QA：在中華帝國的整個歷史中，有沒有類似憲法的東西來規(guī)定皇帝的權(quán)力？換句話說，有皇帝不能違反的規(guī)則、習(xí)俗或法律嗎？
Was there in the Chinese Empire throughout its history something resembling a constitution that defined the powers of the emperor? In other words, were there rules, customs, or laws that the emperor could not transgress?
譯文簡介
網(wǎng)友：從來不是士大夫依賴皇權(quán)，而是皇權(quán)依賴士大夫。許多皇帝從小就沒有離開過紫禁城，只是被養(yǎng)在金籠子里的金絲雀。士大夫們作為皇帝的老師，從小就給皇帝洗腦。
正文翻譯
Was there in the Chinese Empire throughout its history something resembling a constitution that defined the powers of the emperor? In other words, were there rules, customs, or laws that the emperor could not transgress?
在中華帝國的整個歷史中，有沒有類似憲法的東西來規(guī)定皇帝的權(quán)力？換句話說，有皇帝不能違反的規(guī)則、習(xí)俗或法律嗎？
在中華帝國的整個歷史中，有沒有類似憲法的東西來規(guī)定皇帝的權(quán)力？換句話說，有皇帝不能違反的規(guī)則、習(xí)俗或法律嗎？
CaiLei
It has never been the scholar-officials who have been dependent on imperial power, but rather the imperial power that has been dependent on the scholar-officials.
Many emperors never left the Forbidden City since childhood, and were just canaries raised in a cage made of gold. The scholar-officials served as the emperor's teachers and brainwashed the emperor since childhood.
從來不是士大夫依賴皇權(quán)，而是皇權(quán)依賴士大夫。
許多皇帝從小就沒有離開過紫禁城，只是被養(yǎng)在金籠子里的金絲雀。士大夫們作為皇帝的老師，從小就給皇帝洗腦。
It has never been the scholar-officials who have been dependent on imperial power, but rather the imperial power that has been dependent on the scholar-officials.
Many emperors never left the Forbidden City since childhood, and were just canaries raised in a cage made of gold. The scholar-officials served as the emperor's teachers and brainwashed the emperor since childhood.
從來不是士大夫依賴皇權(quán)，而是皇權(quán)依賴士大夫。
許多皇帝從小就沒有離開過紫禁城，只是被養(yǎng)在金籠子里的金絲雀。士大夫們作為皇帝的老師，從小就給皇帝洗腦。
The emperor did not know everything and did not have the energy to manage everything. He had to rely on ministers to govern the empire.
If the ministers deceive their superiors and hide the truth from their subordinates, the emperor can actually be easily deceived.
Except for the founding emperor who can control the overall situation, subsequent emperors will be restricted by the scholar-official class. As long as the emperor shows a little weak character, the power will immediately fall into the hands of the ministers.
皇帝并非無所不知，也沒有精力管理一切。他必須依靠大臣來治理帝國。
如果大臣欺上瞞下，皇帝其實很容易被蒙蔽。
除了開國皇帝能夠掌控全局，后續(xù)的皇帝都會受到士大夫階層的限制。只要皇帝表現(xiàn)出一點軟弱的性格，權(quán)力就會立刻落入大臣手中。
There are also systems above the imperial power, including the ancestral system formed by the founding emperor and successive emperors.
According to the clear provisions of these systems, the emperor cannot ignore the system and do whatever he wants.
在皇權(quán)之上還有制度，包括開國皇帝和歷代皇帝形成的祖制。
根據(jù)這些制度的明確規(guī)定，皇帝不能無視制度為所欲為。
According to the clear provisions of these systems, the emperor cannot ignore the system and do whatever he wants.
在皇權(quán)之上還有制度，包括開國皇帝和歷代皇帝形成的祖制。
根據(jù)這些制度的明確規(guī)定，皇帝不能無視制度為所欲為。
So when the emperor and the ministers can abide by the system, the emperor is constrained by the ministers according to the system.
