1983年至2024年美國海軍和中國海軍水面作戰(zhàn)艦艇建造比較

tomrichards8464
likes: 21
What's with the 2023 and 2024 PLAN commissioning numbers? Is this underreporting due to lagging data, or a real massive drop in the rate of construction? If the latter, is that because the yards are producing something other than MSCs instead?

中國海軍2023和2024年服役的艦艇數(shù)量怎么這么少？是數(shù)據(jù)還沒更新，還是他們真的造得少了？要是造得少了，是不是船廠都在忙別的，沒怎么造大型水面艦艇了？

VictoryForCake
likes: 21
Its generally 3-5 years from keel laying to launch and fitting out, 2020 and 2021 were hard years in China for Covid, commissioning and fitting out a ship is different compared to the more people concentrated work doing building, easier to isolate a smaller group of people.
Even a few months of a delay can throw off timetables by quite a bit.
We know right now from satellite and aerial photography that China has laid down type 55, 52D, and 54A's, alongside a myriad of other ships.

從鋪設(shè)龍骨到下水舾裝通常需要3-5年。2020和2021年中國受疫情影響嚴(yán)重，舾裝和服役所需人員較少，受影響相對(duì)較小，但建造階段需要大量人員聚集，更容易受影響。
即使幾個(gè)月的延誤也會(huì)嚴(yán)重影響進(jìn)度。
我們通過衛(wèi)星和航拍照片得知，中國仍在建造055、052D、054A等大量艦艇。

PLArealtalk
likes: 18
It's more that there was a pause in new construction after the big run of 055, 052D and 054A production of the mid to late 2010s finished. From memory that lack of new orders became apparent before COVID.
My personal view is they were uating what kind of fleet composition they wanted going into the 2020s and beyond, based on new technologies and the likely future strategic environment, and it was only after that did we see a few new orders be placed for restart of some surface combatants classes, but even then it seems deliberately not at the pace they were going at in the mid to late 2010s.

更確切地說，是在2010年代中后期大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)055、052D和054A結(jié)束后，新艦建造出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)停頓期。我記得，新訂單的缺乏在疫情前就已顯現(xiàn)。
我個(gè)人認(rèn)為，他們當(dāng)時(shí)正在基于新技術(shù)和可能的未來戰(zhàn)略環(huán)境，評(píng)估他們希望在2020年代及以后擁有的艦隊(duì)構(gòu)成，此后我們才看到一些新訂單下達(dá)，以重啟某些水面作戰(zhàn)艦艇的生產(chǎn)。但即便如此，（新訂單的生產(chǎn)）速度似乎也明顯不如2010年代中后期。

chanman819
likes: 4
Also gives the recruiting and training pipeline time to catch up or get ready. I would be surprised if that huge surge in construction didn't run up against some crewing constraints

這樣做也能讓征兵和訓(xùn)練體系有時(shí)間趕上進(jìn)度或做好準(zhǔn)備。我認(rèn)為如此大規(guī)模的建造如果沒有遇到一些人員方面的制約，那才奇怪。

PLArealtalk
likes: 7
That is also a possible, albeit probably not primary, factor. I think the surge in construction was somewhat offset by retiring older ships with larger crews.
"What does modern warfare look like and what do we need" is probably the biggest factor, given the 2010s procurement basically helped to catapult the PLAN to generally fleet wide modernity competitive with most upper tier surface navies.
A shift to undersea procurement as more of a priority may also be a factor, that may only be confirmed with time.

人員問題也可能有點(diǎn)關(guān)系，但應(yīng)該不是主要的。我覺得造新船的同時(shí)也退役了一些老船，那些老船要的人多，所以人員壓力也還好。
“現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)要怎么打，我們需要什么”才是最重要的，畢竟2010年代那波造船潮已經(jīng)讓中國海軍變得很現(xiàn)代化，能跟強(qiáng)國海軍比了。
還有一種可能是他們現(xiàn)在更重視造潛艇之類的水下裝備了，這只能通過時(shí)間來證實(shí)。

chanman819
likes: 2
Well, you know how it is with different factors. Sometimes they all come together neatly and consultants get to use the word *synergy* a lot.
Are the crews of older PLAN ships that much larger? It looks like the crews of the retired Type 051 or 053 are large relative to their size and capabilities, but in terms of sailors, a Type 051 has pretty much the same number of crew as a Type 052C (Wikipedia figures).
The aircraft carriers are also going to hog up a bunch of crew. Using the QEs, Kuznetsov, Charles de Gaulle, and the Indian carriers as a reference, each one probably has 1500-2000 crew, or easily as much as a half-dozen large surface combatants.
It does make me wonder if *Fujian* might be closer to a US carrier in crew size.

