中國能否幫助巴西重啟全球軟實力？
Can China Help Brazil Restart Its Global Soft Power?
譯文簡介
現(xiàn)在的關鍵是雙方重新建立高級別戰(zhàn)略對話。盧拉的第一次高調出訪可能是華盛頓。但是，當我們看著歷史的河流流淌時，真正重要的目的地將是中國。
正文翻譯
Can China Help Brazil Restart Its Global Soft Power?
中國能否幫助巴西重啟全球軟實力？
Ten days of full immersion in Brazil are not for the faint-hearted. Even restricted to the top two megalopolises, Sao Paulo and Rio, watching live the impact of interlocking economic, political, social and environmental crises exacerbated by the Jair Bolsonaro project leaves one stunned.
The return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for what will be his third presidential term, starting January 1, 2023, is an extraordinary story trespassed by Sisyphean tasks. All at the same time he will have to
fight poverty;
reconnect with economic development while redistributing wealth;
re-industrialize the nation; and
tame environmental pillage.
That will force his new government to summon unforeseen creative powers of political and financial persuasion.
Even a mediocre, conservative politician such as Geraldo Alckmin, former governor of the wealthiest state of the unx, Sao Paulo, and coordinator of the presidential transition, was simply astonished at how four years of the Bolsonaro project let loose a cornucopia of vanished documents, a black hole concerning all sorts of data and inexplicable financial losses.
在巴西10天的沉浸式體驗不適合膽小的人。即使僅限于前兩個特大城市圣保羅和里約熱內盧，親眼看到由雅伊爾·博索納羅之下加劇的、相互關聯(lián)的經濟、政治、社會和環(huán)境危機的影響，也會讓人感到震驚。
從2023年1月1日開始，路易斯·伊納西奧·盧拉·達席爾瓦的回歸，將是達席爾瓦的第三個總統(tǒng)任期，這是一個被西西弗斯式任務所侵擾的、不同尋常的故事。同時他也必須這么做：
解決貧困；
在重新分配財富的同時重新與經濟發(fā)展聯(lián)系起來;
讓國家重新工業(yè)化;
控制環(huán)境掠奪。
這將迫使他的新政府在政治和財政方面發(fā)揮不可預見的創(chuàng)造性力量。即使是像杰拉爾多·阿爾克明這樣平庸的保守派政治家，他是巴西最富有圣保羅州的前州長，也是總統(tǒng)過渡的協(xié)調人，依然震驚于博爾索納羅四年的治理，是如何讓大量文件消失、并制造了一個涉及各種數(shù)據和莫名其妙的經濟損失的黑洞。
The return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for what will be his third presidential term, starting January 1, 2023, is an extraordinary story trespassed by Sisyphean tasks. All at the same time he will have to
fight poverty;
reconnect with economic development while redistributing wealth;
re-industrialize the nation; and
tame environmental pillage.
That will force his new government to summon unforeseen creative powers of political and financial persuasion.
Even a mediocre, conservative politician such as Geraldo Alckmin, former governor of the wealthiest state of the unx, Sao Paulo, and coordinator of the presidential transition, was simply astonished at how four years of the Bolsonaro project let loose a cornucopia of vanished documents, a black hole concerning all sorts of data and inexplicable financial losses.
在巴西10天的沉浸式體驗不適合膽小的人。即使僅限于前兩個特大城市圣保羅和里約熱內盧，親眼看到由雅伊爾·博索納羅之下加劇的、相互關聯(lián)的經濟、政治、社會和環(huán)境危機的影響，也會讓人感到震驚。
從2023年1月1日開始，路易斯·伊納西奧·盧拉·達席爾瓦的回歸，將是達席爾瓦的第三個總統(tǒng)任期，這是一個被西西弗斯式任務所侵擾的、不同尋常的故事。同時他也必須這么做：
解決貧困；
在重新分配財富的同時重新與經濟發(fā)展聯(lián)系起來;
讓國家重新工業(yè)化;
控制環(huán)境掠奪。
這將迫使他的新政府在政治和財政方面發(fā)揮不可預見的創(chuàng)造性力量。即使是像杰拉爾多·阿爾克明這樣平庸的保守派政治家，他是巴西最富有圣保羅州的前州長，也是總統(tǒng)過渡的協(xié)調人，依然震驚于博爾索納羅四年的治理，是如何讓大量文件消失、并制造了一個涉及各種數(shù)據和莫名其妙的經濟損失的黑洞。
It’s impossible to ascertain the extent of corruption across the spectrum because simply nothing is in the books: Governmental systems have not been fed since 2020.
Alckmin summed it all up: “The Bolsonaro government happened in the Stone Age, where there were no words and numbers.”
Now every single public policy will have to be created, or re-created from scratch, and serious mistakes will be inevitable because of lack of data.
And we’re not talking about a banana republic – even though the country concerned features plenty of (delicious) bananas.
By purchasing power parity (PPP), according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brazil remains the eighth-ranked economic power in the world even after the Bolsonaro devastation years – behind China, the US, India, Japan, Germany, Russia and Indonesia, and ahead of the UK and France.
要確定各個領域的腐敗程度是不可能的，因為根本沒有什么記錄在賬本上。自2020年以來，政府系統(tǒng)就沒有得到供養(yǎng)。阿爾克敏總結道：“博爾索納羅政府發(fā)生在沒有文字和數(shù)字的石器時代?！?現(xiàn)在，每一項公共政策都必須從頭制定或重新制定，而由于缺乏數(shù)據，嚴重的錯誤將不可避免。我們并不是在談論香蕉共和國——盡管有關國家以大量(美味的)香蕉為特色。
Alckmin summed it all up: “The Bolsonaro government happened in the Stone Age, where there were no words and numbers.”
Now every single public policy will have to be created, or re-created from scratch, and serious mistakes will be inevitable because of lack of data.
And we’re not talking about a banana republic – even though the country concerned features plenty of (delicious) bananas.