At this time, everyone obeys the system.
因此，當(dāng)皇帝和大臣都能遵守制度時，皇帝就會按照制度被大臣約束。
這時，所有人都服從制度。
At this time, everyone obeys the system.
因此，當(dāng)皇帝和大臣都能遵守制度時，皇帝就會按照制度被大臣約束。
這時，所有人都服從制度。
————
Feng Lu
In Chinese history, there were elements that bore some resemblance to a constitution in terms of defining imperial powers to a certain extent.
From an institutional perspective, traditional concepts and ancestral instructions played a role in constraining the emperor's power.
For example, in the Ming Dynasty, there was the "Ancestral Instructions of the Ming Dynasty." It stipulated many principles and norms regarding imperial affairs, and the emperor was not supposed to violate them easily.
In terms of administrative operations, the bureaucratic system also had its own rules.
For example, in the Three - Departments and Six - Ministries System, the Central Secretariat was responsible for decision - making, the Chancellery examined imperial edicts, and the Department of State Affairs executed administrative orders. If the emperor's edicts did not conform to established laws, ritual systems, or were strongly opposed by ministers, they might not be implemented smoothly.
From a ideological and cultural point of view, the Confucian concept of "benevolent governance" also restricted the emperor's power.
If the emperor's behavior was considered to have violated the principle of "benevolence," ministers could remonstrate based on Confucian classics.
For example, Emperor Taizong of Tang, Li Shimin, revised some of his decisions because of the remonstrance he received.
However, these constraints did not define the limits of power as clearly and systematically as a modern - day constitution.
Moreover, under the feudal autocratic system, the emperor generally had the highest and almost unrestricted power. In the later period of a dynasty or when there was an autocratic monarch, these constraints were often broken.
在中國歷史上，確實存在一些在某種程度上定義皇權(quán)的元素，這些元素與憲法有相似之處。
從制度角度來看，傳統(tǒng)觀念和祖訓(xùn)對皇帝的權(quán)力起到了一定的約束作用。
例如，在明朝，有明朝祖訓(xùn)。它規(guī)定了許多關(guān)于皇權(quán)的原則和規(guī)范，皇帝不應(yīng)輕易違反。
在行政運作方面，官僚體系也有自己的規(guī)則。
例如，在三省六部制中，中書省負責(zé)決策，門下省審查詔令，尚書省執(zhí)行行政命令。如果皇帝的詔令不符合既定法律、禮制，或遭到大臣的強烈反對，可能無法順利實施。
從思想和文化的角度來看，儒家的“仁政”理念也限制了皇帝的權(quán)力。
如果皇帝的行為被認為違反了“仁”的原則，大臣們可以根據(jù)儒家經(jīng)典進行諫言。
例如，唐太宗李世民因接受諫言而修改了一些決定。
然而，這些約束并沒有像現(xiàn)代憲法那樣清晰和系統(tǒng)地定義權(quán)力的界限。
此外，在封建專制制度下，皇帝通常擁有最高且?guī)缀醪皇芟拗频臋?quán)力。在王朝后期或出現(xiàn)專制君主時，這些約束往往會被打破。
Feng Lu
In Chinese history, there were elements that bore some resemblance to a constitution in terms of defining imperial powers to a certain extent.
From an institutional perspective, traditional concepts and ancestral instructions played a role in constraining the emperor's power.
For example, in the Ming Dynasty, there was the "Ancestral Instructions of the Ming Dynasty." It stipulated many principles and norms regarding imperial affairs, and the emperor was not supposed to violate them easily.
In terms of administrative operations, the bureaucratic system also had its own rules.
For example, in the Three - Departments and Six - Ministries System, the Central Secretariat was responsible for decision - making, the Chancellery examined imperial edicts, and the Department of State Affairs executed administrative orders. If the emperor's edicts did not conform to established laws, ritual systems, or were strongly opposed by ministers, they might not be implemented smoothly.
