The Chips Act cannot subsidize the American semiconductor industry indefinitely, and there is no other global demand base to replace China. Other chip producing nations will inevitably break ranks and sell to China (as they have historically) and the American actions will be for naught. And, in banning the export of chips and other core inputs to China, America handed China its war plan years ahead of the battle. China is being goaded into building self-sufficiency far earlier than they would have otherwise. Prior to the ZTE and Huawei components bans, China was content to continue purchasing American chips and focusing on the front-end hardware. Peter Wennink, the CEO of ASML, stated that China is already leading in key applications and demand for semiconductors. Wennink wrote, “The roll-out of the telecommunication infrastructure, battery technology, that’s the sweet spot of mid-critical and mature semiconductors, and that’s where China without any exception is leading.”

芯片法案不可能無限期地補貼美國半導體產(chǎn)業(yè)，而且全球也沒有其他需求基礎可以取代中國。其他芯片生產(chǎn)國將不可避免地打破規(guī)則，向中國出售芯片（就像歷史上一樣），美國的行動將付諸東流。此外，美國禁止向中國出口芯片和其他核心產(chǎn)品，相當于提前數(shù)年向中國提交了作戰(zhàn)計劃。中國正被激勵著比其他國家更早地實現(xiàn)自給自足。在中興和華為零部件禁令之前，中國滿足于繼續(xù)購買美國芯片，專注于前端硬件。ASML 首席執(zhí)行官皮特·溫尼克表示，中國在半導體的關鍵應用和需求方面已經(jīng)處于領先地位。溫尼克寫道："電信基礎設施和電池技術的推出，是中等關鍵和成熟半導體的最佳時機，而這正是中國毫無例外地領先的地方?！?/b>

A sleeping giant was awoken by short-sighted American protectionist policies. America now faces the short-term threat of loss of critical revenue that fueled the R&D that made it an innovation leader and the long-term inevitability that China will build its own full scale semiconductor ecosystem. The ability of Huawei to launch the Mate 60 Pro, a new smartphone powered by a domestically produced 5G chip and operating system, despite severe American sanctions on the firm illustrates how unwise American policies have been in trying to stop China’s technological growth and development.

美國短視的保護主義政策喚醒了一個沉睡的巨人。美國現(xiàn)在面臨著失去關鍵收入的短期威脅，而這些收入正是美國成為創(chuàng)新領導者的研發(fā)動力；從長遠來看，中國將不可避免地建立起自己的全面半導體生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。盡管美國對華為實施了嚴厲制裁，但華為仍能推出搭載國產(chǎn) 5G 芯片和操作系統(tǒng)的新款智能手機 Mate 60 Pro，這說明美國試圖阻止中國技術增長和發(fā)展的政策有多么不明智。

Since America is unlikely to stop China’s technological growth and development (and, indeed, is unlikely to stop China’s emergence as a peer global power), there is a more enlightened approach to engagement. It is best illustrated by Aesop’s fable, “The North Wind and the Sun.” In the story, the North Wind blows hard and fails to remove the traveler’s cloak. It is, rather, the warm rays of the sun persuade the traveler to remove his cloak.

既然美國不可能阻止中國的技術增長和發(fā)展（事實上，也不可能阻止中國崛起為世界級強國），那么就有一種更加開明的接觸方式。伊索寓言的《北風和太陽》最能說明這一點。在這個故事中，北風猛烈地吹著，卻無法吹走旅行者的斗篷。反而是溫暖的陽光說服旅行者脫下斗篷。

It’s now widely held among American policymakers that America’s five-decade-long policy of engagement with China has failed. As Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner candidly state in their recent Foreign Affairs article, “Nearly half a century since Nixon’s first steps toward rapprochement, the record is increasingly clear that Washington once again put too much faith in its power to shape China’s trajectory. . .China has instead pursued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in the process.”