By purchasing power parity (PPP), according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brazil remains the eighth-ranked economic power in the world even after the Bolsonaro devastation years – behind China, the US, India, Japan, Germany, Russia and Indonesia, and ahead of the UK and France.
要確定各個領域的腐敗程度是不可能的，因為根本沒有什么記錄在賬本上。自2020年以來，政府系統(tǒng)就沒有得到供養(yǎng)。阿爾克敏總結道：“博爾索納羅政府發(fā)生在沒有文字和數(shù)字的石器時代?！?現(xiàn)在，每一項公共政策都必須從頭制定或重新制定，而由于缺乏數(shù)據，嚴重的錯誤將不可避免。我們并不是在談論香蕉共和國——盡管有關國家以大量(美味的)香蕉為特色。
By purchasing power parity (PPP), according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brazil remains the eighth-ranked economic power in the world even after the Bolsonaro devastation years – behind China, the US, India, Japan, Germany, Russia and Indonesia, and ahead of the UK and France.
A concerted imperial campaign since 2010, duly denounced by WikiLeaks, and implemented by local comprador elites, targeted the Dilma Rousseff presidency – the Brazilian national entrepreneurial champions – and led to Rousseff’s (illegal) impeachment and the jailing of Lula for 580 days on spurious charges (all subsequently dropped), paved the way for Bolsonaro to win the presidency in 2018.
Were it not for this accumulation of disasters, Brazil – a natural leader of the Global South – by now might possibly be placed as the fifth-largest geo-economic power in the world.
根據國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的數(shù)據，按購買力平價(PPP)計算，即使在博爾索納羅的破壞多年后，巴西仍是世界上排名第八的經濟大國，僅次于中國、美國、印度、日本、德國、俄羅斯和印度尼西亞，領先于英國和法國。
自2010年以來，一場協(xié)調一致的、針對巴西國家企業(yè)家冠軍迪爾瑪·羅塞夫擔任總統(tǒng)期間的帝國運動(維基解密適時譴責了這場運動，并由當?shù)刭I辦精英實施)，導致羅塞夫(非法)被彈劾，盧拉因虛假指控被監(jiān)禁580天(后來都被撤銷了)，為博爾索納羅贏得2018年總統(tǒng)大選鋪平了道路。
如果不是這些災難的累積，巴西作為南半球的天然領導者，現(xiàn)在可能會成為世界第五大地緣經濟大國。
A concerted imperial campaign since 2010, duly denounced by WikiLeaks, and implemented by local comprador elites, targeted the Dilma Rousseff presidency – the Brazilian national entrepreneurial champions – and led to Rousseff’s (illegal) impeachment and the jailing of Lula for 580 days on spurious charges (all subsequently dropped), paved the way for Bolsonaro to win the presidency in 2018.
Were it not for this accumulation of disasters, Brazil – a natural leader of the Global South – by now might possibly be placed as the fifth-largest geo-economic power in the world.
根據國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的數(shù)據，按購買力平價(PPP)計算，即使在博爾索納羅的破壞多年后，巴西仍是世界上排名第八的經濟大國，僅次于中國、美國、印度、日本、德國、俄羅斯和印度尼西亞，領先于英國和法國。
自2010年以來，一場協(xié)調一致的、針對巴西國家企業(yè)家冠軍迪爾瑪·羅塞夫擔任總統(tǒng)期間的帝國運動(維基解密適時譴責了這場運動，并由當?shù)刭I辦精英實施)，導致羅塞夫(非法)被彈劾，盧拉因虛假指控被監(jiān)禁580天(后來都被撤銷了)，為博爾索納羅贏得2018年總統(tǒng)大選鋪平了道路。
如果不是這些災難的累積，巴西作為南半球的天然領導者，現(xiàn)在可能會成為世界第五大地緣經濟大國。
What the investment gang wants
Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr, a former vice-president of the New Development Bank (NDB), or BRICS bank, goes straight to the point: Brazil’s dependence on Lula is immensely problematic.
Batista sees Lula facing at least three hostile blocs.The extreme right supported by a significant, powerful faction of the armed forces – and this includes not only Bolsonarists, who are still in front of a few army barracks contesting the presidential election result;
The physiological right that dominates Congress – known in Brazil as “The Big Center”;
International financial capital – which, predictably, controls the bulk of mainstream media.
The third bloc, to a great extent, gleefully embraced Lula’s notion of a United Front capable of defeating the Bolsonaro project (which project, by the way, never ceased to be immensely profitable for the third bloc).
投資團體想要什么
巴西新開發(fā)銀行(NDB)或金磚銀行前副行長小保羅·諾蓋拉·巴蒂斯塔一語中的：巴西對盧拉的依賴是個大問題。巴蒂斯塔認為盧拉至少面臨三個敵對集團：
由武裝部隊中一個重要而強大的派系支持的極右翼——這不僅包括仍在幾個軍營前抗議總統(tǒng)選舉結果的博爾索納羅支持者；
主導國會的必要性，在巴西國會被稱為“大中心”;
國際金融資本，可以預見，它們控制著大部分主流媒體。
第三陣營在很大程度上欣然接受了盧拉關于建立能夠擊敗博爾索納羅項目的統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線的概念(順便說一句，這個項目對第三陣營來說從未停止過巨大的利潤)。
Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr, a former vice-president of the New Development Bank (NDB), or BRICS bank, goes straight to the point: Brazil’s dependence on Lula is immensely problematic.
Batista sees Lula facing at least three hostile blocs.The extreme right supported by a significant, powerful faction of the armed forces – and this includes not only Bolsonarists, who are still in front of a few army barracks contesting the presidential election result;
The physiological right that dominates Congress – known in Brazil as “The Big Center”;
International financial capital – which, predictably, controls the bulk of mainstream media.
The third bloc, to a great extent, gleefully embraced Lula’s notion of a United Front capable of defeating the Bolsonaro project (which project, by the way, never ceased to be immensely profitable for the third bloc).
