This EU powerhouse is committing ‘economic suicide’ – who’s to blame

原標題：這個歐盟強國正在進行“經(jīng)濟自殺”——這該怪誰呢？

Germany’s growth is tanking deeper and deeper, and its economy minister alternates between sugar-coating and scapegoating

德國的經(jīng)濟增長下滑得越來越深，而其經(jīng)濟部長時而粉飾太平，時而找替罪羊。

Alexey Miller, the longstanding head of Russian energy giant Gazprom, is not known for rhetorical excess. That’s why his recent public statement at the St. Petersburg International Gas Forum should make Europeans, and especially Germans, prick up their ears.

長期擔任俄羅斯能源巨頭俄羅斯天然氣工業(yè)股份公司總裁的阿列克謝·米勒并不以夸夸其談著稱。這就是為什么他最近在圣彼得堡國際天然氣論壇上的公開聲明應該讓歐洲人，尤其是德國人豎起耳朵的原因。

Miller explained that the “artificial destruction of demand” on the EU gas market – that is, Western sanctions and a little US-UK-Ukrainian pipeline bombing “among friends” – has led to a continuing “deindustrialization” of Western Europe that will disrupt its economies “for at least a decade,” in the best-case scenario.

米勒解釋說，對歐盟天然氣市場的“人為的破壞需求”——即西方的制裁和美英烏“朋友之間”的管道小轟炸——已經(jīng)導致西歐持續(xù)的“去工業(yè)化”，在最好的情況下，這將擾亂其經(jīng)濟“至少十年”。

According to more pessimistic expert assessments, we are witnessing the “economic suicide of Europe,” Miller added, with its “l(fā)ocomotive” – a traditional byname for Germany – now the continent’s “sick man.” And that, Miller stressed, is a diagnosis “with which one can agree.”

根據(jù)更為悲觀的專家評估，我們正在目睹“歐洲經(jīng)濟自殺”，米勒補充說，德國的傳統(tǒng)綽號“火車頭”現(xiàn)在成了歐洲大陸的“病夫”。米勒強調，這是一種“人們可以同意的”診斷。

Context always matters. Due to Berlin’s absurd decision to enthusiastically join the US proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, the German-Russian relationship is at its lowest point since, literally, 1945. So, it may be tempting for Germans to dismiss Miller’s tough words as less than obxtive. But they would be wrong because he has facts on his side.

背景總是很重要的。由于柏林方面做出了荒唐的決定，熱情地加入了美國在烏克蘭針對俄羅斯的代理人戰(zhàn)爭，德俄關系正處于自1945年以來的最低點。因此，德國人可能很容易將米勒的強硬言辭視為不夠客觀。但他們可能錯了，因為他有事實依據(jù)。

Robert Habeck, Germany’s Green minister of the economy, has just had to lower his growth prognosis for 2024 as a whole. So much, in fact, that, instead of the minuscule increase of 0.3% – yes, you read that right: that’s what’s considered good news now in Germany, if it happens, which it does not – the country is looking at a minus of 0.2%. Germany’s economy is not merely stagnant, it is shrinking. When Berlin was still dreaming about that lavish 0.3% growth that is not actually happening, government representatives were speaking of a turning point. Well, there has been a turn alright, another one for the worse.

德國經(jīng)濟部長羅伯特·哈貝克剛剛不得不下調了他對2024年整體經(jīng)濟增長的預測。事實上，下調的如此之多，以至于德國的經(jīng)濟增長不是0.3%的微小增長——是的，你沒看錯：這在德國被認為是好消息，如果這種情況發(fā)生了，實際上并沒有——而是0.2%的負增長。德國經(jīng)濟不僅停滯不前，而且還在萎縮。當柏林還在夢想著0.3%的經(jīng)濟增長時，政府代表已經(jīng)在談論轉折點了。好吧，曾經(jīng)有一個轉折點，好的，另一個更糟。

What makes this much worse is that it is not an outlier event or a temporary phenomenon but the new, miserable German normal. Or, as German economists put it, their country is stuck in a “deep structural crisis.”