嗯，各種因素嘛，有時(shí)候湊一塊兒挺巧的，搞得顧問們老喜歡說“協(xié)同效應(yīng)”。老軍艦的兵真的多那么多嗎？是，051和053看起來是挺擠的，但看人數(shù)，051跟052C差不多（維基百科說的）。
航母也吃人數(shù)啊，看看英國的、俄國的、法國的還有印度的航母，一艘就得一兩千人，頂?shù)蒙衔辶掖篁?qū)了。
我就在想，“福建”號(hào)會(huì)不會(huì)跟美國航母一樣，要那么多人？
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PLArealtalk
likes: 10
I certainly agree that with the sheer amount of ships they had retired, they certainly would have recruited more (and the increased part of the defense budget the PLAN have received would be contributing to that), however the amount of additional recruitment was probably a bit ameliorated due to the larger crews of older ships in the per tonnage sense; from the old subchasers to old destroyers.
In terms of the rate limiting step for current procurement, I think caution around new technologies and the strategic environment are the most significant reasons for the current more "moderate" surface ship build rate.
Or putting it another way, if the leadership assessed that they *needed* another 8x 055s and 25x 052Ds by the end of the decade, the funding for recruitment, procurement and sustainment would probably not be the limiting factor. But knowing what they need, and knowing whether buying X number of a given platform if something better/more long lasting is around the corner, is a more difficult question.

我同意他們退了不少船，肯定要多招人（海軍經(jīng)費(fèi)也多了），但老船噸位大，人也多，所以其實(shí)也沒補(bǔ)多少人。要我說現(xiàn)在造船沒那么快，主要還是因?yàn)樗麄儗?duì)新技術(shù)比較謹(jǐn)慎，也在考慮未來的戰(zhàn)略環(huán)境。換句話說，要是上面覺得到2030年非得再要8艘055和25艘052D，那肯定不差錢，招人也不是問題。但關(guān)鍵是他們得先搞清楚自己到底要什么，要是更好的東西馬上就出來了，現(xiàn)在買一堆現(xiàn)成的劃不劃算，這才是最難的。

beachedwhale1945
likes: 6
You also have to think about when these ships retire. Given a nominal 30 year service life, the PLAN will see the fleet size plummet from 2042-2050. That will require surging construction to counteract, then slowing it back down again.
To maintain a fleet size, you want a slow and steady construction pace, not a boom-and-bust cycle.

你還得想想這些船什么時(shí)候退役。按30年服役期算，中國海軍到2042-2050年那會(huì)兒，船要一下子少一大堆。到時(shí)候就得猛造船來補(bǔ)，補(bǔ)完了又得慢下來。要保持艦隊(duì)規(guī)模穩(wěn)定，最好是慢慢地、穩(wěn)穩(wěn)地造，別一會(huì)兒猛增一會(huì)兒又停下來。

chanman819
likes: 5
There are upsides and downsides. It's not like the PLAN has the same need to drip-feed orders to keep the yards alive like the US during the post-Cold War era.
Just because several ships all enter service at the same time doesn't mean they all have to retire at the same time. The ones in worst shape can be retired early and the rest of the batch tapered off as their replacements enter service.
And ships built in batches, like those 5 Type 052DLs in the same dry dock are going to have far more parts commonality than if they were built in a more serial fashion.
I just view it as less boom-and-bust and more batch production where batches can vary in size and interval depending on force and budgetary needs.