投資團體想要什么
巴西新開發(fā)銀行(NDB)或金磚銀行前副行長小保羅·諾蓋拉·巴蒂斯塔一語中的：巴西對盧拉的依賴是個大問題。巴蒂斯塔認為盧拉至少面臨三個敵對集團：
由武裝部隊中一個重要而強大的派系支持的極右翼——這不僅包括仍在幾個軍營前抗議總統(tǒng)選舉結果的博爾索納羅支持者；
主導國會的必要性，在巴西國會被稱為“大中心”;
國際金融資本，可以預見，它們控制著大部分主流媒體。
第三陣營在很大程度上欣然接受了盧拉關于建立能夠擊敗博爾索納羅項目的統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線的概念(順便說一句，這個項目對第三陣營來說從未停止過巨大的利潤)。
Now they want their cut. Mainstream media instantly turned to corralling Lula, operating a sort of “financial inquisition,” as described by crack economist Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo.
By appointing longtime Workers’ Party loyalist Fernando Haddad as finance minister, Lula signaled that he, in fact, will be in charge of the economy. Haddad is a political-science professor and was a decent minister of education, but he’s no sharp economic guru. Acolytes of the Goddess of the Market, of course, dismiss him.
Once again, this is the trademark Lula swing in action: He chose to place more importance on what will be complex, protracted negotiations with a hostile Congress to advance his social agenda, confident that all the lineaments of economic policy are in his head.
A lunch party with some members of Sao Paulo’s financial elite, even before Haddad’s name was announced, offered a few fascinating clues. These people are known as the “Faria Limers” – after the high-toned Faria Lima Avenue, which houses quite a few post-mod investment banks’ offices as well as Google and Facebook HQs.
現(xiàn)在他們想要自己的分成。主流媒體立即轉向拉攏盧拉，進行了一種“金融審判”，正如出色的經濟學家路易斯·岡薩加·貝魯佐所描述的那樣。盧拉任命長期忠于工人黨的哈達德為財政部長，這表明他實際上將負責經濟。哈達德是一位政治學教授，也是一位體面的教育部長，但他并不是一位精明的經濟大師。當然，市場女神的助手們把他解雇了。
再一次，這是盧拉標志性的行動：他選擇更加重視與敵對的國會進行的復雜而漫長的談判，以推進他的社會議程，他相信經濟政策的所有特征都在他的腦海中。
甚至在哈達德的名字被宣布之前，與一些圣保羅金融精英的午餐派對就提供了一些有趣的線索。這些人被稱為“法利亞利馬人”——以高調的法利亞利馬大道命名，這條大道上有不少后現(xiàn)代投資銀行的辦公室，還有谷歌和Facebook的總部。
By appointing longtime Workers’ Party loyalist Fernando Haddad as finance minister, Lula signaled that he, in fact, will be in charge of the economy. Haddad is a political-science professor and was a decent minister of education, but he’s no sharp economic guru. Acolytes of the Goddess of the Market, of course, dismiss him.
Once again, this is the trademark Lula swing in action: He chose to place more importance on what will be complex, protracted negotiations with a hostile Congress to advance his social agenda, confident that all the lineaments of economic policy are in his head.
A lunch party with some members of Sao Paulo’s financial elite, even before Haddad’s name was announced, offered a few fascinating clues. These people are known as the “Faria Limers” – after the high-toned Faria Lima Avenue, which houses quite a few post-mod investment banks’ offices as well as Google and Facebook HQs.
現(xiàn)在他們想要自己的分成。主流媒體立即轉向拉攏盧拉，進行了一種“金融審判”，正如出色的經濟學家路易斯·岡薩加·貝魯佐所描述的那樣。盧拉任命長期忠于工人黨的哈達德為財政部長，這表明他實際上將負責經濟。哈達德是一位政治學教授，也是一位體面的教育部長，但他并不是一位精明的經濟大師。當然，市場女神的助手們把他解雇了。
再一次，這是盧拉標志性的行動：他選擇更加重視與敵對的國會進行的復雜而漫長的談判，以推進他的社會議程，他相信經濟政策的所有特征都在他的腦海中。
甚至在哈達德的名字被宣布之前，與一些圣保羅金融精英的午餐派對就提供了一些有趣的線索。這些人被稱為“法利亞利馬人”——以高調的法利亞利馬大道命名，這條大道上有不少后現(xiàn)代投資銀行的辦公室，還有谷歌和Facebook的總部。
圖：圣保羅法利亞利馬大道
Lunch attendees included a smattering of rabid anti-Workers’ Party investors, the proverbial unreconstructed neoliberals, yet most were enthusiastic about opportunities ahead to make a killing, including an investor looking for deals involving Chinese companies.
The neoliberal mantra of those willing – perhaps – to place their bets on Lula (for a price) is “fiscal responsibility.” That frontally clashes with Lula’s focus on social justice.
That’s where Haddad comes up as a helpful, polite interlocutor because he does privilege nuance, pointing out that only looking at market indicators and forgetting about the 38% of Brazilians who only earn the minimum wage (1,212 Brazilian real or US$233 per month) is not exactly good for business.
參加午餐的有少數(shù)狂熱的反工人黨投資者，他們是公認的頑固的新自由主義者，但大多數(shù)人都對未來的大賺一筆的機會充滿熱情，其中包括一位正在尋找涉及中國公司的交易的投資者。
那些愿意(也許)把賭注押在盧拉身上的人的新自由主義口頭禪是“財政責任”。這與盧拉對社會公正的關注正面沖突。
這就是哈達德作為一個有幫助、有禮貌的對話者出現(xiàn)的地方，因為他做了優(yōu)先級的細微差別，指出：只看市場指標而無視38%的巴西人只賺最低工資(每月1212巴西雷亞爾或233美元)，這并不利于生意。
The neoliberal mantra of those willing – perhaps – to place their bets on Lula (for a price) is “fiscal responsibility.” That frontally clashes with Lula’s focus on social justice.
That’s where Haddad comes up as a helpful, polite interlocutor because he does privilege nuance, pointing out that only looking at market indicators and forgetting about the 38% of Brazilians who only earn the minimum wage (1,212 Brazilian real or US$233 per month) is not exactly good for business.
