No, the US can’t ‘switch off’ the UK’s nuclear weapons

不，美國(guó)無法“關(guān)閉”英國(guó)的核武器
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(A Vanguard class submarine.)

（一艘前衛(wèi)級(jí)潛艇。）
新聞：

On March 27th, The Conversation published an article by Dr. Becky Alexis-Martin of the University of Bradford, titled “The US has the power to switch off the UK’s nuclear subs – a big problem as Donald Trump becomes an unreliable partner.” The headline itself is bold—and deeply alarming.

3月27日，英國(guó)《對(duì)話》網(wǎng)站刊登了英國(guó)布拉德福德大學(xué)貝基·阿萊克斯-馬丁博士的一篇題為《美國(guó)有能力關(guān)閉英國(guó)的核潛艇——隨著特朗普成為一個(gè)不可靠的合作伙伴，這是個(gè)大問題》的文章。標(biāo)題本身是大膽的，并且令人深感擔(dān)憂。

It’s a headline designed to provoke concern—and it certainly does. But while the article touches on genuine long-term strategic questions, it also reinforces a dangerously misleading impression: that the United States holds real-time control over the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

這是一個(gè)旨在引起關(guān)注的標(biāo)題——它確實(shí)做到了。但是，盡管這篇文章觸及了真正的長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略問題，但它也強(qiáng)化了一種危險(xiǎn)的誤導(dǎo)性印象：美國(guó)對(duì)英國(guó)的核威懾力量擁有實(shí)時(shí)控制權(quán)。

It does not.

它沒有。
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This is not just a theoretical issue of wording. When a piece opens with the line, “The US can, if it chooses, effectively switch off the UK’s nuclear deterrent,” it leaves little ambiguity. This framing implies a direct, present-day capability that simply does not exist.

這不僅僅是一個(gè)措辭的理論問題。當(dāng)一篇文章以“如果美國(guó)愿意，它可以有效地關(guān)閉英國(guó)的核威懾力量”這句話開頭時(shí)，它幾乎沒有留下任何含糊之處。這種框架暗示了一種直接的、當(dāng)今的能力，而這種能力根本不存在。

Yes, the UK relies on American technology, logistics, and cooperation for the maintenance of its Trident missile system. But operational control? That remains exclusively with the UK. This is what defence officials and experts consistently refer to as operational independence.

是的，英國(guó)依靠美國(guó)的技術(shù)、后勤和合作來維護(hù)其三叉戟導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)。但是操作控制呢？只屬于英國(guó)。這就是國(guó)防官員和專家一貫所說的作戰(zhàn)獨(dú)立性。
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Once a Royal Navy Vanguard-class submarine carrying Trident missiles sails from Faslane, it is under British command alone. It is submerged, undetectable, and capable of launching its nuclear payload solely on the order of the UK Prime Minister. There is no American “kill switch,” no joint code, no foreign veto.

一旦一艘載有三叉戟導(dǎo)彈的皇家海軍前衛(wèi)級(jí)潛艇從法斯蘭起航，它就由英國(guó)單獨(dú)指揮。它在水下，無法被探測(cè)到，只有在英國(guó)首相的命令下才能發(fā)射其有效載荷。不存在美國(guó)的“死亡開關(guān)”，不存在聯(lián)合法規(guī)，不存在外國(guó)否決權(quán)。
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Even the article itself briefly acknowledges this reality: “The UK has some autonomy, as it is operationally independent and controls the decision to launch.” But that line is buried, and the broader narrative—from the headline down—undercuts it. Readers are left not with a nuanced understanding of allied cooperation and sovereign control, but with a sensational and incorrect impression of vulnerability to US political whims.

就連文章本身也簡(jiǎn)要地承認(rèn)了這一現(xiàn)實(shí)：“英國(guó)有一定的自主權(quán)，因?yàn)樗谶\(yùn)行上是獨(dú)立的，并控制著發(fā)射的決定?！钡@條線被掩蓋了，從標(biāo)題向下的更廣泛的敘述削弱了它。讀者沒有對(duì)盟國(guó)合作和主權(quán)控制有細(xì)致入微的理解，而是產(chǎn)生了一種聳人聽聞的錯(cuò)誤印象，即容易受到美國(guó)政治突發(fā)奇想的影響。

It’s important to separate structural reliance from operational dependence. The UK does lease Trident II D5 missiles from a shared US-UK pool and relies on US infrastructure for their maintenance. But these are long-term support arrangements, not immediate operational enablers. If US support were cut off tomorrow, the UK would retain the ability to launch for years, thanks to stockpiles, training, and independent systems.

