IN “GUANZI”, a text from the seventh century BC, a statesman thought to be called Guan Zhong lays out the “eight views” needed to assess a country’s status. “Tour its mountains and lakes,” he says, “observe its agriculture, and calculate its production of six types of livestock. Then, it will be apparent whether a country is wealthy or destitute.” These days, Chinese scholars employ different methods, but their aim is the same: to assess the balance of power in a hostile world.

在公元前七世紀(jì)的《管子》一書中，一位叫做管仲的政治家提出了評(píng)估一個(gè)國(guó)家實(shí)力所需的“八觀”。 “游其山湖，”他說(shuō)，“觀其農(nóng)業(yè)，計(jì)算其六種牲畜的產(chǎn)量。 這樣一個(gè)國(guó)家是富裕還是貧窮就會(huì)一目了然。（原文：行其山澤,觀其桑麻,計(jì)其六畜之產(chǎn),而貧富之國(guó)可知也。）” 如今，中國(guó)學(xué)者采用不同的方法，但他們的目標(biāo)是相同的：評(píng)估這個(gè)敵對(duì)世界中的力量平衡。

Measuring power matters because you do not want to fight a war unless you are confident of winning. As the military strategist Sun Tzu explained a century after Guan Zhong: “He who knows himself and knows others shall be victorious in every battle…h(huán)e who knows neither shall be defeated in every battle.”

衡量實(shí)力很重要，因?yàn)槟悴幌氪蛞粓?chǎng)沒(méi)有把握的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。正如在管仲之后一百年，又一位軍事家孫子所解釋的：“知己知彼，百戰(zhàn)不殆；不知己而知彼，一勝一負(fù)；不知己，也不知彼，每戰(zhàn)必殆?！?/b>
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If the theory is simple, actually measuring power is fraught with arbitrary judgments and subjectivity. But that has not stopped Chinese scholars from trying to compute what has come to be known as Comprehensive National Power, or CNP.

雖然這個(gè)理論很簡(jiǎn)單，但實(shí)際上衡量實(shí)力卻充滿了主觀判斷和隨意性。但這并沒(méi)有阻止中國(guó)學(xué)者嘗試計(jì)算綜合國(guó)力（Comprehensive National Power, CNP）。

In the 1980s Chinese scholars started by looking at the power equations drawn up in the West, but found them wanting. A formula devised by Ray Cline, a CIA analyst, was dismissed for being too narrow in scope and too subjective. D, China’s reformist leader, had stated: “In measuring a country’s national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides.” To cater to these demands, Chinese experts started to design their own models.

20世紀(jì)80年代，中國(guó)學(xué)者開(kāi)始研究西方制定的權(quán)力平衡理論，但發(fā)現(xiàn)它們存在不足。CIA 分析員 Ray Cline設(shè)計(jì)的公式因適用范圍太窄且過(guò)于主觀而被否決。中國(guó)改革開(kāi)放總設(shè)計(jì)師曾說(shuō)：“在衡量一個(gè)國(guó)家的綜合國(guó)力時(shí)，必須全面地從各個(gè)角度來(lái)看?！?為了滿足這些要求，中國(guó)專家開(kāi)始設(shè)計(jì)自己的模型。

They ran into some problems. One is that the more complete the range of variables, the harder it is to allocate weights to them. In a paper from 2002, Hu Angang and Men Honghua, then of Tsinghua University, listed eight categories of resources, taking in everything from farmland to computers. CNP is calculated as a weighted average of these resources as a share of the world’s total. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has a similar model, but uses different indicators and weightings. Who is right? Some indexes rely for their weightings on polls of experts, but that’s just a sophisticated version of the conventional wisdom.

他們遇到了一些問(wèn)題。其中一個(gè)問(wèn)題是，變量范圍越是完整詳細(xì)，分配權(quán)重就越是困難。在2002年的一篇論文中，當(dāng)時(shí)就職于清華大學(xué)的Hu Angang和Men Honghua列出了八類資源，包括從農(nóng)田到計(jì)算機(jī)等所有內(nèi)容。這些資源占全球總量的加權(quán)平均值即為CNP。中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院有一個(gè)類似的模型，但使用不同的指標(biāo)和權(quán)重。誰(shuí)是正確的？一些指數(shù)依賴于專家調(diào)查來(lái)確定其權(quán)重，但那只不過(guò)是傳統(tǒng)智慧的復(fù)雜版本。
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Another problem is that the calculation of CNP produces a single number, but the components that make it up are not interchangeable. In theory CNP could predict that a widely admired country which defends its world-class dance troupes with a gunboat and a couple of tanks will be able to hold its own against a Philistine horde that spends all its money on weapons.