參加午餐的有少數(shù)狂熱的反工人黨投資者，他們是公認的頑固的新自由主義者，但大多數(shù)人都對未來的大賺一筆的機會充滿熱情，其中包括一位正在尋找涉及中國公司的交易的投資者。
那些愿意(也許)把賭注押在盧拉身上的人的新自由主義口頭禪是“財政責任”。這與盧拉對社會公正的關注正面沖突。
這就是哈達德作為一個有幫助、有禮貌的對話者出現(xiàn)的地方，因為他做了優(yōu)先級的細微差別，指出：只看市場指標而無視38%的巴西人只賺最低工資(每月1212巴西雷亞爾或233美元)，這并不利于生意。
The dark arts of non-government
Lula is already winning his first battle: approving a constitutional amendment that allows financing of more social spending.
That allows the government to keep the flagship Bolsa Família welfare program – of roughly $13 a month per poverty-level family – at least for the next two years.
A stroll across downtown Sao Paulo – which in the 1960s was as chic as mid-Manhattan – offers a sorrowful crash course on impoverishment, shut-down businesses, homelessness and raging unemployment. The notorious “Crack Land” – once limited to a street – now encompasses a whole neighborhood, much like junkie, post-pandemic Los Angeles.
Rio offers a completely different vibe if one goes for a walk in Ipanema on a sunny day, always a smashing experience. But Ipanema lives in a bubble. The real Rio of the Bolsonaro years – economically massacred, de-industrialized, occupied by militias – came up in a roundtable downtown where I interacted with, among others, a former energy minister and the man who discovered the immensely valuable pre-salt oil reserves.
非政府組織的黑魔法
盧拉已經贏得了他的第一場戰(zhàn)役：批準了一項憲法修正案，允許為更多的社會支出提供資金。這使得政府至少在接下來的兩年里可以保留Bolsa Família的旗艦福利計劃——每個貧困家庭每月大約13美元。
漫步在圣保羅市中心——曾經在20世紀60年代，這里和曼哈頓中部一樣時髦——如今你會看到貧困、企業(yè)倒閉、無家可歸和嚴重失業(yè)的令人悲傷的速成課程。臭名昭著的“可卡因之地”——曾經僅限于一條街——現(xiàn)在包括了整個社區(qū)，很像新冠疫情后吸毒的洛杉磯。
如果你在陽光明媚的日子里去伊帕內瑪散步，里約熱內盧會提供完全不同的氛圍，歷來是一次很棒的體驗。但伊帕內瑪生活在一個泡沫中。博爾索納羅時代真正的里約熱內盧——經濟上的大屠殺、去工業(yè)化、民兵占領——出現(xiàn)在市中心的一次圓桌會議上，我在那里與一位前能源部長以及發(fā)現(xiàn)了極具價值的鹽下石油儲備的人進行了互動。
Lula is already winning his first battle: approving a constitutional amendment that allows financing of more social spending.
That allows the government to keep the flagship Bolsa Família welfare program – of roughly $13 a month per poverty-level family – at least for the next two years.
A stroll across downtown Sao Paulo – which in the 1960s was as chic as mid-Manhattan – offers a sorrowful crash course on impoverishment, shut-down businesses, homelessness and raging unemployment. The notorious “Crack Land” – once limited to a street – now encompasses a whole neighborhood, much like junkie, post-pandemic Los Angeles.
Rio offers a completely different vibe if one goes for a walk in Ipanema on a sunny day, always a smashing experience. But Ipanema lives in a bubble. The real Rio of the Bolsonaro years – economically massacred, de-industrialized, occupied by militias – came up in a roundtable downtown where I interacted with, among others, a former energy minister and the man who discovered the immensely valuable pre-salt oil reserves.
非政府組織的黑魔法
盧拉已經贏得了他的第一場戰(zhàn)役：批準了一項憲法修正案，允許為更多的社會支出提供資金。這使得政府至少在接下來的兩年里可以保留Bolsa Família的旗艦福利計劃——每個貧困家庭每月大約13美元。
漫步在圣保羅市中心——曾經在20世紀60年代，這里和曼哈頓中部一樣時髦——如今你會看到貧困、企業(yè)倒閉、無家可歸和嚴重失業(yè)的令人悲傷的速成課程。臭名昭著的“可卡因之地”——曾經僅限于一條街——現(xiàn)在包括了整個社區(qū)，很像新冠疫情后吸毒的洛杉磯。
如果你在陽光明媚的日子里去伊帕內瑪散步，里約熱內盧會提供完全不同的氛圍，歷來是一次很棒的體驗。但伊帕內瑪生活在一個泡沫中。博爾索納羅時代真正的里約熱內盧——經濟上的大屠殺、去工業(yè)化、民兵占領——出現(xiàn)在市中心的一次圓桌會議上，我在那里與一位前能源部長以及發(fā)現(xiàn)了極具價值的鹽下石油儲備的人進行了互動。
In the Q&A, a black man from a very poor community advanced the key challenge for Lula’s third term: To be stable, and able to govern, he has tohave the vast poorest sectors of the population backing him up. This man voiced what seems not to be debated in Brazil at all: How did there come to be millions of poor Bolsonarists – street cleaners, delivery guys, the unemployed? Right-wing populism seduced them – and the established wings of the woke left had, and still have, nothing to offer them.
Addressing this problem is as serious as the destruction of Brazilian engineering giants by the Car Wash “corruption” racket. Brazil now has a huge number of well-qualified unemployed engineers. How come they have not amassed enough political organization to reclaim their jobs? Why should they resign themselves to becoming Uber drivers?