這樣做有好有壞。中國海軍跟冷戰(zhàn)后的美國不一樣，不用為了養(yǎng)活船廠零零星星地下單。
就算幾艘船一塊兒服役，也不代表它們就得一塊兒退役。狀態(tài)不好的可以先退，剩下的等新船來了再慢慢退。
而且像那五艘在同一個(gè)船塢造的052DL，批量生產(chǎn)的零件通用性肯定比一艘一艘地造要好。我覺得這與其說是大起大落，不如說是按需按預(yù)算分批生產(chǎn)，每批造多少、隔多久造一批，都是可以調(diào)整的。
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beachedwhale1945
likes: 3
>It's not like the PLAN has the same need to drip-feed orders to keep the yards alive like the US during the post-Cold War era.
They don’t have that problem NOW, but predicting the shipyard capacity in 25 years depends on a lot of factors, some completely out of China’s control. If, for example, other nations start producing more commercial ships than China (which over 25 years is not unreasonable), then some of those yards may start closing down without direct government contracts.
The world leader in any particular field rarely lasts more than a few decades, so be very careful about making any predictions on what industrial capacity anyone will have more than 15-20 years into the future.
>Just because several ships all enter service at the same time doesn't mean they all have to retire at the same time. The ones in worst shape can be retired early and the rest of the batch tapered off as their replacements enter service.
This is generally less flexible than you think, and entirely depends on the service life of the individual ships. You have to start planning for the retirements well ahead, running some ships harder than others. Given the decade of high production, China the little flexibility in each ship will start to compound, so by 2050 they will have mass retirements (i.e. much more than the replacement rate). They completed 27 destroyers in the five years from 2018-2022 (5.4 per year), far above the replacement rate of 2.1-3.0 rate I’d expect for their fleet size goal (72-90 DDGs, my estimate).
It’s going to be a challenge, not an insurmountable one, but a challenge.
>And ships built in batches, like those 5 Type 052DLs in the same dry dock are going to have far more parts commonality than if they were built in a more serial fashion.
Which has the downside of potentially perpetuating design flaws, especially when you are starting a massive expansion. Every navy I have ever studied had some significant issues with their first mass-production batches, some major and others minor. I have no doubt China has already compiled a list of such features on the 052Ds and 054As, which they will attempt to rectify on the next batches, but these may-or-may-not be correctable for existing ships.
Conservation of Misery is the most important law for any design engineer to learn.
>I just view it as less boom-and-bust and more batch production where batches can vary in size and interval depending on force and budgetary needs.
Batch production with a highly variable cadence is by definition is a boom-and-bust cycle. China knows this and will start to produce batches at a more even and sustainable pace going forward, with some incremental improvements within a batch and major ones between batches.

“中國海軍不像冷戰(zhàn)后的美國那樣，需要零星地下訂單來維持造船廠的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)?！?br /> 他們現(xiàn)在確實(shí)沒這個(gè)問題，但預(yù)測(cè)25年后的造船廠產(chǎn)能就得考慮很多因素了，有些還完全是中國控制不了的。比方說，要是有別的國家商船造得比中國多（25年時(shí)間不短，這事兒也不是不可能），那有些船廠沒政府訂單就得關(guān)門。任何領(lǐng)域的世界領(lǐng)先地位都很難保持幾十年，所以預(yù)測(cè)任何國家未來15-20年以上的工業(yè)產(chǎn)能都得非常謹(jǐn)慎。
“僅僅因?yàn)閹姿遗炌瑫r(shí)服役，并不意味著它們必須同時(shí)退役。狀況最差的可以提前退役，其余的則在其替代艦艇服役后逐步退役?！?br /> 這可沒你想的那么靈活，完全取決于每艘船的壽命。你得提前很久就開始規(guī)劃退役，讓有些船多跑幾年。考慮到中國過去十年造了那么多船，每艘船的靈活性都會(huì)累積起來，到2050年他們肯定會(huì)面臨大規(guī)模退役（遠(yuǎn)超正常換代的速度）。他們2018-2022五年就造了27艘驅(qū)逐艦（一年5.4艘），遠(yuǎn)超我估計(jì)的他們艦隊(duì)規(guī)模目標(biāo)（72-90艘驅(qū)逐艦）所需的2.1-3.0艘的換代速度。這會(huì)是個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)，雖然不是克服不了，但肯定是挑戰(zhàn)。
“成批建造的艦艇，比如在同一個(gè)船塢建造的5艘052DL，將比以更連續(xù)的方式建造的艦艇擁有更多的零部件通用性。”
但這也有個(gè)缺點(diǎn)，就是可能會(huì)讓設(shè)計(jì)缺陷一直存在，尤其是在大規(guī)模擴(kuò)張的初期。我研究過的所有海軍，第一批大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)的船都有些大大小小的問題。我毫不懷疑中國也已經(jīng)總結(jié)了052D和054A的不足之處，并且會(huì)在下一批次上改進(jìn)，但這些改進(jìn)可能沒法應(yīng)用到已經(jīng)造好的船上?！笆睾愕耐纯唷笔撬性O(shè)計(jì)工程師都必須牢記的。
“我覺得這與其說是大起大落，不如說是按需按預(yù)算分批生產(chǎn)”
批量生產(chǎn)要是忽多忽少，那其實(shí)就是一會(huì)兒猛增一會(huì)兒又停下來的“繁榮-蕭條”模式。中國也明白這個(gè)道理，所以以后造船會(huì)更穩(wěn)一些，速度不會(huì)像以前那樣大起大落，同一批船里小改小動(dòng)，換一批就大改。