更糟糕的是，這不是一個異常事件，也不是一個暫時現(xiàn)象，而是德國悲慘的新常態(tài)?；蛘撸绲聡?jīng)濟學家所說，他們的國家陷入了“深度結構性危機”。

Even the staunchly NATO-philic and Russophobic Economist came to the same conclusions last summer already. Asking (rhetorically) if Germany was “the sick man of Europe,” the journal found that, since 2018, Berlin has been presiding over an economic “l(fā)aggard.”

就連堅定的親北約和恐俄派經(jīng)濟學家去年夏天也得出了同樣的結論。在詢問德國是否是“歐洲病夫”時，該雜志發(fā)現(xiàn)，自2018年以來，柏林一直是經(jīng)濟“落后者”的主導者。

Before that, Germany was doing quite well. After the mid-2000s, its economy had grown – cumulatively – by 24%, while Britain added 22% and France only 18%. But, as of last year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted German cumulative growth of only 8% for the period of 2019 to 2029, while it forecast 15% for the Netherlands and 17% for the US. And the way things are going, the IMF may well have been too optimistic.

在此之前，德國的表現(xiàn)相當不錯。2005年前后，其經(jīng)濟累計增長24%，而英國增長22%，法國僅增長18%。但是，截至去年，國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）預測，2019年至2029年，德國的累計增長率僅為8%，而荷蘭和美國的預測分別為15%和17%。從目前的形勢來看，國際貨幣基金組織可能過于樂觀了。

Germany’s deep economic crisis has many causes. They include an aging population; weak digitalization; a surfeit of bureaucracy (but then that has always been the case); corporate taxes that some consider too high (but then someone will always complain about taxes); the country’s failure to overcome the Covid shock more quickly; the massively deteriorating relationship with China, a key market for Germany in general and an indispensable factor in the making of the “good times” before 2018; Germany’s dependency on global supply chains and markets beyond China, which means it is hard hit by the current fracturing of the globalized economy; the insane decision to abandon nuclear energy and, lixed to that, the failure of a perfectly messed-up “green transition.”

德國嚴重的經(jīng)濟危機有很多原因。其中包括人口老齡化；虛弱的數(shù)字化;官僚主義泛濫（但情況總是如此）；有些人認為公司稅太高（但總有人會抱怨稅收）；該國未能更快地克服新冠疫情帶來的沖擊；與中國的關系大幅惡化，中國是德國的一個關鍵市場，也是創(chuàng)造2018年之前“美好時光”的不可或缺的因素；德國依賴全球供應鏈和中國以外的市場，這意味著它受到當前全球化經(jīng)濟破裂的沉重打擊；放棄核能的瘋狂決定，以及與之相關的完全混亂的“綠色轉型”的失敗。

Yet only the lazy assemble a grab-bag of causal factors and end their analysis with a simple “all of the above.” To do better requires, as a minimum, identifying the most crucial factors. There can be no doubt that two of them are geopolitical: the disruption of the relationship with China and the fact that energy is too expensive, that is more expensive than in many competitor economies. As German experts are acknowledging, this makes producing in Germany “persistently less attractive” than other locations. Put simply, it does not pay any longer to make stuff in Germany. And the reason for that economically lethal state of affairs is well known, even if German politicians and mainstream media won’t admit it: Berlin has cut its economy off from inexpensive Russian gas and oil. And we need to stress the word “inexpensive” because Germans do, of course, still use both. Only they buy them from intermediaries, so they are now expensive.