在問答環(huán)節(jié)中，一位來自一個非常貧窮社區(qū)的黑人提出了盧拉第三任期面臨的關鍵挑戰(zhàn)：為了保持穩(wěn)定，并能夠治理國家，他必須得到廣大貧困人口的支持。這名男子說出了一個在巴西似乎完全沒有爭議的問題:為什么會有數(shù)百萬貧窮的博爾索納支持者？他們是街道清潔工、送貨員、失業(yè)者。右翼民粹主義引誘了他們，而覺醒的左翼的老牌勢力過去沒有、現(xiàn)在仍然沒有能為他們提供什么。
解決這一問題就像洗車“腐敗”騙局摧毀巴西工程巨頭一樣嚴重。巴西現(xiàn)在有大量高素質的失業(yè)工程師。為什么他們沒有積累足夠的政治組織來重新獲得他們的職位?為什么他們要聽命于成為優(yōu)步司機呢?
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網 http://www.top-shui.cn 轉載請注明出處
Addressing this problem is as serious as the destruction of Brazilian engineering giants by the Car Wash “corruption” racket. Brazil now has a huge number of well-qualified unemployed engineers. How come they have not amassed enough political organization to reclaim their jobs? Why should they resign themselves to becoming Uber drivers?
在問答環(huán)節(jié)中，一位來自一個非常貧窮社區(qū)的黑人提出了盧拉第三任期面臨的關鍵挑戰(zhàn)：為了保持穩(wěn)定，并能夠治理國家，他必須得到廣大貧困人口的支持。這名男子說出了一個在巴西似乎完全沒有爭議的問題:為什么會有數(shù)百萬貧窮的博爾索納支持者？他們是街道清潔工、送貨員、失業(yè)者。右翼民粹主義引誘了他們，而覺醒的左翼的老牌勢力過去沒有、現(xiàn)在仍然沒有能為他們提供什么。
解決這一問題就像洗車“腐敗”騙局摧毀巴西工程巨頭一樣嚴重。巴西現(xiàn)在有大量高素質的失業(yè)工程師。為什么他們沒有積累足夠的政治組織來重新獲得他們的職位?為什么他們要聽命于成為優(yōu)步司機呢?
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網 http://www.top-shui.cn 轉載請注明出處
José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs, the new head of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), may carp about the region’s economic failure as even worse now than in the “l(fā)ost decade” of the 1980s: Average annual economic growth in Latin America in the decade up to 2023 is set to be just 0.8%.
Yet what the UN is incapable of analyzing is how a plundering neoliberal regime such as Bolsonaro’s managed to “elevate” to unforeseen toxic levels the dark arts of little or no investment, low productivity and less than zero emphasis on education.
聯(lián)合國拉丁美洲和加勒比經濟委員會(拉加經委會)的新任主席可能會抱怨該地區(qū)的經濟失敗甚至比上世紀80年代“失去的十年”還要糟糕：在截至2023年的十年中，拉丁美洲的平均年經濟增長率將僅為0.8%。
然而，聯(lián)合國無法分析的是，像博爾索納羅這樣的掠奪成性的新自由主義政權是如何成功地將投資很少或沒有投資、生產率低以及對教育的重視程度低于零的黑魔法“提升”到不可預見的有毒水平的。
Yet what the UN is incapable of analyzing is how a plundering neoliberal regime such as Bolsonaro’s managed to “elevate” to unforeseen toxic levels the dark arts of little or no investment, low productivity and less than zero emphasis on education.
聯(lián)合國拉丁美洲和加勒比經濟委員會(拉加經委會)的新任主席可能會抱怨該地區(qū)的經濟失敗甚至比上世紀80年代“失去的十年”還要糟糕：在截至2023年的十年中，拉丁美洲的平均年經濟增長率將僅為0.8%。
然而，聯(lián)合國無法分析的是，像博爾索納羅這樣的掠奪成性的新自由主義政權是如何成功地將投資很少或沒有投資、生產率低以及對教育的重視程度低于零的黑魔法“提升”到不可預見的有毒水平的。
President Dilma in da house
Lula was quick to summarize Brazil’s new foreign policy – which will go totally multipolar, with emphasis on increasing Latin American integration, stronger ties across the Global South and a push to reform the UN Security Council (in sync with BRICS members Russia, China and India).
Mauro Vieira, an able diplomat, will be the new foreign minister. But the man fine-tuning Brazil on the world stage will be Celso Amorim, Lula’s former foreign minister from 2003 to 2010.
In a conference that reunited us in Sao Paulo, Amorim elaborated on the complexity of the world Lula is now inheriting, compared with 2003. Yet along with climate change the main priorities – achieving closer integration with South America, reviving Unasur (the unx of South American Nations) and re-approaching Africa – remain the same.
盧拉很快總結了巴西的新外交政策——這將完全走向多極化，重點是加強拉丁美洲的一體化，加強全球南方的聯(lián)系，推動改革聯(lián)合國安理會(與金磚國家成員俄羅斯、中國和印度同步)。
毛羅·維埃拉是一位能干的外交家，他將成為新的外交部長。但在世界舞臺上微調巴西的人將是盧拉2003年至2010年的前外交部長塞爾索·阿莫里姆。在圣保羅的一次會議上，阿莫里姆詳細闡述了盧拉所繼承的世界與2003年相比的復雜性。
然而，隨著氣候變化，主要的優(yōu)先事項——與南美洲實現(xiàn)更緊密的一體化、復興Unasur(南美洲國家聯(lián)盟)以及重新接近非洲，仍然沒有改變。
Lula was quick to summarize Brazil’s new foreign policy – which will go totally multipolar, with emphasis on increasing Latin American integration, stronger ties across the Global South and a push to reform the UN Security Council (in sync with BRICS members Russia, China and India).
Mauro Vieira, an able diplomat, will be the new foreign minister. But the man fine-tuning Brazil on the world stage will be Celso Amorim, Lula’s former foreign minister from 2003 to 2010.
In a conference that reunited us in Sao Paulo, Amorim elaborated on the complexity of the world Lula is now inheriting, compared with 2003. Yet along with climate change the main priorities – achieving closer integration with South America, reviving Unasur (the unx of South American Nations) and re-approaching Africa – remain the same.