chanman819
likes: 1
All fair enough.
>I have no doubt China has already compiled a list of such features on the 052Ds and 054As, which they will attempt to rectify on the next batches, but these may-or-may-not be correctable for existing ships.
I think we may have seen a hint of that in the gap in the middle of Type 052C production and what looked like one last batch of Type 054As tacked on at the end. At least, it would be consistent with delays or issues cropping up with the development of their replacement designs.
And who knows, if the Type 054Bs turn out to be unusually troubled, maybe we'll see more 054As as a stopgap.
>Conservation of Misery is the most important law for any design engineer to learn.
Gotta pick your poison. I've wondered if part of the issues with the Zumwalt and LCS (and now Constellations) have some of their roots in how long it had been since the US Navy had procured or designed new surface warship classes.
The Burkes aside, it only recently struck me that the US built as many Ticonderoga-class as all other post-WW2 CG/CGNs combined. (27 vs. 9x Leahy, 9x Belknap, 2x California, 4x Virginia, Truxtun, Bainbridge, Long Beach).
I'm sure it helped a lot with manufacturing efficiency and logistics, but I wonder if that also left procurement and design staff out of practice or out of a job. Which, I guess isn't unlike the situation of the Type 052D vs. the mix of preceding post-Cold War designs

說得有道理
“我毫不懷疑中國已經(jīng)編制了052D和054A的此類功能列表，他們將嘗試在下一批中糾正這些功能，但這些功能可能無法為現(xiàn)有艦艇糾正?！?br /> 我認(rèn)為我們可能已經(jīng)在052C型驅(qū)逐艦生產(chǎn)的中斷以及最后追加的一批054A型護(hù)衛(wèi)艦中看到了一些端倪。至少，這與他們的替代設(shè)計(jì)開發(fā)中出現(xiàn)的延誤或問題是一致的。誰知道呢，如果054B型護(hù)衛(wèi)艦的研發(fā)非常不順利，也許我們會(huì)看到更多的054A型作為權(quán)宜之計(jì)。
“守恒的痛苦”是任何設(shè)計(jì)工程師都必須學(xué)習(xí)的最重要的定律。
總得有所取舍。我一直在想，“朱姆沃爾特”級(jí)和瀕海戰(zhàn)斗艦（以及現(xiàn)在的“星座”級(jí)）的部分問題，是不是因?yàn)槊绹＼娞脹]采購或設(shè)計(jì)新的水面艦艇了?！安恕奔?jí)不算，我最近才發(fā)現(xiàn)美國造的“提康德羅加”級(jí)巡洋艦，居然比二戰(zhàn)后其他所有巡洋艦加起來都多（27艘對(duì)9艘“利?！奔?jí)、9艘“貝爾克納普”級(jí)、2艘“加利福尼亞”級(jí)、4艘“弗吉尼亞”級(jí)、“特拉克斯頓”號(hào)、“班布里奇”號(hào)、“長(zhǎng)灘”號(hào)）。這肯定提高了生產(chǎn)和后勤效率，但會(huì)不會(huì)也讓采購和設(shè)計(jì)人員生疏了，甚至丟了飯碗？我覺得這跟052D型驅(qū)逐艦和之前冷戰(zhàn)后各種設(shè)計(jì)的混雜情況有點(diǎn)像。

neocloud27
likes: 9
If you look at the building and commissioning of the 054A, 052D and 055s (the bulk of the ships built in the last few years), there does seem to be a pause/drop of about 18 months after the last batches started building and got commissioned in 2020/2022, they started mass building again at the end of 2022, maybe Covid?