然而，只有懶惰者才會把各種原因拼湊在一起，并以一個簡單的“以上都有”來結束他們的分析。要做得更好，至少需要確定最關鍵的因素。毫無疑問，其中兩個是地緣政治因素：與中國關系的破裂，以及能源過于昂貴的事實，比許多競爭對手的經(jīng)濟體都貴。正如德國專家所承認的那樣，這使得在德國生產(chǎn)的吸引力“持續(xù)下降”。簡而言之，在德國制造產(chǎn)品不再劃算。盡管德國政客和主流媒體不愿承認，但造成這種經(jīng)濟致命狀況的原因是眾所周知的：柏林已經(jīng)切斷了對廉價俄羅斯天然氣和石油的依賴。我們需要強調“廉價”這個詞，因為德國人當然仍然使用這二者。只是他們從中間商那里購買，所以現(xiàn)在很貴。

None of this had to happen. As late as at the beginning of 2022, Berlin could have chosen to promote a reasonable compromise between Russia and the West, which was what was really at stake in the crisis over Ukraine. Back then, especially together with France, Germany could still have charted a course sufficiently independent of the hardliners in the US, with their warmongering camp followers in Eastern Europe and Britain. Berlin could have stopped the insane drive to all-out proxy war in the delusional pursuit of a “strategic defeat” for Russia. If Germany had done so, Ukraine would be much better off, and so would the whole of the EU and Germany as well.

這一切本不應該發(fā)生。直到2022年初，柏林還可以選擇推動俄羅斯和西方之間達成合理的妥協(xié)，這才是烏克蘭危機真正的關鍵所在。當時，尤其是與法國一起，德國仍可以制定一條完全獨立于美國強硬派（其在東歐和英國的好戰(zhàn)陣營追隨者）的路線。柏林本可以阻止瘋狂地發(fā)動全面代理戰(zhàn)爭，妄想給俄羅斯帶來“戰(zhàn)略上的失敗”。如果德國這么做了，烏克蘭會好得多，整個歐盟和德國也會好得多。

All that, however, is water under the bridge. The question now is whether things can be repaired again. There is no reason, unfortunately, for optimism, at least not before fundamental changes in German politics. Under the current government, in any case, it is certain that things will only get worse, because its members display zero interest in even understanding, far less in correcting their mistakes. Take, for instance, Robert Habecks’s very own press conference when he had to announce the fresh recession.

然而，所有這些都是過去式了?，F(xiàn)在的問題是情況能否再次修復。不幸的是，我們沒有理由樂觀，至少在德國政治發(fā)生根本變化之前是這樣。無論如何，在現(xiàn)任政府的領導下，事情肯定只會變得更糟，因為其成員甚至對理解都沒有興趣，更不用說糾正自己的錯誤了。以羅伯特·哈貝克在自己的新聞發(fā)布會上不得不宣布新一輪衰退為例。

Unsurprisingly, Habeck was less than forthright when presenting the disappointing data. He wrapped the cold, hard facts of general decline and his own failure in a little patriotic rhetoric, pontificating unctuously about Germany’s “strength” and “extraordinary structure.” Yet he only displayed his habit of cherry-picking his numbers and, in effect, tried to mislead his listeners on substance.

不出所料，哈貝克在展示這些令人失望的數(shù)據(jù)時并不直截了當。他用一點愛國主義的修辭，把普遍衰落和自己失敗的冷酷無情的事實包裹起來，虛情假意地吹噓德國的“實力”和“非凡的結構”。然而，他只是表現(xiàn)出了他喜歡挑選數(shù)字的習慣，實際上，他試圖在實質問題上誤導聽眾。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://top-shui.cn 轉載請注明出處


His claim, for instance, that Germany is “the third-largest national economy in the world” is so primitive that no minister of the economy should be caught making it. Yes, measured in absolute Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Germany holds that rank; for 2023, the UN even lists it in second place (with adjustment for purchasing power parity).

例如，他聲稱德國是“世界第三大經(jīng)濟體”，這個說法如此低級，以至于任何經(jīng)濟部長說這話都沒問題。是的，以絕對國內生產(chǎn)總值（GDP）衡量，德國占據(jù)那個排名；到2023年，聯(lián)合國甚至將其排在第二位（經(jīng)購買力平價調整后）。

But that is an essentially meaningless data point. Once you split all that big GDP up per capita, Germany is in eleventh place. Not a terribly useful figure but already more realistic than Habeck’s brute lump sum. Let’s put it like this: If you believe in using total GDP as your benchmark, then you probably also believe German World War I tanks were superior because they were bigger. In reality, they were unwieldy, badly engineered, mis-designed, top-heavy monsters prone to getting stuck in the mud.