盧拉很快總結了巴西的新外交政策——這將完全走向多極化，重點是加強拉丁美洲的一體化，加強全球南方的聯(lián)系，推動改革聯(lián)合國安理會(與金磚國家成員俄羅斯、中國和印度同步)。
毛羅·維埃拉是一位能干的外交家，他將成為新的外交部長。但在世界舞臺上微調巴西的人將是盧拉2003年至2010年的前外交部長塞爾索·阿莫里姆。在圣保羅的一次會議上，阿莫里姆詳細闡述了盧拉所繼承的世界與2003年相比的復雜性。
然而，隨著氣候變化，主要的優(yōu)先事項——與南美洲實現(xiàn)更緊密的一體化、復興Unasur(南美洲國家聯(lián)盟)以及重新接近非洲，仍然沒有改變。
And then there’s the Holy Grail: “good relations with both the US and China.”
The Empire, predictably, will be on extreme close watch. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan dropped in to Brasilia, during the fist days of the World Cup soccer tournament, and was absolutely charmed by Lula, who’s a master of charisma. Yet the Monroe Doctrine always prevails. Lula getting closer and closer to BRICS – and the expanded BRICS+ – is considered virtual anathema in Washington.
So Lula will play most overtly in the environment arena. Covertly, it will be a sophisticated balancing act.
The combo behind US President Joe Biden called Lula to congratulate him soon after the election results. Sullivan was in Brasilia setting the stage for a Lula visit to Washington. Chinese pr...ent for his part sent him an affectionate letter, emphasizing the “global strategic partnership” between Brazil and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin called Lula earlier this week – and emphasized their common strategic approach to BRICS.
還有一個“圣杯”是:“與美國和中國的良好關系”。
可以預見，盧拉政府將受到嚴密監(jiān)視。美國國家安全顧問杰克·蘇利文在世界杯足球賽開幕的頭幾天到訪巴西，并被盧拉的魅力所折服。然而，門羅主義總是占上風。盧拉與金磚國家以及擴大后的金磚國家+的關系越來越密切，被華盛頓視為一種詛咒。
The Empire, predictably, will be on extreme close watch. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan dropped in to Brasilia, during the fist days of the World Cup soccer tournament, and was absolutely charmed by Lula, who’s a master of charisma. Yet the Monroe Doctrine always prevails. Lula getting closer and closer to BRICS – and the expanded BRICS+ – is considered virtual anathema in Washington.
So Lula will play most overtly in the environment arena. Covertly, it will be a sophisticated balancing act.
The combo behind US President Joe Biden called Lula to congratulate him soon after the election results. Sullivan was in Brasilia setting the stage for a Lula visit to Washington. Chinese pr...ent for his part sent him an affectionate letter, emphasizing the “global strategic partnership” between Brazil and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin called Lula earlier this week – and emphasized their common strategic approach to BRICS.
還有一個“圣杯”是:“與美國和中國的良好關系”。
可以預見，盧拉政府將受到嚴密監(jiān)視。美國國家安全顧問杰克·蘇利文在世界杯足球賽開幕的頭幾天到訪巴西，并被盧拉的魅力所折服。然而，門羅主義總是占上風。盧拉與金磚國家以及擴大后的金磚國家+的關系越來越密切，被華盛頓視為一種詛咒。
因此，盧拉將在環(huán)保領域發(fā)揮最公開的作用。私下里，這將是一個復雜的平衡之舉。
美國總統(tǒng)喬·拜登背后的團隊在選舉結果公布后不久給盧拉打電話表示祝賀。蘇利文在巴西為盧拉訪問華盛頓做準備。
中國高層親口強調巴西和中國是“全球戰(zhàn)略伙伴關系”。俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京本周早些時候打電話給盧拉，強調了他們對金磚國家的共同戰(zhàn)略方針。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網 http://www.top-shui.cn 轉載請注明出處
China has been Brazil’s top trade partner since 2009, ahead of the US. Bilateral trade in 2021 hit $135 billion. The problem is lack of diversification and focus on low added value: iron ore, soybeans, raw crude and animal protein accounted for 87.4% of exports in 2021. China exports, on the other hand, are mostly high-tech manufactured products.
Brazil’s dependence on commodity exports has indeed contributed for years to its rising foreign reserves. But that implies high concentration of wealth, low taxes, low job creation and dependence on cyclical price oscillations.
There’s no question China is focused on Brazilian natural resources to fuel its new development push – or “peaceful modernization,” as established by the latest Party Congress.
But Lula will have to strive for a more equal trade balance in case he manages to restart the nation as a solid economy. In 2000, for instance, Brazil’s top export item was Embraer jets. Now, it’s iron ore and soybeans; yet another dire indicator of the ferocious de-industrialization operated by the Bolsonaro project.
自2009年以來，中國一直是巴西最大的貿易伙伴，超過了美國。2021年雙邊貿易額達到1350億美元。問題在于缺乏多樣化和專注于低附加值：2021年鐵礦石、大豆、原油和動物蛋白占出口的87.4%。另一方面，中國出口的大多是高科技制成品。
多年來，巴西對大宗商品出口的依賴確實是其外匯儲備不斷增長的原因之一。但這意味著財富高度集中、稅率低、創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機會少，并依賴于周期性價格波動。
毫無疑問，按照最近一次黨代會確立的“和平現(xiàn)代化”，中國將重點放在巴西的自然資源上，以推動其新的發(fā)展。
但盧拉將不得不努力實現(xiàn)更平等的貿易平衡，以便成功地讓巴西經濟恢復穩(wěn)定。例如，2000年，巴西最大的出口項目是巴西航空工業(yè)公司(Embraer)的噴氣式飛機?，F(xiàn)在，是鐵礦石和大豆；這是博爾索納羅治下殘酷去工業(yè)化的又一個可怕指標。
Brazil’s dependence on commodity exports has indeed contributed for years to its rising foreign reserves. But that implies high concentration of wealth, low taxes, low job creation and dependence on cyclical price oscillations.
There’s no question China is focused on Brazilian natural resources to fuel its new development push – or “peaceful modernization,” as established by the latest Party Congress.