From a ideological and cultural point of view, the Confucian concept of "benevolent governance" also restricted the emperor's power.
If the emperor's behavior was considered to have violated the principle of "benevolence," ministers could remonstrate based on Confucian classics.
For example, Emperor Taizong of Tang, Li Shimin, revised some of his decisions because of the remonstrance he received.
However, these constraints did not define the limits of power as clearly and systematically as a modern - day constitution.
Moreover, under the feudal autocratic system, the emperor generally had the highest and almost unrestricted power. In the later period of a dynasty or when there was an autocratic monarch, these constraints were often broken.
在中國歷史上，確實存在一些在某種程度上定義皇權(quán)的元素，這些元素與憲法有相似之處。
從制度角度來看，傳統(tǒng)觀念和祖訓(xùn)對皇帝的權(quán)力起到了一定的約束作用。
例如，在明朝，有明朝祖訓(xùn)。它規(guī)定了許多關(guān)于皇權(quán)的原則和規(guī)范，皇帝不應(yīng)輕易違反。
在行政運作方面，官僚體系也有自己的規(guī)則。
例如，在三省六部制中，中書省負責(zé)決策，門下省審查詔令，尚書省執(zhí)行行政命令。如果皇帝的詔令不符合既定法律、禮制，或遭到大臣的強烈反對，可能無法順利實施。
從思想和文化的角度來看，儒家的“仁政”理念也限制了皇帝的權(quán)力。
如果皇帝的行為被認為違反了“仁”的原則，大臣們可以根據(jù)儒家經(jīng)典進行諫言。
例如，唐太宗李世民因接受諫言而修改了一些決定。
然而，這些約束并沒有像現(xiàn)代憲法那樣清晰和系統(tǒng)地定義權(quán)力的界限。
此外，在封建專制制度下，皇帝通常擁有最高且?guī)缀醪皇芟拗频臋?quán)力。在王朝后期或出現(xiàn)專制君主時，這些約束往往會被打破。
——————
Freddie Chen
There was never a constitution to define or say limit the power of emperor of ancient Chinese emperor.
If we use a term which western people are familiar, it would be “divine right of kings”. However, such divine right is not from any god of any religion. It is from “sky” or “Mandate of Heaven”.
Emperor named themselves “Son of the Mandate of Heaven” by which he/she gained the power to rule the country and people with the willingness of “Mandate of Heaven”.
However, “Mandate of Heaven” is kind of limitation of power of an ancient Chinese emperor, more from a moral perspection.
If we use a modern explanation to explain “Mandate of Heaven”, it is kind of Rousseau‘s Social Contract. Mandate of Heaven is a social contract between emperor and people. People acknowledge emperor’s supreme ruling power in return emperor should do good governance and fair distibution (relatively) to give them a living.
You need to realise that in ancient China, after Qin founded the first centralized dynasty of ancient China. The power is actually shared by emperor and gentry class (before Tang Dynasty)/scholar-gentry class (from Song Dynasty). There were several time, official deposed the emperor and propped up a new one from royal familiy since that the previous one could not do proper for emperor duty. And with such excuse, you would not be regarded as a rebillion but did practice the willingness of “Mandate of Heaven” since that the previous one lost “Mandate of Heaven” by his inappropriate behavior of being an emperor. XD
If we continued with modern explanation, that means the previous emepror failed to fullfill the contract and could not represent the interests of the gentry class. So does the famous “Dynasty Circle” theory. Actually, it is a economic problem that the behind ancient management technology cannot solve the problem of land annexation which created the problem of peasant uprising since that mass of farmer lost lands. You failed to fullfill the contract of doing a relatively fair distribution and could not represent the interests of mass of all Chinese. You lost the Mandate of Heaven.
