoided. When winter came the Wehrmacht thrived, the Red Army was most successful during the rainy season, when long distance resupply and air operations were difficult if not outright impossible.
They didn’t learn from Napoleon, because Napoleon had little to teach them.

這并不是一個(gè)不合理的假設(shè)。二戰(zhàn)的推進(jìn)線超出了《布列斯特-立托夫斯克條約》的限制，唯一的區(qū)別是斯大林領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的共產(chǎn)主義俄羅斯在戰(zhàn)斗中沒(méi)有遭受任何損失。在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)中，他們?yōu)橐粋€(gè)不關(guān)心他們的帝國(guó)而戰(zhàn)，另一種選擇是生活在一個(gè)同樣不關(guān)心他們的帝國(guó)。在二戰(zhàn)中，選擇變成了一邊是不在乎他們和他們的死的帝國(guó)（而另一邊不是）。這是蘇聯(lián)不斷抵抗的關(guān)鍵動(dòng)力，使國(guó)家能夠在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中幸存下來(lái)。
拿破侖的案例在這里完全沒(méi)有可比性。不僅如此，拿破侖戰(zhàn)敗的方式——饑餓、暴露和疲憊，（德國(guó)）也完全避免了。當(dāng)冬季到來(lái)時(shí)，德國(guó)國(guó)防軍行動(dòng)自如。但紅軍在雨季大獲成功，因?yàn)榇藭r(shí)即使不是完全不可能，（德軍方面）也很難進(jìn)行遠(yuǎn)程補(bǔ)給和空中作戰(zhàn)。
他們沒(méi)有向拿破侖學(xué)習(xí)，因?yàn)槟闷苼鰶](méi)有什么可以教給他們的。

Joe Goldberg
The Germans correctly attributed Napoleon’s failure in Russia to be due to impossible logistics in the world of 1800.
The German INCORRECTLY thought that the superior logistical support allowed by railroads, trucks, and aircraft would solve Napoleon’s problem in Russia. They were right as to modern logistical support in Western Europe but the German’s were wrong as to modern logistical support in the USSR which STILL looked a lot like when Napoleon invaded.

德國(guó)人正確地將拿破侖在俄國(guó)的失敗歸因于1800年代無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)的后勤保障。
但德國(guó)人錯(cuò)誤地認(rèn)為，鐵路、卡車和飛機(jī)所提供的優(yōu)越后勤支持可以解決拿破侖在俄國(guó)的問(wèn)題。他們對(duì)西歐的現(xiàn)代后勤支持的看法是正確的，但德國(guó)人對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的現(xiàn)代后勤支持的看法是錯(cuò)誤的，蘇聯(lián)看起來(lái)和拿破侖入侵時(shí)很像。

Kaspar Pena
It’s odd because the Germans didn’t actually do that well logistically. Their army relied far too much on horsepower and the Russian railroad gauges were different than the German ones, so the Nazis had basically construct new rail lines rather than seamlessly switching over.

這很奇怪，因?yàn)榈聡?guó)人在后勤方面做得并不好。他們的軍隊(duì)過(guò)于依賴馬匹，而且俄國(guó)的鐵路軌距與德國(guó)的不同，所以納粹基本上是在建造新的鐵路線路，而不是無(wú)縫切換。

Sergey Bobyk
Actually ww1 Russian Imperial army hold the ground a lot better then Red Army in WW2. Germans and Austrians never get in too deep well into 1917. Russians holded. So called victory came as a direct result of Revolution when Army simply went home in millions taking with them weapons. Lenin as well in his first edicts demobilised everyone.
Genius. Country at war and he sending last loyal men home. Germans woken up and found empty trenches.
In 1918 Germans took more than in all 4 previous years althogether. Not because of own process but because there simply was no any opposition. They could move in as deep as their hearts wished and only logistics and necessary manpower was a constraints.

事實(shí)上，一戰(zhàn)期間沙俄軍隊(duì)比二戰(zhàn)時(shí)紅軍抵抗得更好。
1917年，德國(guó)人和奧地利人從未深入俄羅斯，俄羅斯人守住了。所謂的（德國(guó)和奧地利的）勝利是（布爾什維克）革命的直接結(jié)果，當(dāng)時(shí)數(shù)百萬(wàn)（沙俄）軍隊(duì)帶著武器回家。列寧還在他的第一個(gè)法令中遣散了所有沙俄軍隊(duì)。
真是個(gè)天才，國(guó)家處于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，他卻讓忠誠(chéng)的人歸家。德軍醒來(lái)后發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)面戰(zhàn)壕空無(wú)一人。
1918年德國(guó)人拿到的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)賠款比之前4年的總和還要多。不是因?yàn)樽约捍蜈A的，而是因?yàn)楦緵](méi)有任何敵人。他們可以隨心所欲地深入，只有后勤和必要的人力是限制。

Andreas K?nig
That’s pretty much entirely wrong.
The Russian Imperial Army dissolved thanks to the first Russian Revolution in 1917, the one in February which forced the Tsar to abdicate and which established a Provisional Republic… not because of the Red Revolution in October or because they “send them home”. The Kerensky Offensive in July 1917 was the final nail in the coffin for the Russian Army, whatever was left retreated 240km behind the front → “The only limit to the German advance was the lack of the logistical means to occupy more territory”.
Also, “genius” move by the Tsar to “just” let his people starve and feed them with bullets when they cry for bread… perhaps domestic policies become far more important in times of war, unless you love a good Revolution or two.
Furthermore your comparison is really skewed.