如果你觀察 054A、052D 和 055 型艦艇（過去幾年建造的主力）的建造和服役情況，似乎在 2020/2022 年最后一批開始建造和服役后，有一個(gè)大約 18 個(gè)月的停頓/下降。他們于 2022 年底再次開始大規(guī)模建造，也許是新冠疫情的影響？
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QINTG
likes: 1
When building new models of warships at the beginning, the efficiency will be relatively low, but production efficiency will increase after becoming proficient.
054A==>054B 052d==>052DL 055==>055B

在開始建造新型軍艦時(shí)，效率相對(duì)較低，但在熟練之后，生產(chǎn)效率會(huì)提高。054A==>054B 052d==>052DL 055==>055B

Suspicious_Loads
likes: 6
China also produces ships in batches. 055 were produced 2014-2018 and then stopped. They are probably uating and making changes before next batch comes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_055_destroyer#Ships_of_class

中國也采用批量生產(chǎn)的方式建造軍艦。055 型驅(qū)逐艦在 2014 年至 2018 年間建造，然后停產(chǎn)。他們可能正在評(píng)估并進(jìn)行改進(jìn)，為下一批的建造做準(zhǔn)備。
[維基百科]
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Few-Variety2842
likes: 3
My guess is they are waiting for the newer gen ship designs to be finalized, such as IEP and energy weapons. The test result from the first Type 054B may open the floodgate again

我估計(jì)他們是在等新一代的船設(shè)計(jì)搞定，像什么全電推進(jìn)、能量武器之類的。等第一艘 054B 試完了，可能又要開始猛造了。

Necessary_Pass1670
likes: 3
I have an even simpler theory: five year plan budgets. The temporary pause in 2020 was simply because budgeted planned construction for the 2015-20 five year plan have been realised and funding for further construction only released from the next five year plan in 2021.

我有個(gè)更簡(jiǎn)單的想法：就是五年計(jì)劃的預(yù)算。2020年停了是因?yàn)?015-20這五年計(jì)劃的錢花完了，新的五年計(jì)劃要到2021年才開始撥錢。

CertifiedMeanie
likes: 11
I think one only has to look at specific projects to see major issues in the US Navy procurement.
The Zumwalts turned out to be complete and very expensive failures, that now need an extensive refit to be somewhat useful after they were designed around a ridiculous mission profile that belongs in the 1940s.
The LCS, both of them, turned out to be complete lemons, plagued by all sort of issues and are being abandoned as a whole.
The Constellation-Class looked to fix this issue, by taking a proven design from Italy. However it got so clusterfucked and fumbled that now it's running several years late.
On top of these huge fuck ups come additional smaller fuck ups, like delays with the Columbia SSBNs, DDG(X) not being in sight whatsoever, F/A-XX perhaps being in jeopardy depending on how closely it's tied to the USAFs NGAD effort, early teething issues with the Ford EMALS, shipyards not having the capacity or ability to deliver what's needed and in time.
People often will be optimistic and say that things will change and that now everything will start to get better. But the fact of the matter is that the USN is relying on a fleet of increasingly older ships, with replacements far into the future and at exorbitant prices. All of that compounded by recruitment issues and steel workers in the shipyards being treated like trash, on top of a limited amount of shipyards. Well, the picture that's being painted shows something very clearly: that the USN is in for a hard time.
The PLAN doesn't have infinite growth potential, but there is still a lot of growth left for them with their current set of available infrastructure.
Overall, the world will continue to spin, but it will be a major blow to the US and their interests when they have become the second best Navy in the Pacific. And countries like Korea and Japan are much more interested in defending their own waters rather than enforcing the sovereignty of other countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, you name it. That's something the US is mostly concerned about, so it's not something that can truly be picked up by regional allies.