在古代中國，從未有過憲法來定義或限制皇帝的權(quán)力。
如果我們用一個西方人熟悉的術(shù)語來形容，那就是“君權(quán)神授”。然而，這種神權(quán)并非來自任何宗教的神，而是來自“天”或“天命”。
皇帝自稱為“天子”，通過“天命”獲得統(tǒng)治國家和人民的權(quán)力。
然而，“天命”在某種程度上是對古代中國皇帝權(quán)力的限制，更多是從道德角度出發(fā)的。
如果我們用現(xiàn)代的解釋來說明“天命”，它類似于盧梭的“社會契約”。天命是皇帝與人民之間的社會契約。人民承認皇帝的至高統(tǒng)治權(quán)，而皇帝則應(yīng)進行良好的治理和相對公平的分配，以確保人民的生活。
你需要意識到，在古代中國，自秦朝建立第一個中央集權(quán)王朝后，權(quán)力實際上是由皇帝和士族階層（唐朝以前）/士大夫階層（宋朝以后）共享的。
歷史上曾多次出現(xiàn)官員廢黜皇帝并從皇室中另立新君的情況，原因是前任皇帝未能履行皇帝的職責(zé)。
以這樣的借口行事，你不會被視為叛亂，而是實踐了“天命”的意愿，因為前任皇帝因不當(dāng)行為失去了“天命”。
如果我們繼續(xù)用現(xiàn)代的解釋，這意味著前任皇帝未能履行契約，無法代表士族階層的利益。
著名的“王朝循環(huán)”理論也是如此。實際上，這是一個經(jīng)濟問題，古代管理技術(shù)無法解決土地兼并問題，導(dǎo)致大量農(nóng)民失去土地，從而引發(fā)農(nóng)民起義。
你未能履行相對公平分配的契約，也無法代表全體中國人民的利益。你失去了“天命”。
Freddie Chen
There was never a constitution to define or say limit the power of emperor of ancient Chinese emperor.
If we use a term which western people are familiar, it would be “divine right of kings”. However, such divine right is not from any god of any religion. It is from “sky” or “Mandate of Heaven”.
Emperor named themselves “Son of the Mandate of Heaven” by which he/she gained the power to rule the country and people with the willingness of “Mandate of Heaven”.
However, “Mandate of Heaven” is kind of limitation of power of an ancient Chinese emperor, more from a moral perspection.
If we use a modern explanation to explain “Mandate of Heaven”, it is kind of Rousseau‘s Social Contract. Mandate of Heaven is a social contract between emperor and people. People acknowledge emperor’s supreme ruling power in return emperor should do good governance and fair distibution (relatively) to give them a living.
You need to realise that in ancient China, after Qin founded the first centralized dynasty of ancient China. The power is actually shared by emperor and gentry class (before Tang Dynasty)/scholar-gentry class (from Song Dynasty). There were several time, official deposed the emperor and propped up a new one from royal familiy since that the previous one could not do proper for emperor duty. And with such excuse, you would not be regarded as a rebillion but did practice the willingness of “Mandate of Heaven” since that the previous one lost “Mandate of Heaven” by his inappropriate behavior of being an emperor. XD
If we continued with modern explanation, that means the previous emepror failed to fullfill the contract and could not represent the interests of the gentry class. So does the famous “Dynasty Circle” theory. Actually, it is a economic problem that the behind ancient management technology cannot solve the problem of land annexation which created the problem of peasant uprising since that mass of farmer lost lands. You failed to fullfill the contract of doing a relatively fair distribution and could not represent the interests of mass of all Chinese. You lost the Mandate of Heaven.