但這是一個毫無意義的數(shù)據(jù)點。一旦把所有這些龐大的GDP拆分到人均，德國排在第11位。這不是一個非常有用的數(shù)字，但已經(jīng)比哈貝克的野蠻總和更現(xiàn)實。讓我們這么說吧：如果你相信用GDP總量作為基準，那么你可能也會認為德國一戰(zhàn)坦克更優(yōu)越，因為它們更大。在現(xiàn)實中，它們是笨重的、設計糟糕的、頭重腳輕的怪物，容易陷入泥潭。

Habeck did not do better with other aspects of the economy. Take his boast about how innovative Germany is, with a “research landscape hard to equal” and a “vibrant start-up scene.” Really? Interestingly, we do not find much reflection of that fantasy in the Global Innovation Index (GII), a key metric that has just been released for this year. With The Economist, for instance, reporting on it, Habeck’s staffers surely cannot have missed it. The GII shows no leading position for Germany. In Germany’s own high-income group, the top three are Switzerland, Sweden, and the US. In the also relevant upper-middle income section, we find China, Malaysia, and Türkiye. In a simple global ranking, including everyone regardless of income level, Berlin finds itself in ninth place, and inside Europe – sixth. Germany does not figure among the GII’s “l(fā)eaders in global innovation.” Given its resources, that is not a result to be proud of.

哈貝克在經(jīng)濟的其他方面也沒有做得更好。就拿他吹噓德國的創(chuàng)新能力為例，他說德國擁有“難以匹敵的研究環(huán)境”和“充滿活力的創(chuàng)業(yè)環(huán)境”。真的嗎? 有趣的是，我們在今年剛剛發(fā)布的關鍵指標全球創(chuàng)新指數(shù)（GII）中并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)這種幻想的多少反映。比如《經(jīng)濟學人》的報道，哈貝克的員工肯定不會錯過。全球創(chuàng)新指數(shù)顯示，德國并沒有處于領先地位。在德國自己的高收入群體中，排名前三的是瑞士、瑞典和美國。在同樣相關的中高收入部分，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中國、馬來西亞和泰國。在一個簡單的全球排名中，無論收入水平如何，柏林都排在第九位，在歐洲內部排名第六。德國不在全球創(chuàng)新指數(shù)的“全球創(chuàng)新領導者”之列。鑒于其資源，這不是一個值得驕傲的結果。

Like a lazy student trying to bluff his way through an exam, Habeck could not resist fibbing about wages and consumption either. Citing figures on recent, modest increases in salaries, he displayed economic illiteracy by surmising that consumer spending will “certainly” go up as well and boost the economy as a whole. But before wage earners start consuming – instead of saving – more, they must have confidence in the future.

就像一個懶惰的學生想要通過考試一樣，哈貝克也忍不住在工資和消費上撒些小謊。他引用最近工資適度增長的數(shù)據(jù)，推測消費支出“肯定”也會上升，并推動整體經(jīng)濟，這顯示出他對經(jīng)濟一無所知。但在工薪階層開始增加消費（而不是儲蓄）之前，他們必須對未來有信心。

Yet – lo and behold – that is precisely what many Germans do not have. According to a recent poll conducted by the prestigious accounting firm Ernst and Young (EY) and reported in Der Spiegel, more than a third of Germans (37%) now restrict themselves to buying only what is strictly necessary; large numbers are cutting down on luxuries (58%), home deliveries shopping (49%), gym memberships (43%), going to restaurants and cinemas (40%). Even streaming services – a comparatively inexpensive form of entertainment people do not give up easily – are on the chopping board for 34%. On the whole, only every fourth German (26%) believes they will be better off next year, three-quarters think their own financial situation will get worse or, at best, stay the same.