這是完全錯(cuò)誤的。
沙俄軍隊(duì)的解散要感謝1917年的第一次俄國(guó)革命，這場(chǎng)革命發(fā)生在2月，迫使沙皇退位，并建立了臨時(shí)共和國(guó)，不是因?yàn)?0月的紅色革命，也不是因?yàn)樗麄儯ú紶柺簿S克人）“送他們回家”。 1917年7月的克倫斯基攻勢(shì)是俄軍的最后一顆釘在棺材上的釘子，不管剩下什么，都撤退到前線后方240公里，導(dǎo)致德軍前進(jìn)并占領(lǐng)領(lǐng)地的唯一限制是缺乏后勤。
此外，沙皇的“天才”舉動(dòng)是“只是”讓他的人民挨餓，當(dāng)他們哭喊著要面包時(shí)用子彈喂他們……興許，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)期，國(guó)內(nèi)政策遠(yuǎn)比和平時(shí)期更加重要，除非你想要遭遇革命。

Furthermore your comparison is really skewed.
The Russian Empire was far larger than the Soviet unx and the Russians had the element of surprise, they mobilized first and invaded German territory in East Prussia for instance… The German Army had to travel a far larger distance, first defending their own territory, then invading Russian-Poland.
Meanwhile WW2 Soviet Russia was more or less taken by surprise, their army in the middle of reconstruction and Poland was already divided… Of course Germany has the initiative and takes more land in WW2….
You also fail to take into account that during WW1, the Central Powers were fighting everywhere at the same time… Nazi Germany had the luxury to focus on one enemy at a time, atleast until they invaded Soviet Russia.

再者，你的比較是錯(cuò)誤的：
沙俄帝國(guó)比蘇聯(lián)大得多，俄羅斯人有出其不意的能力，比如，他們首先動(dòng)員起來(lái)入侵德國(guó)在東普魯士的領(lǐng)土。而德國(guó)軍隊(duì)必須行進(jìn)更長(zhǎng)距離的行軍，首先保衛(wèi)自己的領(lǐng)土，然后才能入侵俄羅斯/波蘭。與此同時(shí)，二戰(zhàn)期間的蘇聯(lián)或多或少受到了驚嚇，他們的軍隊(duì)正在重建，波蘭已經(jīng)分裂了，當(dāng)然德國(guó)在二戰(zhàn)中擁有主動(dòng)權(quán)，占領(lǐng)了更多的土地……
你也沒(méi)有考慮到在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)期間，同盟國(guó)同時(shí)在各地作戰(zhàn)。而納粹德國(guó)有奢侈的時(shí)間專注于一個(gè)敵人，至少在他們?nèi)肭痔K聯(lián)之前是這樣。
當(dāng)然，當(dāng)敵人被打敗到面臨革命、大規(guī)模逃兵和軍隊(duì)解散的地步時(shí)，你會(huì)獲得最大的收益……在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)期間，協(xié)約國(guó)(除了1914年的俄羅斯)從未占領(lǐng)過(guò)任何德國(guó)領(lǐng)土，只有在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)快結(jié)束時(shí)，當(dāng)停戰(zhàn)協(xié)議簽署時(shí)，協(xié)約國(guó)才占領(lǐng)了德國(guó)領(lǐng)土。這個(gè)結(jié)果是可以預(yù)料到的，德國(guó)軍隊(duì)解體，德國(guó)也發(fā)生了兩次革命，盡管只有一次成功。
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Sergey Bobyk
Revolution in Feb 1917 destroyed Army. Chain of command was broken , any subordination or discipline gone overnight, soldiers habitually shot their officers with impunity and desert home. Soldiers demanded “full democracy” or vote about who should command, should they gone to attack or not or should they obey whatsoever any orders. Any punishmens or even verbal orders was banned. Human rights idiocy in fighting Army !!! Kerensky was actually the root of it. He simply did not trusted old army and especially officers corp. Correctly, as mutiny of August shown. Lenin with his gang of agitators helped spreading rumours of land grabs of latifundias for free at home. For own goals of course. To organise armed coup Army had to be destroyed first at any cost or Bolsheviks would be hang by nightfall in October.