在古代中國，從未有過憲法來定義或限制皇帝的權(quán)力。
如果我們用一個西方人熟悉的術(shù)語來形容，那就是“君權(quán)神授”。然而，這種神權(quán)并非來自任何宗教的神，而是來自“天”或“天命”。
皇帝自稱為“天子”，通過“天命”獲得統(tǒng)治國家和人民的權(quán)力。
然而，“天命”在某種程度上是對古代中國皇帝權(quán)力的限制，更多是從道德角度出發(fā)的。
如果我們用現(xiàn)代的解釋來說明“天命”，它類似于盧梭的“社會契約”。天命是皇帝與人民之間的社會契約。人民承認皇帝的至高統(tǒng)治權(quán)，而皇帝則應(yīng)進行良好的治理和相對公平的分配，以確保人民的生活。
你需要意識到，在古代中國，自秦朝建立第一個中央集權(quán)王朝后，權(quán)力實際上是由皇帝和士族階層（唐朝以前）/士大夫階層（宋朝以后）共享的。
歷史上曾多次出現(xiàn)官員廢黜皇帝并從皇室中另立新君的情況，原因是前任皇帝未能履行皇帝的職責(zé)。
以這樣的借口行事，你不會被視為叛亂，而是實踐了“天命”的意愿，因為前任皇帝因不當(dāng)行為失去了“天命”。
如果我們繼續(xù)用現(xiàn)代的解釋，這意味著前任皇帝未能履行契約，無法代表士族階層的利益。
著名的“王朝循環(huán)”理論也是如此。實際上，這是一個經(jīng)濟問題，古代管理技術(shù)無法解決土地兼并問題，導(dǎo)致大量農(nóng)民失去土地，從而引發(fā)農(nóng)民起義。
你未能履行相對公平分配的契約，也無法代表全體中國人民的利益。你失去了“天命”。
——————
Thai Nguyen Gia
Technically speaking, there’s no concrete constitution or laws that a lowly person can point to that as basic rights to defend himself. Technically. Nothing like US constitution, French Constitution etc…
And if you want to find a set of laws and customs that define emperor’s power, also nothing.
Not because they dont have, but because they dont accept such things having power over such august personae like an Emperor. The emperors will strive for absolute power, and the court officials (and local factions) will strive to limit emperor’s power.
The emperors will strive for Qin Shi Huang’s limit, aka the ability to burn down books of all (opposing) scholars, define a single authority figure with a single set of measurement for the empire. They will totally ignore that Qin dynasty last only TWO generation and crashing down in total revolts.
The court officials will strive for Emperor sitting in the royal palace paying no attention to court works (which quite a few Emperors been treated that way). On paper, Song dynasty is the peak, with Emperor saying “I will rule aside with civil officials”, with civil officials being court officials representing local factions. There are other dynasties having that kind of state, but such motto saying straight out from Emperor’s lip can only come in Song.
There were a lot of articles in Confucianism books and Taoism scrolls define how emperors should act, but, again, as I said, Emperors really hate ancient people defining their’s actions that way. And other than those scrolls, court officials can also try to limit emperor’s power by precedents, by ancestors’ behaviours.
I dont get the intent of this question by the way. It’s not as if western emperors would pay any attention to such book, such laws, should they exist in the west. So what’s the point?
從技術(shù)上講，古代中國并沒有具體的憲法或法律，可以讓一個普通人作為基本權(quán)利來為自己辯護。技術(shù)上來說，沒有像美國憲法、法國憲法等類似的東西。
如果你想找到一套定義皇帝權(quán)力的法律和習(xí)俗，也沒有。
不是因為他們沒有，而是因為他們不接受這些東西對像皇帝這樣尊貴的人物具有約束力?；实蹅儠非蠼^對權(quán)力，而朝廷官員（和地方派系）則會努力限制皇帝的權(quán)力。
皇帝們會追求秦始皇的極限，即有能力燒毀所有（反對派）學(xué)者的書籍，定義一個單一的權(quán)威人物，并為帝國制定一套單一的度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。他們會完全忽視秦朝只持續(xù)了兩代就在全面起義中崩潰的事實。
朝廷官員則會努力讓皇帝坐在皇宮里，不關(guān)心朝政（不少皇帝就是這樣被對待的）。在理論上，宋朝是巔峰，皇帝說“我將與文官共治天下”，文官作為朝廷官員代表地方派系。其他朝代也有類似的情況，但皇帝親口說出這樣的口號，只有在宋朝才能見到。
儒家經(jīng)典和道教典籍中有許多文章定義了皇帝應(yīng)該如何行事，但正如我所說，皇帝們非常討厭古人以這種方式定義他們的行為。
除了這些典籍，朝廷官員還可以通過先例、祖先的行為來嘗試限制皇帝的權(quán)力。
順便說一句，我不太理解這個問題的意圖。即使西方存在這樣的書籍或法律，西方的皇帝們也不會在意。所以，這有什么意義呢？
Thai Nguyen Gia
Technically speaking, there’s no concrete constitution or laws that a lowly person can point to that as basic rights to defend himself. Technically. Nothing like US constitution, French Constitution etc…
And if you want to find a set of laws and customs that define emperor’s power, also nothing.