我認(rèn)為人們只需要看看具體的項(xiàng)目，就能發(fā)現(xiàn)美國海軍采購方面的主要問題。 “朱姆沃爾特”級(jí)最終成為了徹底且極其昂貴的失敗品，它們的設(shè)計(jì)基于一個(gè)荒謬的、屬于20世紀(jì)40年代的任務(wù)設(shè)定，現(xiàn)在需要進(jìn)行大規(guī)模的改裝才能變得稍微有用一些。
瀕海戰(zhàn)斗艦，無論是哪一種型號(hào)，都成為了徹頭徹尾的次品，受到各種問題的困擾，并且正在被整體放棄。
“星座”級(jí)原本希望通過采用意大利的成熟設(shè)計(jì)來解決這些問題。然而，由于各種混亂和失誤，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)延誤了好幾年。
除了這些巨大的失誤之外，還有其他較小的失誤，例如“哥倫比亞”級(jí)彈道導(dǎo)彈核潛艇的延誤、DDG(X)驅(qū)逐艦項(xiàng)目仍然遙遙無期、F/A-XX戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)項(xiàng)目可能因?yàn)榕c美國空軍的“下一代空中優(yōu)勢(shì)”（NGAD）項(xiàng)目的關(guān)聯(lián)而面臨風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、“福特”級(jí)航母的電磁彈射系統(tǒng)（EMALS）早期存在各種問題、造船廠沒有足夠的產(chǎn)能或能力按時(shí)交付所需的艦艇。
人們常常會(huì)樂觀地認(rèn)為情況會(huì)改變，一切都會(huì)好起來。但事實(shí)是，美國海軍依賴的是一支日益老化的艦隊(duì)，其替代艦艇的交付遙遙無期，而且價(jià)格極其昂貴。所有這些都因征兵問題、造船廠的鋼鐵工人待遇惡劣以及造船廠數(shù)量有限而變得更加復(fù)雜。
總之，呈現(xiàn)出的畫面非常清晰地表明：美國海軍將面臨一段艱難時(shí)期。
中國海軍并非擁有無限的增長(zhǎng)潛力，但就其目前可用的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施而言，仍然有很大的增長(zhǎng)空間。
總而言之，世界將繼續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，但當(dāng)美國成為太平洋地區(qū)第二強(qiáng)大的海軍時(shí)，這對(duì)美國及其利益將是一個(gè)重大打擊。而且，像韓國和日本這樣的國家更關(guān)心保衛(wèi)自己的領(lǐng)海，而不是去維護(hù)其他國家比如像菲律賓、臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）等地的“主權(quán)”。

swagfarts12
likes: 6
The USN needs to start holding people criminally responsible for some of these procurement screw ups, it almost seems like they're doing it on purpose

美國海軍得開始抓一些人進(jìn)監(jiān)獄才行了，就這些采購上出的幺蛾子，簡(jiǎn)直就像他們故意搞的一樣。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://top-shui.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處

Hot-Train7201
likes: 1
>And countries like Korea and Japan are much more interested in defending their own waters rather than enforcing the sovereignty of other countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, you name it.
They're interested in defending their sea trade routes, which flow through those very waters owned by Philippines, Taiwan, etc. Defending their waters means nothing if all their trade is being interdicted by China's navy in the waters of the Philippines, Taiwan, etc.

“韓國和日本更關(guān)心的是守好自己家門口，而不是管菲律賓、臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）那些地方的主權(quán)?！?br /> 他們得保護(hù)海上貿(mào)易線啊，那些航線正好就經(jīng)過菲律賓、臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）那片海。要是他們的貿(mào)易都被中國海軍在那些地方給掐斷了，那光守著自己家門口有啥用？

yippee-kay-yay
likes: 6
I find this logic funny considering China is in the top two trading partners for all those countries. So why are they going to interdict their own cargo?.
Is like the Australian justification for SSN's. "We need them to protect our trade routes with our main partners(which include China) from China".