1917年2月的革命摧毀了沙俄陸軍。指揮系統(tǒng)被破壞，任何從屬關(guān)系或紀(jì)律都在一夜之間消失，士兵們習(xí)慣性地射殺他們的軍官而不受懲罰，逃之夭夭。士兵們要求“完全民主”或投票決定由誰(shuí)來(lái)指揮，他們是否應(yīng)該進(jìn)攻，或者他們是否應(yīng)該服從任何命令。任何懲罰甚至口頭命令都是被禁止的。軍隊(duì)里面講人權(quán)純粹就是白癡行為！
克倫斯基是導(dǎo)致這一切的根源。他就是不相信舊軍隊(duì)，特別是軍官集團(tuán)，正如八月的兵變所顯示的那樣。列寧和他的一幫煽動(dòng)者幫助傳播了在國(guó)內(nèi)免費(fèi)奪取大莊園土地的謠言。這當(dāng)然是為了自己的目標(biāo)。要組織武裝政變，必須不惜一切代價(jià)首先消滅軍隊(duì)，否則布爾什維克就會(huì)在十月黃昏前被絞死。
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That's why Germany had some success. Opposing Army melted home. And in November 1917 Lenin dissolved last remains. Front was literally open.
Personally I can take performance of Russian Army as from August1914-Feb1917 separately. After, there was no Russia as unified state and no Army. But not because of German strength.
But in 4 years Germany failed to move much past Poland and Western Ukraine (colonies) and war never reached Metropolia. Russians hold.

這就是為什么德國(guó)取得了一些成功。對(duì)方軍隊(duì)在自己打自己。1917年11月，列寧解散了最后的舊軍隊(duì)，導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)前線洞門大開(kāi)。
就我個(gè)人而言，我可以把俄羅斯軍隊(duì)從1914年8月到1917年2月的表現(xiàn)分開(kāi)來(lái)看。之后，統(tǒng)一的俄羅斯不復(fù)存在，軍隊(duì)也不復(fù)存在。但這并不是因?yàn)榈聡?guó)導(dǎo)致的。
但在（二戰(zhàn)的）4年的時(shí)間里，德國(guó)沒(méi)能越過(guò)波蘭和西烏克蘭(殖民地)，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)也從未波及大城市。俄羅斯人守住了。

Vladimir Smirnov
“Of course you make the most gains when the enemy was beaten to the point of Revolution, mass desertion and dissolvement of the Army…”
Russian Army started decaying since the First Russian Revolution of 1905. Tsar Nicolas saw entering the war in 1914 as an option out of the coming internal revolt, but he was gravely mistaken. Due to the powerful strife for change in Russia, the Russian Empire would have transformed into something new even without the war of 1914–1918. Germany just happened to rip the benefit of Russia’s internal disarray. And yes, Lenin issued the “Decree of Peace” in November 1917 in response to the masses’ request to abandon the useless war, so naturally Germans took full advantage of the absence of their opponent in the trenches.

“當(dāng)然，當(dāng)敵人被打敗到面臨革命、大規(guī)模逃兵和軍隊(duì)解散的地步時(shí)，你會(huì)獲得最大的收益……”
俄國(guó)軍隊(duì)從1905年第一次革命開(kāi)始衰落。沙皇尼古拉認(rèn)為1914年參戰(zhàn)是為了應(yīng)對(duì)即將到來(lái)的國(guó)內(nèi)叛亂，但他大錯(cuò)特錯(cuò)了。由于俄國(guó)內(nèi)部強(qiáng)烈的變革斗爭(zhēng)，即使沒(méi)有1914-1918年的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，沙俄也會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)變成新的國(guó)家。德國(guó)只是碰巧從俄羅斯的內(nèi)部混亂中獲益。是的，列寧在1917年11月頒布了《和平法令》，以響應(yīng)群眾要求放棄這場(chǎng)無(wú)用的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，所以德國(guó)人自然充分利用了他們的對(duì)手不在戰(zhàn)壕里的機(jī)會(huì)。
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Then in March 2018 the Bolsheviks found themselves in dire necessity to sign a truce in Brest with Germans who advanced deep into the Russian territory.
The example of WW1 played a dirty joke with Germans at the time of WW2. They thought WW2 would be as easy for them as WW1: Russia would be in disarray again, etc. Though this time Russia was not, and the result is well known: WW2 ended when Russian tanks rolled into Berlin.
Germans needed to be better students of history, for Napoleon was their primary teacher. And remains ad infinitum.

然后在1918年3月，布爾什維克發(fā)現(xiàn)他們非常有必要在布列斯特與深入俄羅斯領(lǐng)土的德國(guó)人簽署停戰(zhàn)協(xié)議。
一戰(zhàn)的例子在二戰(zhàn)期間和德國(guó)人開(kāi)了一個(gè)骯臟的玩笑。他們認(rèn)為第二次世界大戰(zhàn)對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)和第一次世界大戰(zhàn)一樣容易：俄羅斯會(huì)再次陷入混亂。盡管這一次俄羅斯沒(méi)有，而且結(jié)果是眾所周知的：二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束時(shí)，俄羅斯坦克開(kāi)進(jìn)了柏林。
德國(guó)人需要成為更好的歷史學(xué)生，因?yàn)槟闷苼鍪撬麄兊闹饕蠋?。并且不可懈怠?br />