將結(jié)構(gòu)依賴與操作依賴分開是很重要的。英國(guó)確實(shí)從美英共享的導(dǎo)彈庫中租用了三叉戟II D5導(dǎo)彈，并依賴美國(guó)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施進(jìn)行維護(hù)。但這些都是長(zhǎng)期的支持安排，而不是立即的行動(dòng)支持。如果明天美國(guó)的支持被切斷，英國(guó)將保留多年的發(fā)射能力，這要?dú)w功于庫存、訓(xùn)練和獨(dú)立的系統(tǒng)。

The system is built to endure. As former Defence Secretary Philip Hammond made clear: “There is no veto in the hands of the Americans. The UK deterrent is fully operationally independent.”

這一體系是為持久而建立的。正如前國(guó)防大臣菲利普·哈蒙德明確表示的那樣：“美國(guó)人手中沒有否決權(quán)。英國(guó)的威懾力量是完全獨(dú)立運(yùn)作的?！?/b>

Moreover, the UK’s warheads are designed and manufactured domestically, using UK scientific expertise. The crews are British. The command systems are British. The final decision rests solely with the Prime Minister.

此外，英國(guó)的彈頭是利用英國(guó)的科學(xué)專業(yè)知識(shí)在國(guó)內(nèi)設(shè)計(jì)和制造的。艇員是英國(guó)人。指揮系統(tǒng)是英國(guó)的。最后的決定完全取決于首相。

That doesn’t mean the UK is immune to strategic risk. Yes, dependence on the US for support over decades raises questions about resilience and future autonomy. And yes, the political reliability of any ally—including under a potentially transactional US administration—is a valid topic for debate.

這并不意味著英國(guó)不受戰(zhàn)略風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。是的，幾十年來對(duì)美國(guó)支持的依賴，引發(fā)了有關(guān)恢復(fù)力和未來自主權(quán)的問題。是的，任何盟友的政治可靠性——包括潛在的交易型美國(guó)政府——都是一個(gè)合理的辯論話題。

But those discussions should be rooted in accurate facts. Suggesting, or even implying, that the US has the power to unilaterally disable the UK deterrent is not only wrong—it’s misleading.

但這些討論應(yīng)該基于準(zhǔn)確的事實(shí)。暗示，甚至提議美國(guó)有能力單方面破壞英國(guó)的威懾力量不僅是錯(cuò)誤的，而且是在誤導(dǎo)。

If the intent of the article was to challenge the cost, logic, or morality of nuclear weapons, that is a legitimate position. But even in that debate, clarity matters. The UK chose to build a deterrent that is technically supported by allies but controlled only by its own government. Trident is not on loan; it is sovereign.

如果這篇文章的意圖是挑戰(zhàn)核武器的成本、邏輯或道德，那是一個(gè)合法的立場(chǎng)。但即使在這場(chǎng)辯論中，清晰也很重要。英國(guó)選擇建立一種技術(shù)上得到盟友支持、但僅由本國(guó)政府控制的威懾力量。三叉戟不是租借的；它是完全獨(dú)立的。

So no, the US cannot “switch off” the UK’s nuclear submarines. And we should be wary of any narrative that suggests otherwise—especially when public understanding of nuclear policy depends so heavily on how we frx it.

所以，不，美國(guó)無法“關(guān)閉”英國(guó)的核潛艇。我們應(yīng)該警惕任何暗示相反觀點(diǎn)的敘述——尤其是當(dāng)公眾對(duì)核政策的理解在很大程度上取決于我們?nèi)绾螛?gòu)建它的時(shí)候。

But as provocative as the claim sounds, it doesn’t reflect the operational reality of the UK’s nuclear posture. The UK’s deterrent remains under sovereign control—technologically supported by allies, yes, but not subject to foreign veto.

盡管這一說法聽起來具有挑釁性，但它并沒有反映出英國(guó)核態(tài)勢(shì)的實(shí)際情況。英國(guó)的核威懾仍處于主權(quán)控制之下——在技術(shù)上得到盟友的支持，沒錯(cuò)，但不受外國(guó)否決權(quán)的約束。

So when people ask whether Britain could fire its missiles without American permission, the answer is simple: yes, it can. And that’s the whole point.

因此，當(dāng)人們問英國(guó)是否可以在沒有美國(guó)許可的情況下發(fā)射導(dǎo)彈時(shí)，答案很簡(jiǎn)單：是的，可以。這就是重點(diǎn)所在。