Not because they dont have, but because they dont accept such things having power over such august personae like an Emperor. The emperors will strive for absolute power, and the court officials (and local factions) will strive to limit emperor’s power.
The emperors will strive for Qin Shi Huang’s limit, aka the ability to burn down books of all (opposing) scholars, define a single authority figure with a single set of measurement for the empire. They will totally ignore that Qin dynasty last only TWO generation and crashing down in total revolts.
The court officials will strive for Emperor sitting in the royal palace paying no attention to court works (which quite a few Emperors been treated that way). On paper, Song dynasty is the peak, with Emperor saying “I will rule aside with civil officials”, with civil officials being court officials representing local factions. There are other dynasties having that kind of state, but such motto saying straight out from Emperor’s lip can only come in Song.
There were a lot of articles in Confucianism books and Taoism scrolls define how emperors should act, but, again, as I said, Emperors really hate ancient people defining their’s actions that way. And other than those scrolls, court officials can also try to limit emperor’s power by precedents, by ancestors’ behaviours.
I dont get the intent of this question by the way. It’s not as if western emperors would pay any attention to such book, such laws, should they exist in the west. So what’s the point?
從技術(shù)上講，古代中國并沒有具體的憲法或法律，可以讓一個普通人作為基本權(quán)利來為自己辯護。技術(shù)上來說，沒有像美國憲法、法國憲法等類似的東西。
如果你想找到一套定義皇帝權(quán)力的法律和習(xí)俗，也沒有。
不是因為他們沒有，而是因為他們不接受這些東西對像皇帝這樣尊貴的人物具有約束力?；实蹅儠非蠼^對權(quán)力，而朝廷官員（和地方派系）則會努力限制皇帝的權(quán)力。
皇帝們會追求秦始皇的極限，即有能力燒毀所有（反對派）學(xué)者的書籍，定義一個單一的權(quán)威人物，并為帝國制定一套單一的度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。他們會完全忽視秦朝只持續(xù)了兩代就在全面起義中崩潰的事實。
朝廷官員則會努力讓皇帝坐在皇宮里，不關(guān)心朝政（不少皇帝就是這樣被對待的）。在理論上，宋朝是巔峰，皇帝說“我將與文官共治天下”，文官作為朝廷官員代表地方派系。其他朝代也有類似的情況，但皇帝親口說出這樣的口號，只有在宋朝才能見到。
儒家經(jīng)典和道教典籍中有許多文章定義了皇帝應(yīng)該如何行事，但正如我所說，皇帝們非常討厭古人以這種方式定義他們的行為。
除了這些典籍，朝廷官員還可以通過先例、祖先的行為來嘗試限制皇帝的權(quán)力。
順便說一句，我不太理解這個問題的意圖。即使西方存在這樣的書籍或法律，西方的皇帝們也不會在意。所以，這有什么意義呢？
——————
Phantom Chuck
There were customs, as there always were in even the most tyrannical of ancient despotisms. If people think the heaven and ancestors are against the despot because he violated immemorial custom of the realm, the despot’s life would be more difficult no matter how despotic he was. also ancient despots were mostly superstitious themselves. So they were often constrained by some of the same superstitions that govern the outlooks of their subjects. So if an emperor killed his own mother, that would be very bad juju.