But Lula will have to strive for a more equal trade balance in case he manages to restart the nation as a solid economy. In 2000, for instance, Brazil’s top export item was Embraer jets. Now, it’s iron ore and soybeans; yet another dire indicator of the ferocious de-industrialization operated by the Bolsonaro project.
自2009年以來，中國一直是巴西最大的貿易伙伴，超過了美國。2021年雙邊貿易額達到1350億美元。問題在于缺乏多樣化和專注于低附加值：2021年鐵礦石、大豆、原油和動物蛋白占出口的87.4%。另一方面，中國出口的大多是高科技制成品。
多年來，巴西對大宗商品出口的依賴確實是其外匯儲備不斷增長的原因之一。但這意味著財富高度集中、稅率低、創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機會少，并依賴于周期性價格波動。
毫無疑問，按照最近一次黨代會確立的“和平現(xiàn)代化”，中國將重點放在巴西的自然資源上，以推動其新的發(fā)展。
但盧拉將不得不努力實現(xiàn)更平等的貿易平衡，以便成功地讓巴西經濟恢復穩(wěn)定。例如，2000年，巴西最大的出口項目是巴西航空工業(yè)公司(Embraer)的噴氣式飛機?，F(xiàn)在，是鐵礦石和大豆；這是博爾索納羅治下殘酷去工業(yè)化的又一個可怕指標。
China is already investing substantially in the Brazilian electric sector – mostly due to state companies being bought by Chinese companies. That was the case in 2017 of State Grid buying CPFL in Sao Paulo, for instance, which in turn bought a state company from southern Brazil in 2021.
From Lula’s point of view, that’s inadmissible: a classic case of privatization of strategic public assets.
A different scenario plays in neighboring Argentina. Buenos Aires in February became an official partner of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative, with at least $23 billion in new projects on the pipeline. The Argentine railway system will be upgraded by – who else? – Chinese companies, to the tune of $4.6 billion.
The Chinese will also be investing in the largest solar energy plant in Latin America, a hydroelectric plant in Patagonia, and a nuclear energy plant – complete with transfer of Chinese technology to the Argentine state.
Lula, beaming with invaluable soft power not only personally when it comes to Xi but also appealing to Chinese public opinion, can get similar strategic partnership deals, with even more amplitude. Brasilia may follow the Iranian partnership model – offering oil and gas in exchange for building critical infrastructure.
中國已經在巴西電力行業(yè)進行了大量投資，主要原因是國有企業(yè)被中國企業(yè)收購。例如，2017年國家電網收購了圣保羅的CPFL，后者又于2021年從巴西南部收購了一家國有公司。
從盧拉的角度來看，這是不可接受的：戰(zhàn)略公共資產私有化的經典案例。
鄰國阿根廷的情況則截然不同。今年2月，布宜諾斯艾利斯成為“新絲綢之路”或“一帶一路”倡議的官方合作伙伴，至少有230億美元的新項目正在籌備中。阿根廷鐵路系統(tǒng)將由誰來升級?中國公司，總額46億美元。
中國還將投資拉美最大的太陽能發(fā)電廠、巴塔哥尼亞(Patagonia)的一座水電站和一座核電站——同時還將向阿根廷政府轉讓中國技術。
盧拉在涉及中國時不僅個人表現(xiàn)出了寶貴的軟實力，而且還吸引了中國的公眾輿論，他可以獲得類似的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關系協(xié)議，而且幅度更大。巴西可能會效仿伊朗的伙伴關系模式——提供石油和天然氣，換取建設關鍵基礎設施。
From Lula’s point of view, that’s inadmissible: a classic case of privatization of strategic public assets.
A different scenario plays in neighboring Argentina. Buenos Aires in February became an official partner of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative, with at least $23 billion in new projects on the pipeline. The Argentine railway system will be upgraded by – who else? – Chinese companies, to the tune of $4.6 billion.
The Chinese will also be investing in the largest solar energy plant in Latin America, a hydroelectric plant in Patagonia, and a nuclear energy plant – complete with transfer of Chinese technology to the Argentine state.
Lula, beaming with invaluable soft power not only personally when it comes to Xi but also appealing to Chinese public opinion, can get similar strategic partnership deals, with even more amplitude. Brasilia may follow the Iranian partnership model – offering oil and gas in exchange for building critical infrastructure.
中國已經在巴西電力行業(yè)進行了大量投資，主要原因是國有企業(yè)被中國企業(yè)收購。例如，2017年國家電網收購了圣保羅的CPFL，后者又于2021年從巴西南部收購了一家國有公司。
從盧拉的角度來看，這是不可接受的：戰(zhàn)略公共資產私有化的經典案例。
鄰國阿根廷的情況則截然不同。今年2月，布宜諾斯艾利斯成為“新絲綢之路”或“一帶一路”倡議的官方合作伙伴，至少有230億美元的新項目正在籌備中。阿根廷鐵路系統(tǒng)將由誰來升級?中國公司，總額46億美元。
中國還將投資拉美最大的太陽能發(fā)電廠、巴塔哥尼亞(Patagonia)的一座水電站和一座核電站——同時還將向阿根廷政府轉讓中國技術。
盧拉在涉及中國時不僅個人表現(xiàn)出了寶貴的軟實力，而且還吸引了中國的公眾輿論，他可以獲得類似的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關系協(xié)議，而且幅度更大。巴西可能會效仿伊朗的伙伴關系模式——提供石油和天然氣，換取建設關鍵基礎設施。
Inevitably, the golden path ahead will be via joint ventures, not mergers and acquisitions. No wonder many in Rio are already dreaming of high-speed rail lixing it to Sao Paulo in just over an hour, instead of the current, congested highway journey of six hours (if you’re lucky).
A key role will be played by former president Dilma Rousseff, who had a long, leisurely lunch with a few of us in Sao Paulo, taking her time to recount, in minutiae, everything from the day she was officially arrested by the military dictatorship (January 16, 1970) to her off-the-record conversations with then-German chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin, and Xi.
It goes without saying that her political – and personal – capital with both Xi and Putin is stellar. Lula offered her any post she wanted in the new government. Although still a state secret, this will be part of a serious drive to polish Brazil’s global profile, especially across the Global South.