另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是CNP的計(jì)算產(chǎn)生一個(gè)單一的數(shù)字結(jié)果，但組成它的要素之間是不可互換的。 理論上，CNP 可以預(yù)測(cè)，一個(gè)具有崇高聲望的國(guó)家僅憑一艘炮艇和幾輛坦克，就能保衛(wèi)其世界頂級(jí)舞蹈團(tuán)，抵御將所有資金花在武器上的野蠻民族的入侵。

What’s more, effective power depends on the context. A country’s cultural exports can convey soft power, but they are of little use in a war. David Baldwin of Princeton University writes that assessing power without a context is like discussing what makes up a good hand without specifying the card game.

此外，有效實(shí)力取決于討論背景。一個(gè)國(guó)家的文化出口可以傳達(dá)軟實(shí)力，但在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中它們幾乎沒(méi)有用處。普林斯頓大學(xué)的David Baldwin寫道，在沒(méi)有上下文的情況下評(píng)估實(shí)力，就像討論一把好牌而不指定紙牌游戲一樣。

You might think all those complications would be enough to knock CNP on the head. Instead, it has spurred researchers to come up with their own, improved versions. The Economist has counted 69 of them. Drawing inspiration from an article by Michael Beckley of Tufts University, we zoom in on the three essential ingredients of national power: economic heft, productive efficiency and military might.

您可能認(rèn)為所有這些復(fù)雜情況足以讓 CNP 頭疼。 相反，它促使研究人員提出自己的改良版本。 《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》統(tǒng)計(jì)了其中的 69 個(gè)。我們從Tufts大學(xué)的邁克爾·貝克利（Michael Beckley）發(fā)表的一篇文章中汲取靈感，聚焦于國(guó)家實(shí)力的三個(gè)關(guān)鍵要素：經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力、生產(chǎn)效率和軍事實(shí)力。

A country cannot be powerful if its economy is inefficient. In the 19th century China lost two opium wars to Britain, despite having a GDP twice the size. On the other hand, neither can a country be powerful if its economy is efficient but small. Luxembourg has not won many wars. And countries cannot fight without a decent army. In the Song dynasty the deadly Mongol cavalry outmatched even the finest Chinese infantry.

如果一個(gè)國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)效率低下，它就不可能強(qiáng)大。 19 世紀(jì)，中國(guó)在兩次鴉片戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中輸給了英國(guó)，盡管中國(guó)的 GDP 是英國(guó)的兩倍。 另一方面，如果一個(gè)國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)效率高但規(guī)模小，那么它也不會(huì)強(qiáng)大。 盧森堡贏得的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不多。 沒(méi)有像樣的軍隊(duì)，國(guó)家就無(wú)法戰(zhàn)斗。 在宋朝，致命的蒙古騎兵甚至勝過(guò)最優(yōu)秀的中國(guó)步兵。

Our hard-power index therefore uses GDP per person to stand for efficiency, military expenditure for might, and non-military GDP for economic heft. These are multiplied, so that countries suffer for their deficiency in any one of them. In the extreme, if any element is zero, then a country’s power is zero, too.

因此，我們的硬實(shí)力指數(shù)使用人均 GDP 代表效率，軍費(fèi)開(kāi)支代表軍事實(shí)力，非軍事 GDP 代表經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力。 它們是乘法關(guān)系，因此各個(gè)國(guó)家將因其中任何一項(xiàng)的不足而受損。 在極端情況下，如果其中任何一項(xiàng)為零，那么這個(gè)國(guó)家的實(shí)力也為零。

Of course, old weapon stocks and nuclear arms also convey might. And GDP does not always translate into economic heft or efficiency. But, at least in the current era, our proxies seem reasonable enough.

當(dāng)然，舊武器庫(kù)存和核武器也傳達(dá)了威力。 GDP 也并不總能轉(zhuǎn)化為經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力或效率。 但是，至少在當(dāng)今時(shí)代，我們的指標(biāo)似乎是足夠合理的。

By our measure, China has been gaining on America, but the latter is still comfortably on top. Sun Tzu would predict peace for a good few years yet.

按照我們的衡量方式，中國(guó)一直在追趕美國(guó)，但后者仍遙遙領(lǐng)先。 孫子會(huì)預(yù)言仍有幾年的和平時(shí)光。