But there were no constitutions in Chinese history, ever. constitution would be a contract between the ruler and the governed. The ruler would not submit to being limited by the consent of the governed.
limited by the mandate of heaven, yes. limited by the mandate of the people? No.
在古代，即使是最專制的暴政下，也存在一些習(xí)俗。如果人們認為上天和祖宗都這個反對暴君，因為他違反了王國自古以來的習(xí)俗，那么無論暴君多么專制，這個暴君的處境都會變得更加困難。此外，古代的暴君大多自己也迷信。因此，他們常常受到與臣民相同的迷信觀念的約束。例如，如果一個皇帝殺了自己的母親，那將是非常不祥的征兆。
但在中國歷史上，從未有過憲法。憲法將是統(tǒng)治者與被統(tǒng)治者之間的契約。統(tǒng)治者不會接受被統(tǒng)治者的同意來限制自己的權(quán)力。
受“天命”的限制，是的。受“人民意志”的限制？不。
Phantom Chuck
There were customs, as there always were in even the most tyrannical of ancient despotisms. If people think the heaven and ancestors are against the despot because he violated immemorial custom of the realm, the despot’s life would be more difficult no matter how despotic he was. also ancient despots were mostly superstitious themselves. So they were often constrained by some of the same superstitions that govern the outlooks of their subjects. So if an emperor killed his own mother, that would be very bad juju.
But there were no constitutions in Chinese history, ever. constitution would be a contract between the ruler and the governed. The ruler would not submit to being limited by the consent of the governed.
limited by the mandate of heaven, yes. limited by the mandate of the people? No.
在古代，即使是最專制的暴政下，也存在一些習(xí)俗。如果人們認為上天和祖宗都這個反對暴君，因為他違反了王國自古以來的習(xí)俗，那么無論暴君多么專制，這個暴君的處境都會變得更加困難。此外，古代的暴君大多自己也迷信。因此，他們常常受到與臣民相同的迷信觀念的約束。例如，如果一個皇帝殺了自己的母親，那將是非常不祥的征兆。
但在中國歷史上，從未有過憲法。憲法將是統(tǒng)治者與被統(tǒng)治者之間的契約。統(tǒng)治者不會接受被統(tǒng)治者的同意來限制自己的權(quán)力。
受“天命”的限制，是的。受“人民意志”的限制？不。
Norman Guberman
When one has lost the people, one's reign is in supreme peril. Likewise, losing wealthy nobles, powerful land owners and the like. Absolute power leads to absolute ruin. Successor rulers were generally well educated to the job. They would have learned this. Once Confucianism prevailed over the land, even more so
當(dāng)一個人失去了人民的支持，他的統(tǒng)治就處于極度危險之中。同樣，富有的貴族、強大的地主等失去支持也是如此。絕對的權(quán)力會導(dǎo)致絕對的毀滅。繼任的統(tǒng)治者通常受過良好的教育，他們會學(xué)到這一點。一旦儒家思想在土地上盛行，這一點就更加明顯了。
When one has lost the people, one's reign is in supreme peril. Likewise, losing wealthy nobles, powerful land owners and the like. Absolute power leads to absolute ruin. Successor rulers were generally well educated to the job. They would have learned this. Once Confucianism prevailed over the land, even more so
當(dāng)一個人失去了人民的支持，他的統(tǒng)治就處于極度危險之中。同樣，富有的貴族、強大的地主等失去支持也是如此。絕對的權(quán)力會導(dǎo)致絕對的毀滅。繼任的統(tǒng)治者通常受過良好的教育，他們會學(xué)到這一點。一旦儒家思想在土地上盛行，這一點就更加明顯了。
——————
Bryan Quach
Absolute monarchy was the rule in ancient China unless the king or emperor made an edict to change anything. Otherwise, there's a rebellion or war to change dynastic rule. Any law that's written or approved by the emperor is definite unless you have a real legitimate reason and can change the mind of the king/emperor which wasn't very easy to do especially after Emperor Qin Shi Huang.