不可避免的是，前方的黃金道路將是通過企業(yè)合資，而不是并購。難怪里約熱內盧的許多人已經夢想著有一條只需一個多小時就能連接到圣保羅的高速鐵路，而不是現(xiàn)在擁擠的、需要6個小時的高速公路旅行 (如果你幸運的話)。
前總統(tǒng)迪爾瑪·羅塞夫將發(fā)揮關鍵作用，她與我們中的一些人在圣保羅共進了一頓漫長而悠閑的午餐，花時間詳細講述了從她被軍事獨裁政權正式逮捕的那一天(1970年1月16日)到她與當時的德國總理安格拉·默克爾、普京、以及中國領導人舉行非正式對話。
不用說，她在中國和普京身上的政治資本和個人資本都是一流的。盧拉為她提供了新政府中任何她想要的職位。盡管仍屬國家機密，但這將是巴西提升全球形象的重要舉措之一，尤其是在南半球國家。
A key role will be played by former president Dilma Rousseff, who had a long, leisurely lunch with a few of us in Sao Paulo, taking her time to recount, in minutiae, everything from the day she was officially arrested by the military dictatorship (January 16, 1970) to her off-the-record conversations with then-German chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin, and Xi.
It goes without saying that her political – and personal – capital with both Xi and Putin is stellar. Lula offered her any post she wanted in the new government. Although still a state secret, this will be part of a serious drive to polish Brazil’s global profile, especially across the Global South.
不可避免的是，前方的黃金道路將是通過企業(yè)合資，而不是并購。難怪里約熱內盧的許多人已經夢想著有一條只需一個多小時就能連接到圣保羅的高速鐵路，而不是現(xiàn)在擁擠的、需要6個小時的高速公路旅行 (如果你幸運的話)。
前總統(tǒng)迪爾瑪·羅塞夫將發(fā)揮關鍵作用，她與我們中的一些人在圣保羅共進了一頓漫長而悠閑的午餐，花時間詳細講述了從她被軍事獨裁政權正式逮捕的那一天(1970年1月16日)到她與當時的德國總理安格拉·默克爾、普京、以及中國領導人舉行非正式對話。
不用說，她在中國和普京身上的政治資本和個人資本都是一流的。盧拉為她提供了新政府中任何她想要的職位。盡管仍屬國家機密，但這將是巴西提升全球形象的重要舉措之一，尤其是在南半球國家。
To recover from the previous, disastrous six years – which included a two-year no man’s land (2016-2018) after the impeachment of president Dilma – Brazil will need an unparalleled national drive of re-industrialization at virtually every level, complete with serious investment in research and development, training of specialized work forces and technology transfer.
There is a superpower that can play a crucial role in this process: China, Brazil’s close partner in the expanding BRICS+. Brazil is one of the natural leaders of the Global South, a role much prized by the Chinese leadership.
The key now is for both partners to establish a high-level strategic dialogue – all over again. Lula’s first high-profile foreign visit may be to Washington. But the destination that really matters, as we watch the river of history flow, will be Beijing.
Pepe Escobar is a Brazilian journalist who has written for Asia Times for many years, covering events throughout Asia and the Middle East. He has also been an analyst for RT and Sputnik News, and previously worked for Al Jazeera.
為了從之前災難性的六年中恢復過來，其中包括總統(tǒng)羅塞夫被彈劾后的兩年無政府期間(2016-2018年)，巴西將需要在幾乎所有層面上進行無與倫比的再工業(yè)化，包括在研發(fā)、專業(yè)勞動力培訓和技術轉讓方面的大量投資。
有一個超級大國可以在這一過程中發(fā)揮關鍵作用：中國，巴西在不斷擴大的金磚國家+中的密切伙伴。巴西是全球南方的天然領導者之一，這一角色受到中國領導層的高度重視。
現(xiàn)在的關鍵是雙方重新建立高級別戰(zhàn)略對話。盧拉的第一次高調出訪可能是華盛頓。但是，當我們看著歷史的河流流淌時，真正重要的目的地將是中國。
作者簡介：
佩佩·埃斯科瓦爾(Pepe Escobar)，巴西記者，多年來為《亞洲時報》撰稿，報道亞洲和中東地區(qū)的事件。他還曾擔任RT和Sputnik News的分析師，此前曾為半島電視臺工作。
There is a superpower that can play a crucial role in this process: China, Brazil’s close partner in the expanding BRICS+. Brazil is one of the natural leaders of the Global South, a role much prized by the Chinese leadership.
The key now is for both partners to establish a high-level strategic dialogue – all over again. Lula’s first high-profile foreign visit may be to Washington. But the destination that really matters, as we watch the river of history flow, will be Beijing.
Pepe Escobar is a Brazilian journalist who has written for Asia Times for many years, covering events throughout Asia and the Middle East. He has also been an analyst for RT and Sputnik News, and previously worked for Al Jazeera.
為了從之前災難性的六年中恢復過來，其中包括總統(tǒng)羅塞夫被彈劾后的兩年無政府期間(2016-2018年)，巴西將需要在幾乎所有層面上進行無與倫比的再工業(yè)化，包括在研發(fā)、專業(yè)勞動力培訓和技術轉讓方面的大量投資。
有一個超級大國可以在這一過程中發(fā)揮關鍵作用：中國，巴西在不斷擴大的金磚國家+中的密切伙伴。巴西是全球南方的天然領導者之一，這一角色受到中國領導層的高度重視。
現(xiàn)在的關鍵是雙方重新建立高級別戰(zhàn)略對話。盧拉的第一次高調出訪可能是華盛頓。但是，當我們看著歷史的河流流淌時，真正重要的目的地將是中國。
作者簡介：
佩佩·埃斯科瓦爾(Pepe Escobar)，巴西記者，多年來為《亞洲時報》撰稿，報道亞洲和中東地區(qū)的事件。他還曾擔任RT和Sputnik News的分析師，此前曾為半島電視臺工作。
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