現(xiàn)在，美國決策者普遍認為，美國長達五十年的對華接觸政策已經(jīng)失敗。庫爾特-坎貝爾和伊利-拉特納在最近的《外交事務》一文中坦率地指出："自尼克松邁出和解的第一步以來，將近半個世紀的記錄越來越清楚地表明，華盛頓又一次過分相信它有能力塑造中國的軌跡... 相反，中國走上了自己的道路，在此過程中違背了美國的一系列期望。”

Certainly, if the policy of engagement was intended to transform China’s internal system of governance, it has failed. Yet, if this was the goal, it was an act of remarkable hubris for a 250-year-old Republic (with one-quarter of China’s population) to believe that it could transform a 5,000-year-old civilization to its liking. However, if the goal of American policy was to encourage the emergence of China as a “responsible stakeholder” (to use the words of Robert Zoellick), the policy may well have succeeded. A comprehensive study done by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), the American Friends Service Committee, and four independent researchers has documented that China’s behavior was altered by various policies of engagement, particularly as it pertains to reducing climate change, improving public health, and global financial stability. Former State Department official Susan Thornton, who oversaw the study as director of the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security at NCAFP, said: “This audit of U.S.-China diplomacy shows that we can make progress through negotiations and that China follows through on its commitments. The notion that engagement with China did not benefit the U.S. is just not accurate.” Indeed, the record shows that there is wisdom contained in the moral of Aesop’s “The North Wind and the Sun”: “Gentleness and kind persuasion win where force and bluster fail.”

當然，如果接觸政策的目的是改造中國的內(nèi)部治理體系，那么它已經(jīng)失敗了。然而，如果這是目標的話，一個擁有 250 年歷史的共和國（人口僅為中國的四分之一）竟然認為自己可以按照自己的意愿改造一個擁有 5000 年歷史的文明，這無疑是一種非?？裢男袨?。然而，如果美國政策的目標是鼓勵中國成為 "負責任的利益攸關方"（用羅伯特-佐利克的話說），那么這項政策很可能已經(jīng)成功了。美國外交政策全國委員會、美國公誼會服務委員會和四位獨立研究人員所做的一項綜合研究表明，中國的行為受到了各種接觸政策的影響，尤其是在減少氣候變化、改善公共衛(wèi)生和全球金融穩(wěn)定方面。美國國務院前官員蘇珊-桑頓在擔任 NCAFP 亞太安全論壇主任期間負責監(jiān)督這項研究，她說： "對美中外交的審計表明，我們可以通過談判取得進展，而中國也會履行其承諾。認為與中國接觸對美國沒有好處的說法是不準確的?！笔聦嵣希涗洷砻?，伊索的《北風和太陽》寓意中蘊含著智慧： "在武力和虛張聲勢無法奏效的地方，溫柔和善意的勸說會取得勝利"。

One fundamental problem is that domestic politics in America are forcing American policymakers to take strident stands against China instead of pragmatic positions. For instance, sanctions preventing the Chinese Defense Minister, Li Shangfu, from traveling to the United States are standing in the way of U.S.-China defense dialogues to prevent military accidents. Yet, the hands of the U.S. government are tied. It cannot lift sanctions, even if they have proved to be ineffective at securing American policy goals.

一個根本問題是，美國國內(nèi)政治迫使美國決策者采取強硬的反華立場，而不是務實的立場。例如，阻止中國國防部長李尚福訪問美國的制裁阻礙了美中為防止軍事意外而進行的防務對話。然而，美國政府卻束手無策。美國政府無法取消制裁，即使制裁已被證明無法有效實現(xiàn)美國的政策目標。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處


This is why the time has come for America to do a major reuation of the methods it uses to secure foreign policy goals. Its go-to tactic of imposing sanctions has failed to either halt China’s technological development or influence China’s behavior in any significant way, and most countries do not find that it is in their interests to go along with them. Are there more effective alternatives to sanctions?

這就是為什么美國現(xiàn)在應該對其用來實現(xiàn)外交政策目標的方法進行重大的重新評估。美國慣用的制裁手段既未能阻止中國的技術發(fā)展，也未能對中國的行為產(chǎn)生任何重大影響，而且大多數(shù)國家也不認為配合制裁符合它們的利益。除了制裁，還有其他更有效的辦法嗎？

In a statement explaining the Biden administration’s approach to China, Anthony blxen said in May 2022: “we’ll compete with confidence; we’ll cooperate wherever we can; we’ll contest where we must.” We agree with this approach. Rather than undermining its own interests and fortifying a geopolitical and economic competitor, America should practice a more enlightened technology policy. The focus must be placed on initiatives that sustainably support and extend America’s innovation leadership, while surgically removing specific national security threats.