考慮到中國是這些國家最重要的貿(mào)易伙伴之一，這種認(rèn)為中國會(huì)攔截其貿(mào)易的邏輯就顯得十分荒謬。他們?yōu)槭裁匆獡p害自身的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，去攔截自己的貨物呢？這類似于澳大利亞為獲得核動(dòng)力潛艇所提出的理由：“我們需要核潛艇來保護(hù)我們與主要貿(mào)易伙伴（其中就包括中國）的貿(mào)易航線，以應(yīng)對(duì)來自中國的潛在威脅。”

ConstantStatistician
likes: 3
Ships are one thing, but arguably even more important is how many aircraft each side can bring to bear in the region. Aircraft are the primary weapon of modern naval combat via aircraft carriers, not warships themselves. The PLAN may lack carriers next to the USN, but mainland China itself is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, meaning the PLAN can rely on ground-based aircraft, while the USN can only bring a limited number of aircraft carriers to any given location at a time.

船是一回事，但更重要的是看誰能在那個(gè)地方擺出更多的飛機(jī)。現(xiàn)在打海戰(zhàn)主要靠航母上的飛機(jī)，不是光靠軍艦。中國海軍航母可能沒美國多，但中國大陸就是個(gè)“不沉的航母”，能用陸地上的飛機(jī)，美國海軍一次能派過去的航母數(shù)量有限。

YareSekiro
likes: 4
I think that's the same idea that US is using South Korea/Japan and to a lesser extent Taiwan as the "unsinkable carrier", but then it comes the question of US dragging SK/Japan into a conflict that they could stayed out of against a foe that is much closer to them than US.

我覺得美國也是這個(gè)意思，把韓國、日本，還有臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）（稍微差一點(diǎn)）當(dāng)成“不沉的航母”來用。但問題是，美國會(huì)不會(huì)把韓國日本拉進(jìn)一場(chǎng)他們本來可以不摻和的仗，而且他們的對(duì)手離他們可比離美國近多了。

Few-Variety2842
likes: 5
> US is using South Korea/Japan and to a lesser extent Taiwan as the "unsinkable carrier"
There is also the issue of feasibility. SKorea and Japan (except for one air base) are still quite far from Taiwan that mid air tankers are still necessary. And, stationing US air force on Taiwan could trigger the war.

“美國是把韓國、日本，還有臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）（稍微算上）當(dāng)‘不沉航母’用?！?br /> 但問題是，這事兒行不行得通。韓國和日本（除了一個(gè)空軍基地）離臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）還挺遠(yuǎn)的，飛機(jī)過去還得空中加油。而且，美國要是在臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)）駐軍，搞不好直接就打起來了。

dasCKD
likes: 2
South Korea, Taiwan, and honestly also Japan to a much smaller extent, are becoming increasingly untenable positions for the USM to really try to hold and fight out of in a big way. In the foreseeable future the US will have to lean much more heavily on CBGs and also US-based air sorties. Which is why I think that bungling the 6th gen over \\\\\\\\*costs\\\\\\\\* of all things was such a foolish idea

韓國、臺(tái)灣（地區(qū)），以及在較小程度上也包括日本，正變得越來越難以成為美國在發(fā)生大規(guī)模沖突時(shí)真正能夠堅(jiān)守和作戰(zhàn)的陣地。在可預(yù)見的未來，美國將不得不更多地依賴航母打擊群以及從美國本土起飛的空襲。這就是為什么我認(rèn)為因?yàn)槌杀締栴}而搞砸第六代戰(zhàn)機(jī)項(xiàng)目實(shí)在是太蠢了。

broncobuckaneer
likes: 1
>against a foe that is much closer to them than US.
Yeah, tough sell to fight a country that can launch ballistic missiles against your entire populace. The entirety of south Korea is within about 300 miles of China and Japan within about about 450 miles (if they launch over N Korea and Russia).

“對(duì)手離他們可比離美國近多了?！?br /> 是啊，要讓他們跟一個(gè)能用導(dǎo)彈打他們?nèi)珖膰掖蛘?，這可不好說服。整個(gè)韓國離中國就三百來英里，日本也就四百五（要是從朝鮮和俄羅斯那邊飛過來的話）。

edgygothteen69
likes: 3
We are so fucked

我們完蛋了

sgt102
likes: 4
USN launched nothing in 2013 & 2014 and one hull in 2015?
I'm surprised that they have a naval shipyard left...

美國海軍 2013 和 2014 年居然一艘船都沒下水，2015 年才一艘？
我真奇怪他們居然還有船廠活著……