Ancient China was from 17th century BCE - 1911 CE between the Shang and Ching dynasties.
在古代中國，絕對君主制是常態(tài)，除非國王或皇帝頒布法令改變某些事情。否則，只有通過叛亂或戰(zhàn)爭才能改變王朝統(tǒng)治。任何由皇帝頒布或批準(zhǔn)的法律都是絕對的，除非你有真正合法的理由并能改變國王/皇帝的想法，而這在秦始皇之后尤其困難。
古代中國從公元前17世紀(jì)的商朝到1911年的清朝結(jié)束。
Bryan Quach
Absolute monarchy was the rule in ancient China unless the king or emperor made an edict to change anything. Otherwise, there's a rebellion or war to change dynastic rule. Any law that's written or approved by the emperor is definite unless you have a real legitimate reason and can change the mind of the king/emperor which wasn't very easy to do especially after Emperor Qin Shi Huang.
Ancient China was from 17th century BCE - 1911 CE between the Shang and Ching dynasties.
在古代中國，絕對君主制是常態(tài)，除非國王或皇帝頒布法令改變某些事情。否則，只有通過叛亂或戰(zhàn)爭才能改變王朝統(tǒng)治。任何由皇帝頒布或批準(zhǔn)的法律都是絕對的，除非你有真正合法的理由并能改變國王/皇帝的想法，而這在秦始皇之后尤其困難。
古代中國從公元前17世紀(jì)的商朝到1911年的清朝結(jié)束。
——————
Huang Yi
Technically, no.
Once an emperor could keep the power under control, and if he/she was shameless enough, nothing could hurt or limit the emperor.
That’s why we say that dictatorship is not a good system.
However, in a dynasty, keeping the power is not easy. The emperor had to make people follow him/her, or the emperor was just a person.
In Chinese dynasties, the emperor was always one of the most dangerous jobs, many emperors were murdered or became the puppet ruler. He had to follow many rules or customs, some of them were made by the culture, and some of them were made by their ancestors, especially who founded the dynasty.
從技術(shù)上講，沒有。
一旦皇帝能夠控制權(quán)力，并且如果他/她足夠無恥，沒有什么能傷害或限制皇帝。
這就是為什么我們說DC制度不是一個好的制度。
然而，在一個王朝中，保持權(quán)力并不容易?；实郾仨氉屓藗冏冯S他/她，否則皇帝就只是一個普通人。
在中國王朝中，皇帝一直是最危險的職業(yè)之一，許多皇帝被謀殺或成為傀儡統(tǒng)治者。他必須遵循許多規(guī)則或習(xí)俗，其中一些是由文化形成的，另一些則是由他們的祖先，尤其是開國皇帝制定的。
Huang Yi
Technically, no.
Once an emperor could keep the power under control, and if he/she was shameless enough, nothing could hurt or limit the emperor.
That’s why we say that dictatorship is not a good system.
However, in a dynasty, keeping the power is not easy. The emperor had to make people follow him/her, or the emperor was just a person.
In Chinese dynasties, the emperor was always one of the most dangerous jobs, many emperors were murdered or became the puppet ruler. He had to follow many rules or customs, some of them were made by the culture, and some of them were made by their ancestors, especially who founded the dynasty.
從技術(shù)上講，沒有。
一旦皇帝能夠控制權(quán)力，并且如果他/她足夠無恥，沒有什么能傷害或限制皇帝。
這就是為什么我們說DC制度不是一個好的制度。
然而，在一個王朝中，保持權(quán)力并不容易?；实郾仨氉屓藗冏冯S他/她，否則皇帝就只是一個普通人。
在中國王朝中，皇帝一直是最危險的職業(yè)之一，許多皇帝被謀殺或成為傀儡統(tǒng)治者。他必須遵循許多規(guī)則或習(xí)俗，其中一些是由文化形成的，另一些則是由他們的祖先，尤其是開國皇帝制定的。
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