然而，你瞧，這正是許多德國人所不具備的。著名會計師事務所安永最近進行的一項民意調查顯示，超過三分之一的德國人（37%）現(xiàn)在只購買絕對必要的東西；很多人減少了奢侈品消費（58%）、送貨上門購物（49%）、健身房會員（43%）、去餐館和電影院（40%）。即使是流媒體服務——一種相對便宜的娛樂形式，人們不會輕易放棄——也有34%的人將其列入削減清單。總體而言，只有四分之一的德國人（26%）相信他們明年的生活會更好，四分之三的人認為他們自己的財務狀況會變得更糟，或者充其量保持不變。

This is the picture of an economically deeply depressed society. And for good reason. Habeck’s frequent cheap appeals to not fall victim to pessimism must strike many Germans as mockery. A man with the extremely comfortable salary and lifestyle of a German minister displays his egotism and his crass lack of empathy for the citizens he is supposed to work for and take care of.

這是一個經(jīng)濟極度蕭條的社會的寫照。這是有原因的。哈貝克頻繁地呼吁人們不要成為悲觀主義的犧牲品，這句廉價的話一定會讓許多德國人覺得是一種嘲弄。一個擁有極其舒適的薪水和德國部長般的生活方式的人，表現(xiàn)出他的自我中心，以及對他應該為之工作和照顧的公民缺乏同情心。

Indeed, it is even worse. Like many of the country's politicians, Habeck, one of the greatest and most obvious failures of German postwar politics, has developed a paranoid and/or bad-faith, neo-McCarthyite habit of blaming Russia and of accusing any domestic challenge of being in the service, intentionally or not, of Moscow. He demonstrated exactly this paranoia and bad faith again when very mildly and reasonably challenged by a mainstream German journalist about his over-optimistic depiction of Germany’s strengths.

事實上，情況甚至更糟。哈貝克是德國戰(zhàn)后政治中最大、最明顯的失敗者之一。和德國的許多政治家一樣，他養(yǎng)成了一種偏執(zhí)和/或不誠實的新麥卡錫主義習慣，指責俄羅斯，指責任何國內挑戰(zhàn)都是在有意無意地為莫斯科服務。當一位德國主流記者非常溫和而合理地質疑他對德國實力的過度樂觀描述時，他再次表現(xiàn)出了這種偏執(zhí)和惡意。

In response, he offered no substantial answer at all, but, instead, publicly disparaged the journalist for not taking enough care of the “intention” behind his question. Which, according to Habeck, somehow betrayed the signature style of dark forces trying to tear Germany down, that is, in other words, Russia, of course.

作為回應，他根本沒有給出實質性的答案，而是公開貶低這位記者沒有充分考慮其問題背后的“意圖”。根據(jù)哈貝克的說法，這在某種程度上暴露了試圖摧毀德國的黑暗勢力的標志性風格，換句話說，當然是俄羅斯。

The German minister of the economy presides over a crash site of failed plans. His reaction is to deny that reality, while, at the same time, blame it on what, under Stalinism, would have been called “wreckers” and “traitors” conspiring with outside enemies. Robert Habeck is not only a failure but also an extremely dangerous, perhaps deranged man, who still wants to be chancellor. For Germany’s sake – and I am writing this as a German – German voters must keep him out of that office. He has done enough damage already.

德國經(jīng)濟部長主持了一個失敗計劃的崩潰現(xiàn)場。他的反應是否認這一事實，與此同時，將其歸咎于在斯大林主義下會被稱為“破壞者”和“叛徒”與外部敵人密謀的人。羅伯特·哈貝克不僅是個失敗者，而且是一個極其危險的、或許是精神錯亂的人，他還想當上總理。為了德國——我是以德國人的身份寫這篇文章的——德國選民必須把他趕出這個職位。他造成的破壞已經(jīng)夠多了。

If he should ever read this text, he will surely blame it as well on the big bad Russians. But here’s a newsflash for you, Robert, between countrymen: It’s all on you, and only you. No country that has you in government even needs outside opponents to be in a mess.

如果他讀了這篇文章，他肯定也會把責任推到大壞蛋俄羅斯人身上。但是，羅伯特，作為同胞，我有一條快訊要告訴你：一切都取決于你，而且只取決于你。任何有你執(zhí)政的國家都不需要外部對手就會陷入混亂。