2022 年 5 月，安東尼-布林肯在一份解釋拜登政府對華態(tài)度的聲明中說："我們將滿懷信心地競爭；我們將盡可能地合作；我們將在必要的地方較量。”我們同意這種做法。美國不應損害自身利益，強化地緣政治和經(jīng)濟競爭對手，而應奉行更加開明的技術政策。重點必須放在可持續(xù)地支持和擴大美國創(chuàng)新領導力的舉措上，同時通過外科手術消除具體的國家安全威脅。

In lieu of a zero-sum framing of the U.S.-China technology competition, a sustainable structure for collaboration is beneficial to both countries and humanity. Most Western emissions reductions targets cannot be met without participation from China, who hold many of the patents and core inputs for solar, wind, and electric battery power. Joint research programs, clinical trials and data sets are critical for solving chronic global health issues like cancer. Decoupled technology ecosystems not only impede advancement, but also create other endemic risks resulting from parallel development and unilateral regulation. Unchecked growth in potential doomsday technologies like artificial intelligence or nuclear immediately comes to mind. Continuing to welcome scientific talent from China to study, work and settle down in the United States is beneficial for the scientific progress of both countries as well. These scientists can act as a bridge towards scientific collaboration between the United States and China.

中美技術競爭不應以零和為框架，可持續(xù)的合作結構對兩國和人類都有利。如果沒有中國的參與，大多數(shù)西方國家的減排目標都無法實現(xiàn)，因為中國擁有太陽能、風能和蓄電池發(fā)電的許多專利和核心投入。聯(lián)合研究計劃、臨床試驗和數(shù)據(jù)集對于解決癌癥等全球慢性健康問題至關重要。脫鉤的技術生態(tài)系統(tǒng)不僅會阻礙技術進步，還會因平行發(fā)展和單邊監(jiān)管而產(chǎn)生其他地方性風險。人工智能或核技術等潛在末日技術的無節(jié)制增長，立即浮現(xiàn)在我們的腦海中。繼續(xù)歡迎來自中國的科學人才到美國學習、工作和定居，也有利于兩國的科學進步。這些科學家可以成為中美兩國科學合作的橋梁。

The American government should also consider rebooting in full all the high-level dialogues that had been initiated by the Bush administration, continued by the Obama administration, and ended by the Trump administration. A resumption of high-level dialogues, together with the establishment of a high-level science and technology dialogue bringing together the top scientists from both countries, could well result in more positive outcomes for American long-term national interests.

美國政府還應考慮全面重啟由布什政府發(fā)起、奧巴馬政府繼續(xù)、特朗普政府結束的所有高級別對話。重啟高級別對話，同時建立匯集兩國頂尖科學家的高級別科技對話，很可能會為美國的長期國家利益帶來更積極的成果。

Initially, this great power collaboration could be focused on areas where both sides have common long-term interests (like climate change, pandemic preparedness, global economic stability, education). When basic levels of trust are established, dialogue and cooperation can be expanded step by step. None of these moves will result in a diminution of American power and standing in the world. Indeed, America’s prestige and standing could well rise as the rest of the world sees America pursuing reasonable policies that are serving both American and global interests. America will remain the most admired country in the world, if it pursues a wiser course with China.

最初，這種大國合作可以集中在雙方有共同長期利益的領域（如氣候變化、大流行病防備、全球經(jīng)濟穩(wěn)定、教育）。當雙方建立了基本的信任后，對話與合作就可以逐步擴大。這些舉措都不會削弱美國在世界上的實力和地位。事實上，當世界其他國家看到美國奉行合理的政策，為美國和全球利益服務時，美國的威望和地位很可能會上升。如果美國對中國采取更明智的做法，它仍將是世界上最受欽佩的國家。

This essay is published in cooperation with the Asian Peace Programme at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute.

本文是與新加坡國立大學亞洲研究院的亞洲和平項目合作發(fā)表。